

G U R P S[®]

SPECIAL OPS

Counterterrorism, Hostage Rescue,
and Behind-the-Lines Action

SECOND EDITION



BY GREG ROSE

STEVE JACKSON GAMES

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ISBN 1-55634-366-3

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STEVE JACKSON GAMES

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
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ABOUT GURPS

Steve Jackson Games is committed to full support of the *GURPS* system. Our address is SJ Games, Box 18957, Austin, TX 78760. Please include a self-addressed, stamped envelope (SASE) any time you write us! Resources now available include:

Pyramid (www.sjgames.com/pyramid). Our online magazine includes new rules and articles for *GURPS*. It also covers the hobby's top games – *AD&D*, *Traveller*, *World of Darkness*, *Call of Cthulhu*, *Shadowrun* and many more – and other SJ Games releases like *In Nomine*, *INWO*, *Car Wars*, *Toon*, *Ogre Miniatures* and more. And *Pyramid* subscribers also have access to playtest files online, to see (and comment on) new books before they're released.

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
Page References

See *GURPS Compendium I*, p. 181, for a full list of abbreviations for *GURPS* titles. Any page reference that begins with a B refers to *GURPS Basic Set, Third Edition Revised*; e.g., p. B144 refers to page 144 of *Basic Set*. CI refers to *Compendium I*, CII to *Compendium II*, HT to *High-Tech, Third Edition* and VE to *Vehicles, Second Edition*.

TOP SECRET

INTSUM, GURPS SPECIAL OPS

As of: 230032ZAPR99



A camouflaged sniper lies in wait by a jungle trail . . . a team of black-clad Delta Force soldiers rappels through a skylight onto unsuspecting terrorists . . . a small squad of specialists monitors troop movements far behind enemy lines . . . heavily armed U.S. Navy SEALs prepare for a raid on a biological weapons facility – this is the world of *GURPS Special Ops*.

The fall of the Soviet Union has reduced the risk of World War III, but ethnic conflicts, global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continue to threaten world peace and stability. When neither diplomacy nor conventional military force can neutralize these threats, more and more nations are turning to the highly trained soldiers of special operations units for solutions. *Special Ops* describes these men and their training, tactics and equipment – everything you need to run a campaign that focuses on hostage rescues, dirty little wars and behind-the-scenes military conflict.

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Classified by: S-2, Steve Jackson Games
Downgrade to Secret: April 1, 2010
Declassify: April 1, 2020

Copy 2 of 2

TOP SECRET

WHAT ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS?



The term “special operations” conjures up images of daring hostage rescues, brave bands of unconventional warriors leading armies of guerrillas against an occupying foe, and furtive forays into

the nether world of espionage, deceit and danger. To be sure, there are elements of all of this in the world of special ops, but the reality is both more prosaic and infinitely richer than this popular image suggests.



COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

These missions usually require the ability to penetrate enemy lines in a variety of adverse conditions to rescue soldiers or civilians. At one time, U.S. special operations forces were often called upon to perform these types of activities, but current doctrine is to use them in this capacity only in support of special ops missions. Special ops troops may still be called on to perform CSAR in support of conventional forces on a case-by-case basis, however.

Counterdrug Activities

Counterdrug activities parallel many aspects of foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions. Many of the skills needed to detect and interdict drug production and trafficking are similar to those practiced by small military units, and special operations forces are sometimes used to train the law enforcement agents of high-risk countries to perform these tasks.

Demining Activities

Land mines are often used in warfare to deny an opposing force access to certain routes of travel. Unfortunately, they tend to remain long after the conflict has been resolved. Special operations soldiers can help reduce the danger posed by mines to civilians by training local personnel in mine identification and removal techniques.

Continued on next page . . .

We can probably get the best definition of special operations from those who order special ops units into action. In its 1998 *Special Operations Forces Posture Statement*, the U.S. Army defined special operations as "characterized by the use of small units in direct and indirect military actions focused on strategic and operational objectives. These actions require units with combinations of specialized personnel, equipment, training, and tactics that go beyond the routine capabilities of conventional military roles." The *Posture Statement* further lists five requirements that distinguish special operations from conventional military operations: unconventional training and equipment, political sensitivity, unorthodox approaches, limited opportunity and specialized intelligence.

The key notion is that special operations forces either support conventional operations by doing what conventional forces cannot easily do for themselves, or replace conventional forces where such forces are inappropriate.

In wartime, special operations forces would provide a necessary foundation for conventional success by gathering information for strategic planning and use in propaganda, conducting commando and guerrilla operations, and organizing behind-the-lines resistance. In peacetime, the nature of special operations would be determined by the need for capabilities beyond the reach of, or politically inappropriate for, conventional forces.

Special operations are *military* operations, involving troops specifically trained for unorthodox missions in which the degree of force, the difficulty of the mission or an intimate connection to national policy makes it necessary to rely on specialized units. It is not so much that special ops soldiers are "super-soldiers" as that they have received specialized training inappropriate for or too costly for conventional units. They may be "elite" troops in some sense – in particular, as a result of selection procedures – but what they do is not so much *better than* as *different from* what conventional units do well.

Perhaps the best way to explain "special operations" is to describe the distinct types of missions that special ops units perform. The *Posture Statement* lists nine principal mission areas: counter-proliferation, combating terrorism, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, psychological warfare, civil affairs, unconventional warfare and intelligence operations. In addition to these primary missions, it also lists "collateral activities" (see sidebar) considered appropriate for special ops units, including combat search and rescue, counterdrug activities, demining activities, peace operations, coalition support and a variety of "special activities" in support of national foreign policy.

Special Operations Missions

Counter-Proliferation

One of the primary concerns of leading world governments today is curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). WMD include not only nuclear arms, but also chemical and biological agents. This issue has become pressing since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since most of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons were situated outside Russia, on the boundaries of the union, they are now spread throughout the recently formed splinter republics. The U.S. government has paid particular attention to gathering and eliminating these weapons.

The use of nuclear weapons by former Soviet republics is a concern in today's climate of ethnic and political unrest, but the real worry is that they will be viewed as a lucrative commodity by these struggling nations: After all, there is no shortage of customers willing to pay large sums for such devices. A study conducted

in 1996 by a high-ranking member of the Russian Ministry of Defense revealed the additional risk of the *theft* of nuclear weapons during transport – particularly by former members of the military who have experience with such materials.

The threat doesn't end with nuclear weapons. Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union the largest chemical weapons arsenal in the world: an estimated 40,000 tons of chemical agents in the form of bombs, missile warheads and other delivery systems – some 32,000 tons of which are believed to be nerve agents. In 1995, the Russian Federal Security Service – responsible for investigating domestic espionage and political corruption – arrested the general in charge of the Russian chemical forces for selling nearly six tons of chemicals to Middle Eastern buyers. That same general received the Lenin Prize in 1991 for his work in the development of Soviet nerve agents.

Not all WMD proliferation concerns are linked to the fall of the Soviet Union. Iraqi scientists purchased anthrax for their country's biological warfare program through mail-order houses in the U.S.! Such biological weapons are relatively cheap, potentially just as effective as nuclear or chemical weapons, and *much* harder to regulate. The cost to effectively bombard one square kilometer with standard high-explosive munitions is about \$2,000. Nuclear weapons can accomplish the same for \$800, while chemical weapons are even more cost effective at \$600. Biological weaponry, however, can do the same job for \$1.

Given the danger to both civilian and military targets posed by WMD, the U.S. Department of Defense considers thwarting their spread to be one of the primary missions of its special operations forces today. Actions in support of this goal can include aspects of other primary missions as well, such as special reconnaissance, direct action, counterterrorism and even foreign internal defense.



COLLATERAL ACTIVITIES

(Continued)

Peace Operations

Due to their unique skills, many special operations units are well-suited to establishing and maintaining peace. This is one of the fundamental missions of a civil affairs unit, but other units, like the U.S. Army Special Forces, can employ their training just as effectively in a non-combat situation as they can under fire. Teaching ability and a working knowledge of the host nation language are a valuable combination when making vital initial contacts with a populace.

Coalition Support

Multinational peacekeeping forces are one of the United Nations' tools of choice when ending or averting violent conflict. Although these coalition forces show a political unity of effort, integrating the military units of several different nationalities into a single effective fighting unit can be a command and control nightmare. Many special operations forces are trained not only in foreign languages, but also in the tactics and equipment of other countries. This knowledge, combined with communication and teaching skills, can help consolidate a coalition force.

Special Activities in Support of Foreign Policy

These missions are clandestine and covert actions conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy. They are subject to executive and Congressional oversight in the U.S., but this rather broad category serves as a "catch-all" for a variety of activities.



WHAT ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS?

7

WHAT SPECIAL OPERATIONS SOLDIERS ARE NOT

They Are Not Spies

Espionage is a political function, not a military one. Special operations units may gather intelligence, but this is usually in support of military objectives rather than for external political or economic ends. The distinction between special ops intelligence-gathering and espionage is not always clear; e.g., certain Russian special ops units are directly subordinated to military intelligence, and Israeli *sayerot* are frequently seconded for service with Mossad (Israeli intelligence). In general, though, while special ops units are occasionally assigned to service with intelligence agencies, their orientation is primarily military.

They Are Not Police

Police SWAT teams frequently conduct operations which resemble counterterrorist missions by special operations units, but some important legal and practical distinctions exist.

First, in the United States, special ops units may not be used for civilian law enforcement; the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits any U.S. military unit from assuming this role except under conditions of martial law or foreign invasion. 1st SFO-Delta might be called upon to rescue hostages from a foreign embassy in Washington, or to recover a missile silo seized by terrorists, but in both cases they are operating on federal reservations (the District of Columbia and a military installation). They would not be called upon to rescue hostages in a bank in Detroit, even if the hostage takers were foreign nationals; by law, such missions are the job of the FBI, or state and local police agencies. The same is true for the special ops units of most Western nations.

Second, while the objective of a police SWAT team is to secure the safe release of hostages and arrest the perpetrators, this is not the case for special ops units. The safe release of hostages is certainly a common objective of both, but special ops units are not there to *arrest* terrorists – they are there to bring a swift and definite end to the situation by whatever means necessary. The *military* character of special ops missions and units makes them quite different even from similarly equipped police.

Making special operations troops into policemen is not merely cost-ineffective, but also exposes the soldiers to political constraints and criticisms that make the successful performance of the task for which they were trained highly unlikely. Witness the situation with British SAS troops in Northern Ireland, for instance.

Combating Terrorism

These missions aren't limited to counterterrorism. "Counterterrorism" denotes offensive measures taken to prevent, deter or respond to terrorism. Special operations forces are certainly capable of such actions; indeed, many governments have spent a lot of money to ensure that their special ops forces can perform effectively in this role. However, they can also undertake *antiterrorist* missions. "Antiterrorism" refers to defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts *before they occur*. Counterterrorism is a reactive strategy, while antiterrorism is an active one.

Antiterrorism and counterterrorism have grown in importance in the post-Cold War era. The threat of global conventional war no longer seems likely, but numerous terrorist groups have emerged in recent years. Since they aren't subject to the political restraints imposed on national governments by the world community, terrorist organizations are able to strike with relative impunity in pursuit of their goals.

Terrorists possess several other advantages over conventional forces. First, they are able to blend into the civilian population, making it difficult for government agencies to detect and neutralize them, while they can strike their targets with ease. Next, weblike organizational structures make them nearly immune to attacks on their command network. Finally, their actions attack the *psyche* of their target population: A single, successful terrorist attack exposes civilians to the perceived threat of violence "anytime, anywhere."

Even the *threat* of terrorism can have a staggering impact on a nation. The cost of protecting the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta against terrorist attack was estimated at nearly \$230 million. Some contemporary military theorists consider the terrorist to be an "advanced," if criminal, form of soldier. As a result, national governments have begun to respond by directing their own advanced soldiers – special operations forces – against them.

Foreign Internal Defense

Foreign internal defense missions are traditionally aimed at training, equipping and advising the troops of foreign nations to deal with internal subversion and guerrilla warfare. As the political commitment to foreign defense grows, though, special operations troops are undertaking special reconnaissance and direct action missions against guerrilla forces and installations, both independently and in conjunction with native troops. Similar missions are also conducted by special ops troops within their own borders or in colonial possessions. Counterterrorist missions sometimes evolve into foreign internal defense missions when the local law enforcement and military establishments cannot deal with a terrorist threat (as in Northern Ireland).

Special Reconnaissance

Special reconnaissance missions involve penetration deep into enemy-held territory for long periods of time to gather intelligence on enemy order of battle, installations, transportation, logistics, communications and operations, or to take prisoners for interrogation. Such reconnaissance is usually conducted by small units – five to 20 men – operating with great stealth at considerable distance from friendly forces, often without the possibility of friendly support if they are forced to engage the enemy. These missions require great resourcefulness, intimate familiarity with the terrain and local languages and customs, and steely nerves in

the face of great peril, as well as a healthy dose of luck. Of the 81 U.S. Special Forces soldiers reported missing in action in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, 56 were lost on strategic reconnaissance missions.

Direct Action

Direct action missions are short, raid-like operations to assault or seize key enemy installations or terrain, or to interdict enemy lines of communication. They may also involve the assassination or kidnapping of enemy leaders.

These missions differ from conventional operations in several ways. First, the intention generally is not to hold an objective indefinitely; e.g., a strike force may use its small size and mobility to seize an airfield and hold it until conventional forces can secure the area. Second, the aim is usually to inflict maximum damage in the shortest possible time, followed by a successful withdrawal. Third, mission objectives are often well in the enemy's rear, far removed from supporting conventional forces. Finally, the level of training and expertise required for such missions is rarely equalled by non-special ops soldiers.

Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare missions are designed to induce or reinforce attitudes favorable to the originating force in enemy forces or civilians – i.e. win them over. This is accomplished by conveying selected information to the target audience. Psychological operations (PSYOP) units use a variety of methods to accomplish their goals; pamphlets, goodwill missions and radio broadcasts are among the most common. Although PSYOP units are specially trained, with an emphasis on the language and culture of their target region, they are not usually considered elite troops.

Civil Affairs

Civil affairs (CA) missions are conducted to assist other commanders in establishing and maintaining relations between military forces and civilian authorities. Those undertaking such missions usually possess skills valuable to the civilian populace, from carpentry to government administration. While U.S. Army Special Forces detachments may perform CA missions in pursuit of their duties, the U.S. also possesses several reserve CA units. These have seen extensive duty in recent years in Haiti, Panama and Bosnia. CA specialists, like PSYOP specialists, often train to target a specific culture and region, but are not considered elite troops.

Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare missions involve organizing, training, equipping and leading indigenous resistance to occupying enemy forces. This is the difficult and dangerous job of units that are expected to allow enemy forces to bypass them so that they can spearhead resistance, or of small units inserted behind the lines. These units assist conventional military forces by tying down enemy forces, disrupting supply lines and communications, and providing vital intelligence on enemy order of battle, logistics and operations. The classic examples of unconventional warfare missions are the exploits of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), British Special Operations Executive (SOE), and Soviet partisans in occupied Europe and Asia during World War II.

SPECIAL OPS IN EARLY AMERICA: KING PHILIP'S WAR

The first recorded special operations unit on the North American continent was formed by the Massachusetts militia under Captain Benjamin Church during King Philip's War (1675-1676). Metacombet, chief of the Wampanoag Indians (also known as "King Philip"), led an abortive revolt against Massachusetts' selective enforcement of a treaty restricting Indian hunting and fishing rights. (It was the policy of the Massachusetts Bay Colony to force the Indians westward by whatever means necessary – including playing very fast and loose with treaty obligations.)

With twelve colonial villages destroyed and over 1,000 colonists killed, the colonists responded by forming long-range reconnaissance units to locate and ambush Indian war parties. Church's Rangers, as they were called, fulfilled this mission, eventually trapping and killing Metacombet with his last remaining warriors near what is today Bristol, Rhode Island.




SPECIAL OPS IN EARLY AMERICA: THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR

The premier colonial special operations unit was formed during the French and Indian War (1754-1763). The British commander required a special reconnaissance force in his campaign against the French in northern New England, but was having considerable difficulty recruiting such a force and finding a commanding officer. Robert Rogers, a young Massachusetts woodsman who had recently been charged with counterfeiting, agreed to recruit rangers if the charges were dropped.

He quickly became a company commander. A year later, he was entrusted with nine Ranger companies and promoted to major. Rogers' Rangers joined in British campaigns against Ticonderoga, Lake George and Crown Point.

The signal triumph of Rogers' Rangers, however, was their direct action raid against the Abenaki Indian stronghold at St. Francis, near Montréal. They traversed 400 miles of heavy woodland in just over six weeks, surprised the Indian encampment, killed over 200 warriors and their French advisors, and returned 400 miles overland to Crown Point. Only 93 men of Rogers' original force of 180 survived the operation; most of those lost died from disease, hunger and exposure.

Despite his success in war, Rogers was a desperate failure in civilian life. Unable to serve in the revolutionary forces because of his reputation as a drunkard and George Washington's deep distrust, Rogers briefly commanded two companies of Tory Loyalists, but was removed after unsuccessful and costly skirmishes near White Plains, New York. Rogers returned to England, where he died in 1795, an alcoholic who had been imprisoned for debt.



Unconventional warfare remains the mission of many special operations units, but it has rarely been carried out since the Korean War. Large-scale conventional warfare with easily identified areas of enemy occupation has been rare since the early 1950s. In Vietnam – with the exception of limited Special Forces operations with Hmong tribesmen in Laos and the Montagnards in the central highlands of Vietnam – the problem was less that of identifying areas of enemy occupation and organizing resistance than that of identifying the enemy from among the indigenous population.

During Desert Shield, there was an initial effort by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to conduct unconventional warfare operations in Kuwait. Concern that such activity would touch off the ground war before the Coalition forces were prepared prevented the operation from leaving the planning stage, however.



Intelligence Operations

These missions aim to gain the upper hand in intelligence, either by degrading the enemy's information-gathering abilities or by defending one's own. There is frequently a good deal of overlap between intelligence operations and other kinds of missions. For instance, direct action missions against enemy electronic warfare installations, as well as special reconnaissance missions, often have intelligence operations as a primary or secondary goal. These missions may also include diversionary actions to mislead enemy intelligence organizations.

Peacetime and Wartime: Changing Roles for Special Ops

Many of the missions discussed on pp. 6-10 are primarily wartime activities. Psychological warfare, direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance and even civil affairs are usually limited to the scope of armed conflict. As such, they are generally closely coordinated with conventional operations and serve to advance and support the objectives of those operations. Successful mili-

tary commanders recognize that close integration of conventional and special operations is essential to victory, and act accordingly.

In peacetime, the missions of special operations units are often more political than military. Political leaders who do not clearly understand the relationship between conventional and special operations tend to use special ops troops for what they believe will be quick, surgically precise solutions to complex, protracted political and economic problems.

Special operations forces are *not* designed to solve the world's problems, but the near-dismantling of U.S. Special Forces after the Vietnam War (until the Iranian hostage crisis brought the dearth of U.S. capability to the attention of policy-makers) suggests a pattern in which special ops troops are blamed for ill-considered political policy. Leaders confusing mission goals (which special ops units deliver with exquisite precision) with the ability to set the world right kill troops as surely as the enemy who pulls the trigger.

Historical Examples of Special Operations

The definitions of special operations tend to be a little dry. Perhaps the following historical examples can give some idea of the price in blood and lives of real special ops. Some of these were successes and some were failures, but none were easy.

Examples have not been provided for all types of missions. Counter-proliferation missions are so new that no historical examples exist – at least none that are unclassified. CA and PSYOP missions are increasingly the domain of specially trained units, and are seldom undertaken by special ops troops nowadays. And some special ops missions – while no doubt of vital importance to national policy – just don't make for interesting reading!

Combating Terrorism

These missions are most often a specialized form of direct action. Hostages are often involved, so they require a high degree of planning and coordination, great precision and a controlled level of violence to limit the possibility of friendly casualties.

The SAS and the Iranian Embassy

On May 1, 1980, six Iraqi-trained Arab terrorists seized the Iranian embassy in Princes Gate, London. They took 24 hostages – including Police Constable Trevor Lock, BBC correspondent Chris Cramer and sound engineer Slim Harris – and demanded the release of 91 alleged political prisoners in Iran.

Negotiations between the Metropolitan Police and the hostage takers continued for six days, but the terrorist nature of the incident resulted in the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) Team of the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment being alerted immediately. Britain's COBRA (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) Committee – consisting of the Home Secretary, the junior ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defense, and representatives of police, intelligence and counterintelligence services and the SAS – recommended to the prime minister that no action other than negotiation be taken unless hostages were in imminent danger of being killed. Prime Minister Thatcher concurred, and the CRW Team began planning an assault in light of that contingency.

SPECIAL OPS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Washington had little use for Major Rogers, but he valued special reconnaissance and rewarded Colonel Daniel Morgan and his regiment, Morgan's Rifles, by designating them the Continental Army's "Corps of Rangers." Morgan's Rifles played a crucial role – largely through reconnaissance and ambush – in the defeat and surrender of Major General John Burgoyne at Saratoga in 1777.

Another special operations unit, Knowlton's Rangers, was organized in 1776 to conduct deep penetrations behind British lines and capture prisoners for interrogation. Special ops missions were also carried out from 1775 to 1781 by Francis Marion – the "Swamp Fox" – whose Partisans tied down large numbers of British and Tory Loyalist troops in tidewater South Carolina with classic guerrilla tactics.

MANIFEST DESTINY: SPECIAL OPS AND THE INDIAN WARS

In the years before and after the Civil War, the chief mission of the U.S. Army was what amounted to foreign internal defense operations against the continent's aboriginal population. Much of the fighting was done by regular line units, but special operations forces and tactics played a key role in the conflict.

As early as 1812, Ranger companies were formed for Indian campaigns. In 1818, two companies of Rangers were formed from Tennessee and Georgia militia volunteers, and saw extensive action under Andrew Jackson in the Seminole War in Florida. The Ranger companies of the Mexican colony, and later the Republic of Texas, played a similar role against raiding Comanches, and formed the nucleus of what became the Texas Rangers after Texas statehood.

In 1868, Major George Forsyth was authorized to form units of Indian scouts – civilian frontiersmen and friendly Indians who were trained and equipped by the army to harass and interdict hostile Indian raiding parties. Forsyth's Scouts were badly bloodied at Arickaree Ford by over 1,000 Sioux, Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors, but the idea of recruiting and training friendly Indians to engage in guerrilla warfare against other Indian tribes remained a key strategy for U.S. counterinsurgency operations. By the 1880s, nearly half of all forces pitted against Indian forces were Indian scouts in the service of the U.S. Army.

THE GRAY GHOST: SPECIAL OPS IN THE CIVIL WAR

Both North and South mounted special reconnaissance and direct action operations during the Civil War, but the most famous and successful special ops unit was the Partisan Rangers, formed in February, 1863, under the command of Confederate Lieutenant John S. Mosby. Living off the land – and more often than not off supplies captured from Union forces – Mosby's Rangers quickly earned their commander the title "The Gray Ghost" for their daring forays behind Union lines, striking without warning, often at night, and exfiltrating without a trace. The best known of Mosby's raids was conducted on March 9, 1863, at Fairfax Court House, Virginia, where he and his 29 men captured Brigadier General Edwin Stoughton and 100 of his 5th New York Cavalry Regiment as they slept.

When the harried Union army sought to discourage Mosby's raids by declaring his men outlaws and executing them for banditry, Mosby responded by executing an equal number of Union prisoners. Captured Partisan Rangers were quickly accorded prisoner-of-war status by a chastened General Grant.

By the time of Lee's surrender, Mosby had been promoted to colonel and commanded eight Partisan Ranger companies, which he disbanded rather than surrender to Union forces. A distinguished attorney, Mosby became a close friend of President Grant after the war, serving as U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong (1878-1885) and Assistant U.S. Attorney General (1904-1910). Mosby died on May 30, 1916.



In the interim, three hostages were released, including the BBC correspondent; all were debriefed by the SAS. Late on the afternoon of May 6, an assistant press attaché, Abbas Lavasani, on the pretext of a visit to the rest room, seized one of the police radios with which the terrorists were communicating with authorities. The terrorist leader killed him immediately. As the situation worsened, the SAS moved into position. An hour later, shots were fired inside the embassy and Lavasani's body was dumped out the front door, giving the impression that a second hostage had been executed. The government immediately passed control of the operation to the SAS, and the assault began at 1920 hours.

As the assault began, 15 male hostages were located in Room 10, the embassy's telex room, on the third floor facing the street. They were guarded by three terrorists. Five female hostages had been separated from the men and were being held in Room 9, on the opposite side of the building, guarded by a single terrorist. Constable Lock and BBC sound engineer Harris were on the second-floor landing near the terrorist leader, who was speaking with authorities on the telephone.

Eight SAS soldiers crossed to the embassy roof from an adjoining building and prepared to rappel down two ropes at the back of the embassy. Another SAS team waited on an adjoining balcony with shaped charges, ready to blow the armor-plated windows on the second-floor balcony at the front of the embassy. As the first pair began their rappel, one of the soldiers smashed a window with his boot as he swung down. No longer able to wait for the assault signal – the blast of the charges taking out the front balcony windows – the first pair dropped immediately to the ground and began setting charges at the rear entrance, while the second pair smashed the window of the third-floor rear balcony with axes and hurled a stun grenade inside. A member of the third pair, however, found himself precariously caught above the rear entrance as his rappelling rope knotted.

Aware that the blast of their charges would likely kill their dangling comrade, the team at the rear entrance abandoned the explosives and began smashing the door and hurling stun grenades. Hearing the commotion, the terrorist leader, followed closely by Constable Lock, rushed to investigate. As the terrorist took aim at an SAS soldier breaching the window, Lock tackled him and a struggle ensued. Lock drew his revolver (which he had successfully concealed for six days of captivity). As the terrorist rolled to the side and pointed his pistol at Lock, the SAS man took him down with a burst of sub-machine-gun fire.

Meanwhile, the stun grenades had set the embassy's second-floor curtains ablaze and fire threatened to engulf the SAS man still dangling from the rappelling rope. His comrades on the roof noticed this and cut the line, depositing him not very gently on the ground. He stood up, secured his equipment, and dashed into the embassy, encountering a terrorist in the hallway. He instantly riddled the terrorist with bullets.

Within two minutes of the assault's beginning at the rear of the embassy, the team on the front balcony detonated their charges and the remainder of the SAS force poured into the embassy, hurling stun munitions and CS (tear/vomit) gas.

When the attack began, the terrorists in Room 10 started shooting hostages. Another assistant press attaché was killed and the chargé d'affaires was wounded. A third hostage escaped injury when a round fired at him hit a coin in his pocket.

As the SAS approached Room 10, the terrorists threw down their weapons, shouted "We surrender!" in Farsi and attempted to mingle with the hostages. When the SAS men entered the room, they immediately demanded, "Who are the terrorists?" One of the hostages identified them. At this point, a painful and controversial decision was made. Suspecting that the embassy had been wired with explosives, and experienced in booby-trap operations in Northern Ireland, the CRW Team was instructed to kill any terrorists who had not clearly surrendered before they could blow the building. Seeing no such indications of surrender, they shot the three terrorists as they sat against the wall.

Moments after the SAS crashed into Room 10, a second SAS team reached the female hostages in Room 9. The terrorist guard had discarded his weapon and huddled among the women. As the SAS dragged him from the room, the women begged the soldiers not to hurt him on account of his kindness to them (a classic "Stockholm Syndrome" reaction; see sidebar, p. 19). At the third-floor landing, they searched him for weapons and he resisted for a moment. An SAS NCO pitched him headfirst down the stairs, after which the terrorist exhibited an appropriate docility and was dragged from the building. The last terrorist, who had taken refuge in a room on the top floor, was shot dead as he attempted to fire on the SAS.

With the embassy afire from stun grenade explosions, the SAS searched the building and evacuated the hostages. The entire operation lasted 11 minutes. Five terrorists were killed, one was captured, one hostage was killed (another was killed before the assault), another was wounded, and no SAS casualties were taken.


Special Reconnaissance

Special reconnaissance is simultaneously one of the most difficult and most profitable uses of special operations troops. Small groups of highly trained soldiers can discover and transmit intelligence of great value – often drastically out of proportion to the effort expended.

Desert Storm: Special Ops in Scud Alley

On January 17, 1991, the aerial bombardment of Iraq began in preparation for the ground campaign. That night, Iraq launched eight Scud missiles against Israel. One of the primary concerns of the Coalition during Desert Storm was to avoid Israeli involvement in the war, the fear being that if the Israelis were involved, many Arab nations would feel obliged to support Iraq, or at least declare neutrality in the conflict. The Scud attacks were intended to goad Israel into attacking Iraq and thus dissolve much of the Coalition.

Moments after the missiles struck their targets, Israeli jets were in the air. Only a promise from President Bush to deploy both Patriot missile defense systems and troops to destroy the Iraqi missile launchers kept Israel out of the war. Satellite imaging was able to locate a launcher *after* a missile had been fired, but the crews were able to secure and move the launcher by the time air strikes could be vectored to that location. If special ops soldiers could locate the launchers before they fired, air strikes could catch the crews in the open and destroy the missiles. General Schwarzkopf, who had kept U.S. special ops troops out of Iraq due to concerns about touching off an early ground war, now had to order them deep into the Iraqi hinterlands to avoid losing valuable allies.



CISTERNA: THE DOWNFALL OF DARBY'S RANGERS

In May, 1942, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff directed his representative to the British Combined Operations Staff to form a U.S. Army commando unit to complement the British Commando Special Service Brigade. This unit became the 1st Ranger Battalion. Major William Darby, an artillery officer and West Point graduate who was serving as aide-de-camp to the commander of U.S. forces in Northern Ireland, was selected to organize the battalion.

Seven hundred Rangers were personally selected by Darby from over 2,000 volunteers. These Rangers then completed British commando training. They received their baptism of fire in the disastrous British and Canadian raid on Dieppe in August, 1942, and distinguished themselves in the North African campaign, receiving a Presidential Unit Citation for their actions at al-Guettar. They spearheaded the invasion of Sicily and captured over 4,000 prisoners in a single day in the drive on Palermo.

These successes were eventually marred by the decision of higher headquarters to use the lightly equipped Rangers – by then a regiment of four battalions – as conventional infantry. On January 29, 1944, the 1st and 3rd battalions were ordered to lead the assault on Cisterna, near the beachhead at Salerno. They were caught in a catastrophic ambush along a flooded irrigation ditch near the village. Darby, taking personal command of the 4th Battalion, sought to relieve his two forward battalions, but he was forced to withdraw after taking more than 50% casualties, including the deaths of all his company commanders. Of the 767 Rangers in the 1st and 3rd Battalions, only six returned to Allied lines.

GIGN AT DJIBOUTI

On the morning of February 3, 1976, a school bus carrying 30 children – dependents of French Air Force personnel – was hijacked in Djibouti by four terrorists from the Front for the Liberation of the Coast of Somalia (FLCS). The terrorists drove the bus to the Somali border, where they were joined by two accomplices.

Elements of the *2e Régiment Étranger de Parachutistes (2e REP)*, on duty in Djibouti, were alerted, as was the *Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN)*, based at Maisons-Alfort near Paris. Lt. Prouteau, the GIGN commander, and nine of his men were immediately flown to Djibouti.

After reconnoitering the area where the bus was parked – a flat, clear plain with no cover – Prouteau decided to position his men in the rocks along an embankment more than 200 yards from the bus. His plan was to use his men as snipers to simultaneously eliminate the terrorists with head shots. Each sniper was assigned a section of the bus and the terrorists were assigned numbers. Each sniper reported to Prouteau when he had acquired a terrorist target. Elements of the *2e REP* were on hand to provide site security and to deal with any overt Somali aid to the terrorists.

By mid-afternoon, the terrorists agreed to permit a meal to be served to the children. The food was laced with tranquilizers in the hope that the children would be sedated and slump down in their seats, permitting a better view of the interior. At 1547 hours – ten hours after they first moved into position – the GIGN snipers acquired their targets: Four terrorists inside the bus and one outside it were quickly eliminated. One sniper missed a shot on the sixth terrorist, also outside the bus.

As the firing began, Somali troops at the nearby border post opened fire on the GIGN snipers. The *2e REP* counterattacked, silencing the Somalis and killing their East German advisor. Meanwhile, the remaining terrorist boarded the bus. Seeing this, Prouteau and two of his men dashed to take the last terrorist out. Unfortunately, he had killed one hostage, a young girl. The remaining 29 hostages were unharmed.



The British SAS began deep reconnaissance and direct action in Iraq on January 20. Teams were infiltrated by helicopter to monitor launcher movements along main supply routes (MSRs) and to cut lines of communication where possible. Less than a week later, one of these teams was discovered by the Iraqis and disappeared. Foot patrols simply weren't mobile enough to accomplish the task of locating and destroying the launchers.

The U.S. sent a small Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) detachment, including a squadron of 1st SFOD-Delta (Delta Force) commandos, to assist with the operation. The SAS briefed the Delta troopers on the situation and strongly advised that the teams use vehicles in the Iraqi desert. The British and Americans then outlined areas of operation, marking likely routes of travel for the launchers: "Scud alleys."

The SAS covered the southern portion of Iraq, while Delta took the north-western border. The teams were to locate launchers and call in air strikes – or engage the targets themselves, if necessary. After Delta's first raid behind Iraqi lines on February 6, it presented General Schwarzkopf with a videotape of four Scud launchers being destroyed by one of the teams.

The teams continued operating until the conclusion of the ground war on February 27. Throughout that period, they played a constant game of cat-and-mouse with the heavily armed Iraqi patrols that were searching for them. On February 26 – one day before the Iraqi surrender – two USAF A-10 ground-attack aircraft working in support of the special ops teams discovered that one of the targets identified by the reconnaissance units was actually a large number of Scud launchers deployed in a field. The pilots attacked the site and were credited with destroying 20 launchers.

Intelligence reports had indicated that Iraq, hoping to disrupt the alliance, was planning a last-ditch Scud attack on Israel that night with as many as 26 missiles. It is unknown whether the A-10 pilots discovered the staging ground, but Iraq surrendered the next day and no such attack ever materialized.

In the years following Desert Storm, the effectiveness of the Scud hunters was questioned by several agencies. An Air Force study found no definite proof that any mobile Scuds had been destroyed, while UN weapons inspectors reported that even many of the fixed launch sites had actually survived the air strikes. Regardless, the teams did succeed in greatly curtailing the missile launches. Prior to their deployment, an average of more than five Scuds were launched each day; once the teams were active, that number dropped to one a day.

Direct Action

This is one of the most spectacular and potentially most valuable of special operations. It places great demands on intelligence, combat ability and coordination. The strike force can't have the level of support of a conventional force. The target has to be one they can handle, and handle quickly enough that they are not overwhelmed by enemy reaction.

The SAS at Pebble Island

When the British command finally decided, on May 9, 1982, that the first major landing in its Falklands campaign would take place in San Carlos Sound on the west coast of East Falkland Island, the possibility of devastating air attacks on the disembarking troops became a critical concern. The destroyer HMS *Sheffield* had been sunk by an Argentine aircraft attack only five days earlier. Argentine *Pucara* ground-attack aircraft, with a combat radius of over 900 miles, were reported on Pebble Island barely sixteen miles to the northwest. The elimination of these aircraft, a necessary condition for the landing's success, was left to the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment.

On the evening of May 11, an eight-man team from D Squadron, 22nd SAS was landed by Sea King helicopter, in storm conditions, on the coast of West Falkland Island across from Pebble Island. The team, equipped with canoes to cross the straits, intended to remain in concealment on West Falkland during the day on May 12 and then proceed by canoe to Pebble Island to conduct a reconnaissance. The storm that had imperiled their original landing became worse, however, and they were forced to remain until the evening of May 13. Paddling across the straits, they took up positions near the settlement and airstrip on Pebble Island, observing a garrison of over 100 Argentine troops and several *Pucara* aircraft. After transmitting their intelligence by radio, the team established a landing zone and awaited the strike force on the night of May 14.


Two Sea King helicopters from the aircraft carrier HMS *Hermes* delivered 45 men of D Squadron, 22nd SAS, under the command of Major Cedric Delves, as well as a naval fire-support team from the 148th Battery, 29th Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery. The original plan called for one troop of D Squadron to approach the settlement and contact the civilians there to organize guerrilla resistance. High winds and driving rain had delayed the rendezvous, however, so Major Delves decided to use this troop to block Argentine avenues of approach to gain time for his unit's extraction.

FOUL UP IN MALTA

Egyptian special operations units have an unenviable reputation for disaster in hostage rescue operations. After the ludicrous confrontation at Larnaca airport in Cyprus in March, 1978 (the Egyptian commander on site ordered an assault on a hijacked aircraft after negotiations had been successful in obtaining an agreement to free the hostages and the Egyptian assault force was gunned down by Cypriot National Guardsmen), the *Saiqa* unit involved was disbanded and replaced by Unit 777. Unit 777 appeared to have many of the problems which haunted its predecessor.

In September, 1985, EgyptAir Flight 648 was hijacked to Malta. Unit 777 was quickly dispatched to launch a rescue mission. The Egyptian force waited 11 hours on the ground for the go-order without attempting to gather any intelligence about the armament or whereabouts of the hijackers on the plane. Indeed, they failed completely to debrief any of the released hostages. When the assault was ordered, they conducted it in early evening – 2015 hours – when the hijackers were alert. As troops stood ready to blow the emergency hatches, a diversion was launched through the cargo doors. This was, however, botched and merely alerted the hijackers to the imminent assault.

Extra-heavy charges were used to blow the hatches, creating dense smoke in the plane. No stun munitions were used to disorient the hijackers, and the Egyptian commandos stormed aboard the plane with guns blazing. The assault took an excruciating 90 seconds and was topped by the performance of Unit 777 snipers, who shot hostages as they sought to escape the smoke-filled aircraft, mistaking them for hijackers. In all, 57 hostages were killed by the explosions, stray rounds, smoke inhalation and sniper fire.



DEATH ON THE ROCK

During the early part of 1988, British intelligence, monitoring the activity of two known members of the IRA in Spain, believed that an attack was being planned on the Governor's Palace on Gibraltar. The IRA had recently perfected a long-range remote-control device for detonating explosives, and the British feared a car bomb attack on the military installation on the Mediterranean island. When a third terrorist joined the pair in early March, it appeared the attack was imminent.

A team of 16 SAS soldiers was flown to Gibraltar to work with police on the island. The operation was code-named Flavius, and was under the command of the Gibraltar Police Commissioner. His orders were to arrest the terrorists and secure their weapons and any explosives. The SAS soldiers were deployed in four-man teams on eight-hour shifts, working in plain clothes and armed with 9mm automatic pistols.

On March 5, Gibraltar police reported to the operation command post that one of the terrorists was seen tampering with something inside a parked car. When the other two terrorists were also spotted moving away from the site, the operation was declared active. A demolition expert stated that the car likely contained a bomb, so the Police Commissioner turned the operation over to the SAS. The on-duty team immediately closed in on the terrorists and, minutes later, fired on them. When the smoke cleared, all three terrorists were dead and the SAS had suffered no injuries – in fact, the terrorists hadn't even fired back!

The operation was initially touted as a tremendous success in the media, but two startling facts were revealed the next day. First, none of the terrorists had been armed or even had a trigger device – the troopers had been compromised as they closed in on the three and mistook one of the terrorists' actions as a reach for a gun. Second, the car the police had identified did not contain any explosives. Worse still, a witness soon came forward and claimed to have seen at least two of the three terrorists put their hands in the air. The police did discover a car filled with Semtex explosive on the day after the shootings, but the event raised public ire.

Public outcry over the affair lasted for several months, and challenged the appropriateness of using military special ops forces for civilian law enforcement.



Within minutes of landing, the forward observers of 148th Battery were calling in rounds on the Argentine positions from Royal Navy frigates offshore. Facing no initial resistance, Delves dispatched a troop to mine the *Pucaras* and an enemy ammunition dump with timed demolition charges. Under the cover of their exploding charges, the SAS men withdrew toward their landing zone, only to be faced by rallying Argentine forces. In a brief but sharp clash, the SAS troops managed to break the attack by killing the Argentine commanding officer. With Argentine mortar fire falling around them, the strike force was extracted by Sea King helicopters in a Force 9 gale. They had destroyed 11 aircraft, including six *Pucaras*, as well as the entire store of aerial munitions on Pebble Island, and had inflicted more than forty casualties on the Argentine defenders – all with only two SAS troopers receiving light wounds.

Unconventional Warfare

Good examples of unconventional warfare missions are rare – a specific set of special circumstances is necessary to allow such operations. Only a few examples exist in this century, and without a doubt the best documented are those conducted by the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Europe during WWII.

Project JEDBURGH

This OSS operation was instrumental in preparing the way for the Allied liberation of Western Europe, and became the model for unconventional warfare which inspired the formation of the U.S. Special Forces. The *Official War Report of the Office of Strategic Services* describes the JEDBURGH mission and its successes:

Between June and September 1944, 276 JEDBURGHs were parachuted into France, Belgium and Holland. Of these, 83 were Americans, 90 British, and 103 French. They made up three-man teams consisting of two officers and one radio operator, wore Army uniforms and prepared no cover story. If captured, they were to give only name, rank and serial number, claiming prisoner of war treatment according to military law. JEDBURGH teams were supplementary to the SO circuits (covert intelligence and sabotage networks), and helped organize and arm part of the large number of recruits who joined the resistance movement in response to the Allied call to arms and to the impetus provided by D-Day. They did not assume command functions, since the French had their own leaders, but they suggested, helped to plan, and took part in sabotage of communications, destruction of fuel and ammunition dumps, attacks on enemy pockets cut off by the advance of the Allied armies and the procurement of intelligence. They subsequently provided liaison between American and British task forces and the Maquis, as various areas were overrun.

During June and July, eight American SO officers and six radio operators parachuted behind enemy lines as part of nine JEDBURGH teams. Most of these entered Brittany . . . Initially, each team established contact with the local resistance leader, began radio communications with SFHQ in London, and arranged to arm and equip the Maquis in its area of operations. The JEDBURGH teams in Brittany armed and organized more than 20,000 men. Under their direction, these men kept railroad tracks cut, derailed trains and destroyed engines, paralyzing all railway traffic throughout the peninsula. On the roads, they attacked German troop and supply movements from ambush. As a consequence of this Maquis activity, a major part of the German forces in Brittany was diverted to fighting resistance groups. Due to the mobility of the Maquis, their superior knowledge of the terrain and their extremely high morale, they were able to inflict losses many times heavier than they suffered themselves . . .

During August and September 1944, 69 additional American JEDBURGHs parachuted into France. They, too, concentrated on organizing attacks on railways, roads and bridges, and on cutting electric power, telephone and telegraph lines, thus hindering German commanders in moving troops, bringing up supplies and communicating with one another. JEDBURGH teams organized ambushes, attacks against German garrisons and convoys, and small-scale actions to mop up by-passed or isolated enemy units. They also deployed resistance forces to immobilize German troops trapped for lack of supplies or inability to open escape routes . . .

Counter-scorching was an important phase of JEDBURGH work . . . Upon the approach of Allied armies, they protected vital bridges and power plants.

JEDBURGH personnel were carefully screened and trained for their mission. The skills needed – weapons, demolition, field engineering, communications, intelligence analysis and medicine – are still those that make up the special ops training field.

Intelligence Operations

These missions are often the most unusual of all special operations activities, requiring not only unconventional training and skills, but also unconventional thinking.

COUNTERTERRORIST AND SPECIAL OPS UNITS

Most countries have developed some form of special operations force in recent years, be it an elite counterterrorist unit or a military unit. The following list of counterterrorist and other special operations units is by no means exhaustive, and is provided as a basis for further research when developing special ops scenarios. The letter in brackets after each unit's name indicates whether the unit is a police [P] or military [M] organization.

Argentina – *Brigada Falcon* [P], 601 and 602 Commando Companies [M].
Australia – Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) [M].
Austria – *Gendarmerieeinsatzkommando* (GEK) [P], *Jagdkommando* [M].
Bahrain – U-Group [P].
Belgium – *Escuadron Special d'Intervention* [P], 1st Special Reconnaissance Company [M].
Bosnia (Muslim) – Black Swans [M].
Brazil – 1st Special Forces Battalion [M].
Cambodia – "Battalion 911" [M].
Canada – Joint Task Force Two [M].
Chile – *Grupo de Operaciones Especiales* [P], *Unidad Anti-Terrorista* [P].
China – 6th and 8th Special Warfare Groups [M], 12th Special Warfare SF Detachment [M].
Colombia – *Fuerzas Especiales Anti-terroristas Urbanas* [M].
Denmark – *Aktions Gruppen* (AKS) [P], *Froemandskorpset* [M], *Jaegerkorpset* [M].
Egypt – Task Force 777 [M].
Finland – *Osasto Karhu* [P], Utti Light Infantry [M].
India – Special Counter-Terrorist Unit, Special Frontier Force [P].
Indonesia – *Satgas Gegana, National Police* [P], *Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus)* [M].
Iran – 23rd Special Forces Brigade [M].
Iraq – Special Forces Brigade ("Green Berets") [M].
Italy – *Gruppo di Intervento Speciale* [P], *Nucleo Operativo Centrale di Sicurezza* [P/M].
Jordan – 101st Special Forces Battalion [M].
Kenya – General Support Unit Recce Company [P].
Malaysia – Special Strike Unit [P].
Myanmar – Special Forces [M].
North Korea – Special Purpose Forces (Commando Brigades) [M].
Pakistan – Special Services Group [M].
Paraguay – Antiterrorist Unit [P].
Philippines – Anti-Terrorist Unit, Crisis Response Battalion [P], Alpha Two Zero (A-20) [M], First Scout Regiment [M], Special Forces Regiment [M].
Poland – 4101st Paratroop Battalion (LRRP) [M].
South Africa – SAPS Special Task Force [P], Recce Commandos [M].
South Korea – Korean National Police 868 Group [P], 707th Special Mission Battalion [M].
Spain – *Grupos Especiales de Operaciones* [P], *Unidad Especial de Intervencion* [P/M].
Sri Lanka – Army Commando Squadron [M].
Thailand – Royal Thai Navy SEALs [M].
Turkey – *Ozel Inithar Kommando Bolvya* [M].
Ukraine – *Berkut* Detachments [P].
Vietnam – "Dac Cong" (Special Forces) [M].

OVERT, COVERT AND CLANDESTINE: WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?

"Overt," "covert" and "clandestine" are technical terms when applied to special operations.

An *overt* operation is one in which no effort is made to conceal the operation or the identity of the country conducting it. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, conducted by U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, is an excellent example of an overt operation, as are hostage rescues and most other counterterrorist missions.

A *covert* operation is one in which an effort is made to conceal the identity of the country conducting the operation, but not the fact that the operation is taking place. Deniability – the ability to cast plausible doubt on the allegation of a country's involvement – is crucial to the success of covert operations. The use of "unilaterally controlled Latino assets" – the CIA's euphemism for Latin American mercenaries secretly hired by the U.S. – to attack Nicaraguan ports, oil tanks and communications centers, and to mine Nicaraguan harbors in 1983-84, is an example of a covert operation. This operation shared a problem common to most covert operations, however: deniability is a tenuous thing and not easily preserved. Most governments recognize this and generally tend not to conduct covert operations if they cannot accept the heat generated by their disclosure.

A *clandestine* operation is one in which an effort is made to conceal both the operation and the identity of the country conducting it. All special reconnaissance missions are, by their nature, clandestine. If the enemy becomes aware of the reconnaissance, he has an incentive to alter what was observed, invalidating the intelligence.



Mina Saud

By November 1990, it had become obvious that a ground war against Iraq was likely. The U.S. Marine Corps immediately began planning the kind of operation that justifies its existence – an amphibious invasion – and Navy SEAL teams were assigned to scout the Kuwaiti coastline for suitable locations for such an assault. Avoiding Iraqi mines and dodging gunfire not only from the shore but also from trigger-happy Coalition patrol vessels, the SEALs conducted 10 scouting missions. The intelligence they returned was discouraging: the coast was too heavily defended to make a large amphibious assault worthwhile.

The Marine Corps would see action in the war, just not in an amphibious attack. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) planned to use them to bolster Saudi divisions in an attack on southeastern Kuwait when the ground war commenced. There was no reason for the Iraqis to know this, however, and the Marine Corps' very presence in the Persian Gulf gave CENTCOM the tool they needed to deceive Iraqi intelligence. A group of SEALs, led by Lieutenant Tom Dietz and code-named Task Unit Mike, was given a daunting mission: Convince the Iraqi coastal defenders that the Marine Corps would stage a landing in order to divert the defenders' attention from the Coalition ground attack.

The press played an unwitting but vital role in this deception. As soon as the decision was made to divert Iraqi defenses, the military began to "leak" details of preparations for an amphibious assault. The media reported not only that such an assault was likely, but that the troops had been chosen and a landing site selected for a Marine Corps invasion of Kuwait. The stage had been set for the deception; all that remained was for the SEAL team to convince the defenders that a mere fifteen men were, in fact, a Marine Corps division.

The diversion was scheduled to begin at 1 a.m. on February 24, 1991, three hours before the actual ground war was to begin. Special warfare speedboats carried Task Unit Mike to within seven miles of the Kuwaiti coast. Under cover of darkness, the team took three Zodiac rubber rafts to within 500 yards of the shore. Each raft carried five SEALs, each with a specific task. Three SEALs would stay on each raft – a radio operator, a gunner for the raft's M60 machine gun and an engine repairman. The other two would swim the remaining 500 yards to the shore.

The swimmers carried over 40 pounds of equipment each, including 20 pounds of C-4 explosive, a pistol, a small SCUBA bottle with three minutes of air, a flashlight, an emergency strobe light and either an MP-5 submachine gun or an M16/M203 assault rifle. Using their rucksacks as flotation devices, the swimmers paddled their way to the edge of the beach, where they placed the explosives at the edge of the surf and set the timers to detonate at 1 a.m. – a little over two hours away. Unseen by the sentries on the beach, the SEALs made their way back to the Zodiacs, now resting 300 yards offshore. Two large, bright orange buoys were then placed in the water. In daylight, it would appear as though the buoys marked a clear approach channel to the beach – a sure sign that the area had been prepped for an amphibious landing.

Meanwhile, Dietz had two of the speedboats move in from seven miles out to just a few hundred yards offshore. Once the SEALs were aboard, the second part of the plan was initiated. At 12:30 a.m., the crews of the two boats began firing .50-caliber machine guns and Mk.19 grenade launchers at the beach. For five minutes, the vessels moved up and down the beach, raking the defenders with gunfire and dumping additional timed charges overboard. Once the SEALs were sure the soldiers on shore were awake and beginning to react, the two speedboats raced back to the rendezvous point. Less than half an hour later, 120 pounds of C-4 exploded, filling the air with sand and seawater. To the Iraqis on shore, it looked as though the beach had just been prepared for an amphibious assault.



The SEALs' diversion was more successful than its planners had hoped. Not only did the men of Task Unit Mike convince the shore defenders to remain in place when the actual ground attack began, but the Iraqis even pulled parts of two other divisions back to reinforce the beach against the nonexistent amphibious assault!

Combat Search and Rescue

Combat rescue is a demanding military task. The objective cannot simply be plastered with overwhelming fire, because the mission is to bring someone or something out intact.

STOCKHOLM SYNDROME

This is a peculiar psychological reaction sometimes manifested by hostages. The hostages begin to identify with their captors, sometimes to such an extent that they will forcibly resist rescue. More likely than forcible resistance are pleas that the rescuers do not injure the hostage takers, even though these may be resisting the rescue with deadly force. This phenomenon was first noted in hostages in a Swedish bank robbery, hence the name. There are about as many psychological explanations for Stockholm Syndrome as there are psychologists.

One theory is that the captors, because they so completely dominate the captives, come to represent lawful authority in the eyes of the hostages. The hostages become filled with guilt; subconsciously, they feel that they must have done something terrible or the authorities (the captors) would not be punishing them. In such circumstances, they begin to act as if obedience to the will of the captors is morally and ethically correct. In most Western societies, this attitude is reinforced because of the average person's lack of experience with armed violence. In his experience, only figures of legitimate authority — soldiers and police — have or use weapons; therefore, weapon-wielders must be the law.

A second explanation is that the trauma of captivity and threat so magnify any act of kindness that the act outweighs the knowledge that it is the captors who have put the captives at risk in the first place. The hostages become so grateful for simply not having been tortured, raped or killed that they warm to these negative benefactions as if they had been positive acts. Any genuine minor gesture, such as a drink of water or a chance to use the bathroom, becomes a great humane action, deserving of reward.

In any hostage situation, rescuers may be faced with hostages who have emotionally joined the hostage-takers. Both PCs and NPCs can show signs of Stockholm Syndrome. Anyone without the Strong Will advantage must roll against Will once per day of captivity. Those with the Weak Will disadvantage must roll every *hour*. On a failure, the captive will begin to favor the captors; on a critical failure, he will actively join in (resist rescue by force, give away escape or resistance plans — even help to guard the other captives).

SWAT

"SWAT" is an acronym for Special Weapons and Tactics. With the massive civil unrest of the 1960s and 1970s, most American police departments realized they were not equipped, trained or psychologically prepared for high-intensity combat operations. These included large-scale confrontations, from protest marches to riots; violent contained situations, such as sniper incidents, hostage incidents and armed stand-offs, and the possibility of actual armed insurrection.


Every large police department (and most smaller ones) organized a special force to cope with such situations. SWAT is the most common name for such teams, but they are also called Emergency Action Teams, Special Duty Teams and other names. Some departments feel that the name SWAT has too many connotations of force; simply announcing that the SWAT team has been called can increase the likelihood that the situation will become violent.

SWAT teams are usually composed of officers who volunteer for extra duty and training. Few departments have enough manpower to assign anyone to SWAT duty full time; if they do, it will probably be only a training officer or perhaps a commander. A call for the SWAT team usually means a delay while officers are called from their other duties to draw equipment and deploy to the scene.

Once on the scene, the purpose of SWAT is to prevent trouble, not to cause more. They want to contain violent situations in a limited area, lower the amount of violence, prevent death or injury to anyone (including the perpetrators) and resolve the situation as quietly as possible. Given a choice, they will always talk rather than shoot.

One of their problems is that they must exist amidst a firestorm of publicity. SWAT operations are news, and the TV cameras are often the first heavy equipment on the scene. Almost anything that is done will be recorded and then endlessly second-guessed by everyone who has a better solution after the event.

Another problem is that they are usually surrounded by civilians and civilian property which must not be damaged by the police. This strongly restricts their tactics. The usual rule is that the police cannot use deadly force except to protect life and property. In a stand-off or sniper situation, they will only fire if fire from the target endangers life. In a hostage situation, they will only attack if hostages are being killed. Apprehending the perpetrators is secondary to preserving life and property.



Operation ACID GAMBIT

In April, 1989, members of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) arrested an American, Kurt Muse. Muse had been running a secret CIA-sponsored radio station and had been broadcasting anti-Noriega propaganda. He was taken to the Cárcel Modelo prison in Panama City, where his PDF guards were ordered to shoot him if a rescue was attempted. Prior to the invasion of Panama, members of 1st SFOD-Delta (Delta Force), were assigned to rescue Muse during the first moments of the invasion – before his captors had time to execute their orders.

A sniper team was hidden in a patch of heavy vegetation near the prison before the invasion began. On December 19, 1989, at about 12:45 a.m., the snipers took out the guards at the front of the prison, clearing the way for a team of Delta commandos approaching in an armored personnel carrier. Simultaneously, an MH-6 Little Bird helicopter landed on the prison roof and four more Delta operatives leapt out. The rooftop team was equipped for night fighting, with laser-sighted MP-5 submachine guns and night-vision goggles. They blew open a metal door with C-4 explosive and rushed down to the second floor, where Muse was being held.

Muse heard the explosion on the roof; moments later, he heard the sound of gunfire. Aware that something was going on, he got dressed and took cover on the floor. Gunfire echoed through the prison for a couple of minutes, then a voice warned Muse that his cell door was about to be blown open. Moments later, a Delta soldier rushed through the ruins of the door, put a Kevlar vest and helmet on Muse, and led him to the roof.

On the way out, Muse saw at least five dead PDF soldiers – including the one who had been ordered to kill him, outside his cell door. Delta's attack had been so swift that the guard did not have time to carry out the execution. Muse was surprised to note, considering the speed of the commandos' attack, that the Delta team had only killed the soldiers who had resisted them; in the stairway to the roof, he saw a cowering PDF trooper handcuffed to the railing.

The commandos ushered Muse into the MH-6 and the helicopter was quickly airborne. Unfortunately, not all of the defenders had been subdued; a rifle shot from the prison struck a vital part of the helicopter. The MH-6 was forced to the ground, but the pilot literally drove it down the street and into a nearby parking lot to attempt another take-off. Once again, gunfire forced the chopper down. This time, the men on the external bench were injured in the crash. Trapped on the ground, the Delta operators formed a perimeter around Muse and the helicopter. It was only a matter of minutes before an American armored personnel carrier arrived and carried the team and Muse to safety.

Special Activities

These operations are nearly always covert or even clandestine. Their nature is usually such that exposure would negate, at least in part, any benefits from a successfully completed mission.

Taj-Bek Palace

When Mohammed Daoud, known as the "Red Prince," seized power in Afghanistan in 1973, he seemed content to maintain close ties with the Soviet Union. He eventually began to build relations with Iran and Pakistan, however. He also he began to distrust his own People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In the spring of 1978, he had the leading members of the PDPA arrested. The arrests prompted other PDPA members to stage a coup, and by the end of the month, the military had installed Nour Mohammed Taraki – a PDPA faction leader – as the new leader of Afghanistan.


Taraki held fairly radical views, and in his attempts to restructure Afghan life, he made the critical error of trying to suppress the role of Islam. Within months, several regions of Afghanistan rose up in open revolt against Taraki's regime, forcing him to seek military assistance from the Soviet Union. Soviet arms and advisors were soon pouring into Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Soviet presence worsened the situation, and many Afghans began to call for a jihad (holy war) against the Soviets. In early 1979, rebels seized the city of Herat and butchered dozens of Soviet citizens. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, concerned that the violence in Afghanistan could spread and threaten its own Central Asian republics, responded by increasing their military support for Taraki's government.

CELL STRUCTURE

Subversive and revolutionary organizations frequently use the principal of organization into *cells*. This can make communications slow and difficult, but limiting contact between cells makes betrayal of the entire organizations by one traitor or prisoner almost impossible.

A cell is a small group of people – usually three to five, though larger groups are possible. The members of the cell know only each other; no threat or blandishment can get from them any other name. The cell leader knows how to contact other cells. This usually means that he knows at least one other person, the one who recruited him.

In the ideal cell organization, even the leader knows no one in another cell. All communication is through *cut-outs* and *drops*. A cut-out is a messenger who knows only that he receives messages from one party and transmits them to another. He knows neither the meaning of the message nor any more than he must about the people for whom he carries it. A drop is another method of minimizing the loss in the event of compromised communications. It is a place, a park bench for instance, where one party leaves a message to be picked up after he leaves. Combining both methods gives even more security.



SPECIAL OPS IN THE FUTURE

Certainly, so long as there is warfare, there will be a need for special operations. The technology will change, but the missions will be there.

A classic example of special ops in science fiction is the novel *Wasp*, by Eric Frank Russell. His hero, a human, grew up on a Sirian-owned planet, spoke the language fluently (although his cover stories had to allow for his regional accent) and understood the culture. Once he was disguised as a Sirian and deposited "behind the lines" on a Sirian planet, he spread rumors, created panic, organized a resistance movement, disrupted the economy by distributing counterfeit money, assassinated high-ranking officials and generally softened up the planet for the Terran invasion.

The title *Wasp* refers to part of the hero's effectiveness: the enemy invested so much effort in looking for him that they diverted important resources away from the war effort – much as a single wasp buzzing in a driver's face can cause a car to crash.



One of the units to be provided to Taraki was composed of the best Central Asian troops the Soviets had to offer. Made up solely of Farsi- or Dari-speaking troops from *Spetsnaz* or airborne units, this force was dubbed the "Muslim Battalion." The hope was that it would be able to blend in with the Afghan military and provide Taraki with a reliable bodyguard. Before the unit could be deployed, however, Hafizullah Amin – one of Taraki's rivals – staged a coup of his own and took control of the government. In what was intended to be a show of political strength to the Soviets, Amin had Taraki killed on October 8, 1979.

The Soviet leadership was shocked by Amin's actions; they were even more upset when he placed the blame for Afghanistan's civil war on the Soviet military advisors. They concluded that Amin and his government had to be replaced by a more moderate faction of the PDPA. The problem was that both Taraki and Amin had been relentless in their persecution of rival PDPA factions, and none had the strength to carry out a coup on its own. Luckily, the Soviets already had a unit prepared to operate inside Afghanistan: the Muslim Battalion.

On November 18, 1979, the Muslim Battalion received orders to depart for a base near the Afghan capital of Kabul. Despite his blustering, Amin never suspected any threat from the Soviets; in fact, believing the Soviet unit to be more trustworthy than his own units, he allowed the Muslim Battalion to set up camp near his residence, Taj-Bek Palace. While the Muslim Battalion was being positioned in Kabul, the KGB was forming an assault team from its Alpha, Beta and

Vympel special ops units, code-named *Kaskad*. In early December, elements of *Kaskad* infiltrated Kabul disguised as a sports team. Their primary mission was to eliminate or capture Amin and the members of his council.

Until the night before the assault, the Muslim Battalion was unaware of its actual mission in Kabul. Its commander, Colonel Vassily Kolesnik, was summoned to the Soviet embassy on December 26 and told to draw up a plan to attack Taj-Bek Palace immediately. The Muslim Battalion was to secure the palace and hold it against counterattacks while the *Kaskad* team hunted down Amin. On Colonel Kolesnik's request, his unit was reinforced with a company of airborne soldiers and an antitank missile platoon that would be used to breach the heavy palace doors. The attack was set for 9 p.m. the following night.

As the old military adage goes, "No plan survives the first minute of battle." The Soviet plan didn't even get that far. Amin, convinced by the KGB that he was about to receive more support from Moscow, held a formal dinner on the night of the

attack. He invited all of his ministers, the members of the Afghan Politburo and their families. Everything was going better than the Soviets had hoped until Amin and a number of the guests became ill shortly after the dinner began – apparently from poisoned food. It's still unknown who was behind the poisoning attempt, but security was immediately tightened around the palace. Ironically, the commander of Amin's Presidential Guard even requested medical assistance from the Soviet Embassy.

The Soviets were forced to move their timetable up in response to the increased activity around the palace. *Spetsnaz* troops intercepted a platoon of Afghan reinforcements that had been summoned to the palace and took them out using silenced weapons and knives. Another *Spetsnaz* company was tasked to neutralize a nearby Afghan tank battalion. As the Afghan tankers began to respond to the alarm at the palace, the Soviet team drove up to the battalion headquarters and took the battalion commander and his company commanders prisoner. The tankers gave chase on foot, but three *Spetsnaz* soldiers opened fire with machine guns and routed the would-be rescuers. Meanwhile, the rest of the *Spetsnaz* company sabotaged the Afghans' T-55 tanks.

The element of the Muslim Battalion tasked with seizing the palace approached it in BMP-2 armored fighting vehicles painted with Afghan markings. The palace sentries were not fooled by the paint job, and opened fire with machine guns. The Soviets responded by calling in four ZSU-23-4 (*Shilka*) anti-aircraft vehicles, which opened up on the defenders with four 23mm autocannon apiece. The Afghans were forced to take cover from the withering fire. In spite of the *Spetsnaz* team's best efforts, though, the palace guards continued to hold out.

With the exterior of the palace unsecured, the *Kaskad* team took cover inside the Soviet armored personnel carriers. When it became evident the Afghans would not be quickly defeated, a *Spetsnaz* officer decided to charge the palace with the BMPs. The vehicles drove through the palace doors and the *Kaskad* team took over. Inside the palace, the fighting was just as heavy as it had been outside, but the KGB team was eventually able to clear the palace and locate Amin. The Afghan leader was captured alive but wounded, and *Kaskad* turned him over to a group of Taraki's followers. Amin did not survive the night.

Twelve *Spetsnaz* died and 28 were wounded in the fighting around the palace. An estimated 500 Afghans died fighting the Muslim Battalion and another 150 were taken prisoner. The total number of *Kaskad* casualties is unclear – reports range from only four dead to as many as 46.

While the attack on Taj-Bek Palace was in progress, other KGB teams and *Spetsnaz* units took out key government installations and the 103rd Guards Airborne Division seized key intersections around Kabul. Two Soviet Motorized Rifle Divisions advanced south from the border into Afghanistan the same day. None of the other invading units faced much resistance.

On December 28, 1979, Babrak Karmal, the PDPA leader chosen by the Soviets to assume power, was escorted into Kabul by Soviet airborne troops. Although Karmal attempted to regain the support of the Islamic leaders of the rebellion, the majority of Afghans were tired of Soviet intervention in their country. The coup at Taj-Bek Palace, while successful, marked the beginning of 10 years of hard fighting for the Soviet military, which eventually culminated in a humiliating defeat.



FANTASY SPECIAL OPS

Many fantasy adventures have the feel of special operations. Selecting a complementary team, choosing appropriate equipment and then launching a tiny force against overwhelming odds make an ever-exciting theme. Frodo and Sam's long march through Mordor is one of the most devastating direct action missions in the fantasy genre.

Some stories specifically combine a fantasy background with special ops. Poul Anderson's *Operation Chaos* begins with an anti-personnel strike against a genie and ends with a combat rescue from Hell. Most fantasy worlds are worlds in conflict, and any war has room for the small, dedicated group of specialists after one vital target. Glen Cook's *Black Company* series is a fine treatment of special ops in a world of sorcery.

Another combination of fantasy and special ops is the meeting of modern warrior and the powers of magic. In Brian Daley's *Doomfarers of Coramonde*, an ACAV (an M113 armored personnel carrier armed and equipped as a reconnaissance vehicle) is faced with a dragon. Modern weapons are devastatingly powerful, but spells can be as deadly, especially for the unprepared.

Sometimes the world of magic enters the modern world rather than vice versa. David Brin's "Thor Meets Captain America" describes a special operation gone wrong in a world where Nazi Germany has the aid of the gods of the Vikings.

CHAPTER 2

UNIT'S AND PERSONNEL



Special operations units are, by definition, elite forces. The standards for selection to serve in such units are far more rigorous than those applied to other soldiers, and the training is much more intensive. The physical and psychological qualifications required of special ops troops differ from unit to unit and country to country, but in all cases, soldiers with serious physical or psychological disabilities (including many of the disadvantages usually

available to GURPS characters) are excluded. Quite often, soldiers must complete at least one term of service – and must attain a certain grade or rank – before volunteering for such units. In addition, the service records of volunteers are carefully scrutinized to exclude personnel who have exhibited discipline problems. Finally, volunteers are subjected to exhaustive background investigations to qualify for security clearances.

United States of America

The U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force all deploy special operations units, although Air Force units primarily provide transportation and air support for the other three services.

U.S. Army

Airborne Rangers

Volunteers for Ranger training must meet exacting physical standards, including the ability to do 52 push-ups and 62 sit-ups, each in two minutes, do six chin-ups, and run two miles in under 15 minutes. They must pass the Combat Water Survival Test, consisting of a 15-meter swim with full equipment, a blindfolded 3-meter drop into deep water and equipment removal while submerged. A five-mile run in formation, a 12-mile road march with rucksack and basic infantry skills tests must also be completed prior to acceptance to Ranger training. Volunteers must possess a high school education and have a high GT (General Classification Test) score. The selection criteria for officers are similar to those for enlisted personnel. Only soldiers from specific combat MOSs (infantry, cavalry scout, armor crewman, combat engineer and certain SF specialties) may attend Ranger school.

U.S. Army Ranger Training Program (RTP). This training is among the most strenuous and demanding available to U.S. soldiers. The volunteer must attend the four-week-long Ranger Indoctrination Program at Fort Benning, which hones weapons and other combat skills and introduces the standard operating procedures of the Ranger Battalions. After several months' familiarization duty with a Ranger Battalion, the volunteer is sent to Ranger School.

Ranger School lasts 61 days – with an average of nearly 20 hours of training a day – and is conducted in three phases. The first, held at Fort Benning, concentrates on leadership skills and small-unit tactics, as well as intensive physical training and mental stress. The second phase is conducted at Camp Frank D. Merrill, in Dahlonaga, Georgia, where trainees are given exhaustive training in reconnaissance, patrol, raiding and ambush techniques, as well as mountaineering and land navigation under combat conditions. The third phase, conducted at Camp Rudder, near Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, consists of small-unit exercises conducted under jungle and swamp combat conditions.

The philosophy of Ranger School is to force trainees to exercise creative leadership under conditions of extreme stress and exhaustion. Less than 40% of volunteers complete the program and receive the Black Beret and Ranger Tab. The Airborne Rangers template appears on p. 56.

Ranger Unit Organization. The U.S. Army currently has three Ranger Battalions on active duty: the 1/75, based at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; the 2/75, based at Fort Lewis, Washington; and the 3/75, based at Fort Benning, Georgia. Ranger units were originally formed during the Second World War, but they were disbanded after the Korean conflict. In '69, the army reactivated the Ranger Battalions. The mission of the Ranger Battalions is to provide a long-range reconnaissance, ambush and strategic raid capability in support of conventional forces, as well as large-scale counter guerrilla and counterterrorism operations. The unit organization of the Ranger Battalions, therefore, closely parallels that of regular light infantry.

U.S. ARMY TRAINING COURSES

Basic Military Training (BMT)

All U.S. Army personnel must attend BMT. This eight-week course introduces the recruit to military life and provides the basic skills needed for soldiering. It is both training and an elimination procedure. No one can successfully complete it with any attribute below 8; all graduates will have the Guns (Light Auto), First Aid and Savoir-Faire (Military) skills at a minimum level of 10. Other national armies have similar entry-level training programs. In cultures with conscript military service, a large proportion of the male population will have been through BMT.

Advanced Individual Training (AIT)

Upon completion of BMT, trainees are sent to AIT, the course which will give the trainee his *Military Occupational Specialty* (MOS). By whatever name, this is the training that turns a basic soldier into a trained specialist in some useful trade. It can last from a few weeks to many months, depending on the skill(s) taught. *Infantry AIT* (below) is a requirement for most special operations troops. Soldiers with a non-infantry MOS may volunteer for service with special ops units, but they are usually required to attend Infantry AIT prior to special ops training.

Continued on next page . . .



U.S. ARMY TRAINING COURSES

(Continued)

U.S. Army Infantry Advanced Individual Training Course

This eight-week course, conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia, consists of intensive introductory training for the combat infantryman. Graduates of Infantry AIT must have HT 10 and no other attribute below 9. They have BMT skills (see above) and Throwing (for hand grenades), Spear (for bayonets) and Guns (Pistol), all at level 10 or better. Upon graduation from this course, a would-be special ops soldier must attend the Airborne Basic Course (below) to become jump-qualified.

U.S. Army Airborne Basic Course


This three-week course is also conducted at Fort Benning. The physical requirements for acceptance to "jump school" – the ability to do 42 push-ups and 52 sit-ups, each in two minutes, and to run two miles in less than 16 minutes – are nearly as rigorous as those for Ranger training (p. 25), but roughly 13,000 military personnel successfully complete it every year. Only about 15% of those accepted fail to receive their Paratrooper Wings. The course is structured in three week-long cycles. During "ground week," physical training and basic airborne familiarization are emphasized, with classes on jumpmaster commands, harness fitting, exit technique and executing the parachute landing fall. The second week ("tower week") involves training in tactical exit and lateral drift control, as well as landing simulation exercises conducted from a 34-foot-high tower. In the final week ("jump week") the trainee applies his training to five practice jumps from an aircraft: three jumps with the standard T10 parachute (a "Hollywood" daylight jump with minimal equipment, a tactical jump with full equipment, and a night tactical jump) and two jumps with the MC1-1B steerable parachute.

U.S. Army Airborne Intermediate and Advanced Courses

These courses – again at Fort Benning – offer intermediate and advanced courses of varying length to qualified service applicants who have completed the basic course. Among the techniques taught in these courses are High-Altitude Low-Opening (HALO), High-Altitude High-Opening (HAHO) and Low-Altitude Low-Opening (LALO) airborne operations (see pp. 86-87). It is not uncommon for special operations troops to have completed several specialized intermediate and advanced courses at the Airborne Training Center. Most Ranger volunteers attend the Ranger Training Program (p. 25) prior to any intermediate or advanced airborne training, but Rangers frequently attend these courses after completing the RTP.

A Ranger Battalion is composed of a headquarters and headquarters company, consisting of 16 officers and 40 enlisted men, and three Ranger Companies, each consisting of seven officers and 151 enlisted men. The basic building-block of the Ranger Company is the 11-man squad, consisting of two five-man combat teams and a squad leader. Three such squads make up a rifle platoon, and three rifle platoons, plus headquarters element and a heavy weapons platoon, make up a company.

In the long-range reconnaissance mission, the five-man team is the primary operational unit. Larger units are, of course, utilized for ambush and raid missions. One chief difference between Ranger units and Special Forces (below) in regard to these missions lies in the army's expectation that Ranger units will be employed in larger-scale operations, in direct support of regular infantry, rather than independently or in coordination with indigenous regular or guerrilla forces.



Special Forces

A volunteer for the U.S. Army Special Forces must be able to do 42 push-ups and 53 sit-ups, each in two minutes, run two miles in less than 16 minutes, and swim 50 meters unassisted in BDUs (battle dress uniform). He must be a U.S. citizen, possess a high school diploma and have a GT score of 100 or greater. He must be airborne-qualified or eligible for airborne training, grade E-4 (promotable) or higher, and qualify for a "Secret" clearance. Officer candidates must possess a "Secret" clearance prior to arrival at the selection phase, be eligible for a "Top Secret" clearance, and score at least 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) or already possess some skill in a foreign language.

U.S. Army Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). The selection course for U.S. Army Special Forces lasts 21 days and is divided into three sections. The first section is designed to quickly eliminate candidates who are unable to meet either the physical or psychological strain required of a Special Forces soldier. The second section focuses more on judgement and mental ability while under physical stress. The third and final portion of SFAS requires the volunteers to exhibit an ability to work as a part of a team – a vital skill for Special Forces soldiers. Throughout the course, little or no feedback is provided to the volunteers to allow them to gauge their progress. Unlike many other special operations selection courses, SFAS isn't designed to test physical endurance so much as mental fortitude and adaptability.

U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course. The qualification, or Q, course is conducted in three phases over a period of approximately 24 to 31 weeks.

The basic skills phase, held at Camp Mackall Training Facility, North Carolina, emphasizes physical and basic combat soldiering skills under conditions of intense stress and exhaustion. Extensive hands-on training in land navigation, small unit tactics and patrolling is provided.

The technical skills phase consists of advanced, comprehensive training in the volunteer's SF specialty: communications, demolition, medical or weapons. The communications course, lasting 21 weeks, consists of intensive training in U.S. and foreign radio communications systems, voice and Morse transmission and reception, electronic countermeasures, and communications security. The demolition course, lasting 13 weeks, provides training in plastic explosives, dynamite charges, fuses and combat engineering. The medical course, lasting 46 weeks, trains personnel in all aspects of field and preventive medicine, including field-expedient surgery. The weapons course, lasting 13 weeks, provides the trainee with a mastery of the small arms and company indirect-fire weapons of many nations.

The final phase of Q course lasts 36 days and focuses on mission planning and unit training skills. The volunteer learns not only how to apply his recently acquired knowledge himself, but also how to effectively teach others. The course culminates in the 15-day-long Robin Sage field exercise (see sidebar, p. 29). The Special Forces character template is on p. 57.

The Q course does not, however, end a Special Forces soldier's training. Most SF troops are immediately sent to the New Academic Facility on Ft. Bragg to learn a foreign language. The language is assigned based on the soldier's score on the DLAB (which each soldier takes during the initial selection process). The language courses last between 4 and 6 months – depending on the difficulty of the language – and provide basic communication skills to the soldier.

The majority of SF troops are eventually cross-trained in more than one SF specialty. As well, language training is provided at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. Many SF troops also attend one of the joint service Survival, Escape, Resistance and Evasion (SERE) Schools, the Intermediate and Advanced Airborne Courses (p. 26), the Navy's Waterborne Operations School, or the Army's Arctic or Jungle Warfare Schools.

Arctic Warfare Center. The U.S. Army Arctic Warfare Center conducts training at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska and Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Training in arctic survival, camouflage, skiing and combat operations is provided.

Defense Language Institute (DLI). The Defense Language Institute offers basic, intermediate and advanced language training in most of the world's languages. Programs last from six months to a year. Any soldier in an MOS in which knowledge of a foreign language is useful may apply for training.

Jungle Warfare Center. The U.S. Army Jungle Warfare Center conducts training in jungle survival, camouflage and combat operations under the U.S. Southern Command at Fort Sherman in the Panama Canal Zone.

Survival, Escape, Resistance and Evasion (SERE) School. SERE training is designed to familiarize the soldier with basic techniques of escape, evasion and resistance behind enemy lines. The intensity and duration of the SERE course differs from service to service.

Waterborne Operations Course. The Waterborne Operations Course, conducted at the Naval Amphibious School at Coronado, California, provides training for Army, Marine and SEAL personnel in the basics of waterborne insertion/extraction and combat operations.

THE RANGER CREED

The Ranger Creed seeks to put down on paper the ethics and traits most desired in the 75th Ranger Regiment. It is specific to the U.S. Army Rangers, but the mind set and values it represents are common to virtually every volunteer elite military unit in the world.

Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor and high esprit de corps of my Ranger Regiment.


Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger, my country expects me to move further, faster, and fight harder than any other soldier.

Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong and morally straight, and I will shoulder more than my share of the task, whatever it may be. One-hundred percent and then some.

Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well-trained soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, my neatness of dress, and care of equipment shall set the example for others to follow.

Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country; I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.

Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor. Rangers Lead the Way!




"HOOAH!"

One of the most frequently heard exclamations in the U.S. Army (and other branches of the U.S. military, to a lesser extent), "Hooah!" – most often pronounced "who-ah" or "who-uh" – is also one of the most versatile expressions available to a soldier. It's virtually impossible to spend time on a U.S. military base without being bombarded by a barrage of "Hooahs!", but its origins are shrouded in so many layers of mystery and misdirection that it's nearly impossible to determine where the term was first uttered.

The most commonly heard explanation is it is simply the pronunciation of "HUA," the acronym for "Heard, Understood and Acknowledged." This story appeals to the more straight-laced members of the military, but there are a couple of other legends explaining the "true" meanings of "Hooah." One of the more imaginative tales claims that it originated with the Rangers. When told of yet another seemingly impossible mission being assigned to them, the story goes, the Rangers looked at their commanding officer and asked "Who – us?!" Over time, the question was shortened to the more commonly heard term used today. Yet another anecdote claims the expression is indeed an acronym, but one which is closer to the average soldier's opinion of the orders issued to him: "Head Up A-..." well, let's just say it refers to another part of the human anatomy!

With so many ideas on how the term came into being, it's hardly surprising that it has a variety of meanings, depending on the circumstances, inflection and enthusiasm with which it is vocalized. Some of the more common are:

1. Outstanding! I'll get right on it!
2. I hear you.
3. I acknowledge your existence, but I have no idea what you're talking about.
4. That's the stupidest thing I've ever heard, but since you outrank me, I've no choice but to do it.



Special Forces Unit Organization. The first Special Forces unit, the 10th Special Forces Group, was activated in 1952 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The army currently has five active duty Special Forces Groups (SFG): the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10th. Each SFG is tasked to provide coverage of a different area of the world:

- 1st SFG (based at Fort Lewis, Washington, with a C Detachment at Torii Station, Okinawa) concentrates on East Asia and the Pacific.
- 3rd SFG (based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina) focuses on Africa.
- 5th SFG (based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky) covers Southwest Asia and Northeast Africa.
- 7th SFG (based at Fort Bragg, with a company at Fort Clayton, Panama) deals with South America and the Caribbean.
- 10th SFG (based at Fort Carson, Colorado, with a battalion at Stuttgart, Germany) contends with Europe.

Each SFG – effectively an SF brigade – has a headquarters company, a combat electronic warfare and intelligence (CEWI) company, a service company, a signals company, and three Special Forces battalions. Each battalion consists of a C-Detachment and three Special Forces companies. Each SF company consists of a B-Detachment and six Special Forces A-Detachments. The sidebar on p. 31 details the composition of an A-Detachment.

Active duty SFGs can be augmented with personnel from two Army National Guard SFGs (the 19th in Salt Lake City, Utah, and the 20th in Birmingham, Alabama).

First Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta

America's premier counterterrorist unit, the First Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-Delta, also known as "Delta Force") contacts prospective soldiers possessing desirable skills and backgrounds twice a year. It then puts prospective volunteers through a daunting battery of selection tests. Like all Special Forces troops, 1st SFOD-Delta volunteers must be high school graduates, U.S. citizens and eligible for a "Secret" clearance, and must have a GT score of 110 or greater. They must also be airborne-qualified or eligible for airborne training, and in grade E-4 (promotable) or higher.

The physical standards testing is stricter than that of other U.S. Army Special Forces units. Volunteers must be able to perform 62 sit-ups and 55 push-ups, each in two minutes, prior to actually beginning the selection course. Volunteers who pass the physical standards testing are then run through a three- to four-week selection course at Camp Dawson, West Virginia.

The course extends over hardwood-covered mountains, crisscrossed by streams and rivers. Carrying a rucksack, a map and a compass, each volunteer is ordered to go from one location to another, not knowing how much time he has to complete the assignment. Upon reaching his goal, the soldier is ordered to march to another location, again as quickly as possible. If he does not reach a rendezvous point in a specified amount of time, he fails the course and is eventually shipped back to his old unit. Throughout the course, no feedback is provided on the soldier's performance. The evaluators go to great pains to keep the selection criteria secret, and will even keep failed applicants in the course to confuse their peers.

Volunteers who pass this selection course are subjected to intensive psychological screening. The objective is to identify those recruits best able to exercise individual initiative under the conditions of profound stress associated with the

kinds of missions undertaken by 1st SFOD-Delta. Macho "cowboys" who cannot master the subtle psychological challenges of this screening are weeded out. Those who meet the selection standards attend the 1st SFOD-Delta Operator's Course. The results of the selection process are then sealed, ensuring that the standards remain secret.

1st SFOD-Delta Operator's Course. The Operator's Course is conducted over a six-month period at Fort Bragg. The training concentrates on a wide variety of military and civilian skills essential to counterterrorist operations. Marksmanship is heavily emphasized – firing three to four hours per day, five days per week – with requirements that trainees be able to hit 100% on 900-yard targets and 90% on 1,000-yard targets.

Some of the topics covered in the course are assault techniques, command and control functions, first aid and paramedical training, hostage management, vehicle and machinery operation, airborne and airmobile techniques and tactics, and man-to-man fighting techniques – and this list is by no means exhaustive.

Particular attention is given to realistic training in taking down terrorist-controlled sites: assaulting and clearing buildings, seizing aircraft and the like. A \$90,000 training complex, known as "the House of Horrors" and including a mock-up of an aircraft cabin, has been constructed at Fort Bragg to provide the utmost realism in training exercises. Major air carriers routinely provide aircraft for 1st SFOD-Delta Operator's Courses and other training exercises so that operators become as familiar with aircraft access and operation as possible.

A 1st SFOD-Delta operator is not finished with his training upon completing the Operator's Course. Language training, SERE and other survival schools, and waterborne operations training are frequently provided for Delta Operators, as well as extensive on-the-job training through field and command post exercises. The character template for Delta Force is on p. 58.

1st SFOD-Delta Unit Organization. Since its founding at Fort Bragg on November 19, 1977, the precise organization of 1st SFOD-Delta has remained classified information. Unclassified sources reveal that the unit has been divided into three operational squadrons, each with about 75 soldiers divided into four- to six-man teams. 1st SFOD-Delta also possesses a support squadron, a signals squadron, an aviation squadron with 12 AH-6 and MH-6 helicopters painted to resemble civilian aircraft, and a "Funny Platoon" (see sidebar, p. 32). Since mission-tailored units are the rule in 1st SFOD-Delta, it is to be expected that the number of operators and their force configuration for any operation will depend heavily upon the requirements of the mission. While 1st SFOD-Delta's mission remains primarily counterterrorist operations, it has seen increased deployment in conventional roles over the last decade.

160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment

The three battalions of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment are tasked to provide tactical transport and support for U.S. Army special operations units. The 1st and 2nd Battalions are located at Ft. Campbell and the 3rd Battalion is based at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia. These battalions operate the MH-6/AH-6 Little Bird light helicopter, MH-60L/K Black Hawk combat assault helicopter, the HH-60D Night Hawk special operations transport helicopter, and the MH-53J Pave Low special operations helicopter. Pilots, crew and maintenance personnel selected for service with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment are reputed to be the best available, and train extensively with the ground forces they are intended to support.


EXERCISE ROBIN SAGE

The final stage of U.S. Special Forces training is an elaborate field exercise known as "Robin Sage." Special ops units are known for taking an unconventional approach to everything, and training is seldom an exception. This exercise is an excellent example of the unique operations that these units undertake to prepare themselves for real missions.

Robin Sage is a two-week-long exercise at the culmination of the Q course. It takes place in the backwoods of North Carolina, but unlike many conventional military field exercises, it does not take place on a military post – it is conducted in and around three small towns in the Uwharrie National Forest. Many members of the civilian community take part in the exercise, playing the roles of guerrilla leaders, partisan supporters or even the forces of the fictional "Pineland." Citizens also loan the U.S. Army land to use for maneuvers and air-resupply drop zones.

The students are divided into teams and ordered to infiltrate Pineland. They are to link up with rebel leaders, usually played by other Green Berets, and assist them in their fight against the puppet government installed by a neighboring country. All aspects of Q-course training are tested, and diplomatic ability is tested nearly as hard as other skills as the students face difficult, often nearly belligerent "allies." The ultimate objective is to turn the guerrilla force into an effective military unit. The "guerrillas" are all U.S. Army soldiers, but they are non-combat troops – cooks, clerks and the like – so the students must still school them in all but the most basic skills.

Throughout the exercise, a Green Beret trainer monitors and evaluates the team's progress. The students must accomplish their mission in Pineland to graduate from the Q course!



SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND SPECIAL FORCES

"Special operations forces" embraces the whole spectrum of unconventional warfare units. Commando raids, rescue operations, psychological operations, counterinsurgency, long-range reconnaissance and assassination are a far from exhaustive list of special operations.

In the U.S., since the early 1950s, Special Forces (p. 26) has been a more restricted term. Special Forces' primary mission is to serve as military instructors and staff specialists. They were organized on the basis of experience with the resistance movements of WWII, particularly the French Resistance and the guerrilla forces in the Philippines, Yugoslavia and Burma. The OSS and the regular military had extensive experience with these forces, and a distillation of that experience defined the Special Forces mission.

The heart of Special Forces is the 12-man A-Team (sidebar, p. 31). It is composed of trained instructors in infantry weapons, engineering and demolition, intelligence, communications, and medicine. From experience, these are the skills most needed by a guerrilla force and most often lacking in its recruits. Each A-Team is expected to be the core training and special staff element of a battalion of up to 1,000 guerrillas or counter-guerrillas.

Special Forces training, and even Special Forces' peacetime operations, are more exciting and challenging than ordinary military life. Special Forces attracts volunteers who have more initiative, intelligence and competence than the line of the army. As a result, Special Forces is often drawn on for troops to carry out difficult missions that are not strictly of this pattern. This is a waste of resources, but it happens so often as to be usual.

This use of Special Forces as a term is common in the U.S., even when describing the special operations of other countries. It is not universal; in WWII, for instance, the British called *all* commando formations "special forces."

U.S. Marine Corps

Force Recon

Force Reconnaissance units (usually known as Force Recon) provide the U.S. Marine Corps with a long-range reconnaissance special operations capability. Troops are selected for Force Recon on the basis of their performance in BMT, and have physical standards similar to those of the U.S. Army's Special Forces (p. 26). Selected soldiers receive additional advanced training, similar to that of U.S. Army Rangers (p. 25) but with a distinct emphasis on amphibious operations. Some Force Recon soldiers also receive jungle and arctic warfare, SERE, waterborne operations and Defense Language Institute language training. The skill template for Force Recon is on p. 58.

Force Recon Unit Organization. A Force Reconnaissance Company is assigned to each Fleet Marine Force. This company consists of a headquarters with five officers and 26 enlisted men, a supply services platoon with one officer and 35 enlisted men, and six reconnaissance platoons, each with one officer and 14 enlisted men. The First Force Reconnaissance Company was reactivated on May 27, 1987.

U.S. Navy

Sea-Air-Land Soldiers (SEAL) Teams

The U.S. Navy's Sea-Air-Land Soldiers Teams comprise that service's primary special operations capability. The selection criteria for SEALs are similar to those of U.S. Army Special Forces (p. 26), but the endurance swimming requirements are more rigorous. SEAL personnel were once drawn largely from the Navy's Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs), but these were redesignated as SEAL Teams or SEAL Delivery Vehicle teams in 1983, and most volunteers today are regular Navy personnel – who can be no more than 28 years old if they wish to enter BUD/S training (below).



Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) Training. BUD/S volunteers are provided with 25 weeks of gruelling training, primarily at the Naval Special Warfare Center at Coronado, California. BUD/S is arguably the toughest course available to U.S. soldiers. Attendees must first complete a two-week physical training course just to prepare for the physical strain they will face in BUD/S.

The first eight weeks of this training emphasizes physical conditioning: running, speed and endurance swimming, confidence and obstacle courses, calisthenics, and small boat seamanship. The notorious "Hell Week" occupies the sixth week of BUD/S training. During this period of intense physical training, candidates are allowed a total of only 4 hours sleep. One graduate of BUD/S training characterizes this phase as "the closest thing to hell I've

ever been through. By the sixth week you pray that a shark gets you, just to get some peace; but when you get on the job you understand why it was the way it was."

The next seven weeks of training involve advanced instruction in sea navigation, open- and closed-circuit scuba, deep-sea diving, and underwater demolition. This phase is followed by 10 weeks of instruction in surface demolition, combat engineering, amphibious operations, land navigation, hand-to-hand combat, weapons familiarization, reconnaissance techniques and small unit tactics training on San Clemente Island. The BUD/S course is followed by attendance at the Army's three-week Airborne Basic Course (p. 26) at Fort Benning.

SEAL Training. Volunteers selected for SEAL Teams complete advanced training in waterborne operations and swimmer delivery vehicle (SDV) operation, SEAL Tactical Training on a variety of insertion techniques, and training in other specialized military skills and in languages, similar to that afforded U.S. Special Forces (p. 27). The character template for Navy SEALs is on p. 59.

SEAL Unit Organization. The Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) in Coronado, California, oversees all special operations in the U.S. Navy. NAVSPECWARCOM directs the actions of Special Boat Squadron (SB) One in Coronado, California, SB Two in Little Creek, Virginia, and the two Naval Special Warfare Groups (NAVSPECWARGRU). SEAL Teams are directly subordinate to one of the two NAVSPECWARGRU.

The 1st NAVSPECWARGRU, based at the Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado, California, controls:

- SEAL Team 1 (Coronado; Area of Operations: Southeast Asia)
- SEAL Team 3 (Coronado; AO: Middle East)
- SEAL Team 5 (Coronado; AO: Korea)
- Naval Special Warfare Unit (NSWU) 1 (Guam)
- NSWU 3 (Bahrain)
- SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Team 1 (Pearl Harbor)

The 2nd NAVSPECWARGRU is based at Little Creek, Virginia, and controls:

- SEAL Team 2 (Little Creek; AO: Northern Europe)
- SEAL Team 4 (Little Creek; AO: Africa)
- SEAL Team 8 (Little Creek; AO: Mediterranean and North Africa)
- NSWU 2 (Stuttgart)
- NSWU 4 (Puerto Rico)
- NSWU 8 (Panama)
- NSWU 10 (Spain)
- SDV Team 2 (Little Creek)

The Naval Special Warfare Development Group (formerly known as SEAL Team 6), based in Little Creek, Virginia, is responsible for U.S. counterterrorist operations in a maritime environment. It is under the direct command of NAVSPECWARCOM, but is also a component of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) for counterterrorist support.

Each SEAL Team consists of 25 officers and 156 ratings, organized into a headquarters element and five independent platoons with an officer and 30 ratings each. Most SEAL operations are conducted by platoons rather than full teams. The Naval Special Warfare Units are command and control elements, consisting of 17 officers and ratings, to which SEAL elements are attached for particular operations. Each SDV Team consists of approximately 120 officers and ratings, operating and maintaining ten free-flooding, six-man midget submarines.



SF A-DETACHMENT ORGANIZATION

An A-Detachment, or A-Team, consists of two officers and ten NCOs. The organization listed below is the standard A-Detachment structure; mission requirements may modify this. The ranks listed are those for each position under ideal circumstances. Due to shortages of soldiers of the designated rank, a given position may be filled by an SF member of lower rank.

- 1 Detachment Commander: Captain
- 1 Executive Officer: Warrant Officer
- 1 Operations NCO: Master Sergeant
- 1 Operations and Intelligence NCO: Sergeant 1st Class
- 1 Weapons NCO: Sergeant 1st Class
- 1 Medical Specialist: Sergeant 1st Class
- 1 Engineer NCO: Sergeant 1st Class
- 1 Communications NCO: Sergeant 1st Class
- 1 Assistant Weapons NCO: Staff Sergeant
- 1 Assistant Medical Specialist: Staff Sergeant
- 1 Assistant Engineer NCO: Staff Sergeant
- 1 Assistant Communications NCO: Staff Sergeant

THE "FUNNY PLATOON"

Scouting overseas targets for military action often requires operatives on site to properly evaluate the defenses and hazards that troops will face. The U.S. Army already has at least one program that places trained personnel in hostile areas to assess and prepare these sites for later military intervention. During Operation EAGLE CLAW – the failed attempt to rescue the Teheran embassy hostages in 1980 – U.S. Army SF soldiers infiltrated Teheran ahead of the assault teams to scout the targets and arrange transportation.

For years, 1st SFOD-Delta has argued for the right to train these operatives, especially since many of its operations are directly supported by them. The Army's existing program has consistently been able to resist Delta's attempts to take charge. In response, Delta has organized its own intelligence detachment, usually referred to as the "Funny Platoon" because of the unorthodox methods it employs – even for Delta! These operatives are capable of sneaking into a foreign country ahead of other commandos to provide up-to-date intelligence on target activities. Other members of the detachment monitor computer terminals constantly updated by information from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

One of the unique aspects of the "Funny Platoon" is that it employs women – the only element of Delta or any other U.S. military special ops unit to do so. In the early 1990s, after passing a modified selection course, five women were admitted to Delta. They were trained to work undercover in situations where male operatives would not be as effective. It is unknown whether these women have been employed in real-world Delta operations to date.



U.S. Air Force

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)

The 16th Special Operations Wing (SOW), two independent Special Operations Groups (SOG) and a Special Tactics Group (STG) are the elements of AFSOC tasked for support of Army, Navy and Marine Corps special ops units.

The 16th SOW, based at Hurlburt Field, Florida, is responsible for supporting North, South and Central America, North Africa and the Middle East. The 16th SOW consists of:

- 4th Special Operations Squadron (flying AC-130H Spectre gunships)
- 6th Special Operations Squadron (tasked with Foreign Internal Defense)
- 8th Special Operations Squadron (flying MC-130E Combat Talons)
- 9th Special Operations Squadron (flying MC-130P Combat Shadows)
- 15th Special Operations Squadron (flying MC-130H Combat Talon II)
- 16th Special Operations Squadron (flying AC-130H Spectre gunships)
- 20th Special Operations Squadron (flying MH-53J Pave Lows)
- 55th Special Operations Squadron (flying MH-60G Pave Hawks)



The 352nd SOG is based at Mildenhall RAF base in the U.K., and supports special operations in Europe and the territories of the former Soviet Union. The 352nd SOG consists of:

- 7th Special Operations Squadron (flying MC-130H Combat Talon II)
- 21st Special Operations Squadron (flying MH-53J Pave Lows)
- 67th Special Operations Squadron (flying MC-130P Combat Shadows)
- 321st Special Tactics Squadron (combat air controllers and pararescue)

The 353rd SOG is based at Kadena Airbase in Japan and supports special operations throughout most of Southeast Asia, Australia and the Pacific Islands. It is composed of:

- 1st Special Operations Squadron (flying MC-130E Combat Talons)
- 17th Special Operations Squadron (flying MC-130P Combat Shadows)
- 31st Special Operations Squadron (flying MH-53J Pave Lows)
- 320th Special Tactics Squadron (combat air controllers and pararescue)

The 720th Special Tactics Group is based at Hurlburt Field and provides search-and-rescue, combat weather and combat air control support for JSOC.

Since the air-support fiasco during Operation EAGLE CLAW (the Iranian hostage-rescue mission), the USAF has given top priority to development and maintenance of a special ops support capability. Pilots, crew and maintenance personnel assigned to AFSOC special ops units are considered to be among the best the Air Force has to offer. Personnel assigned to the 720th Special Tactics Group and the 320th and 321st Special Tactics Squadrons are given training similar to that of U.S. Army Special Forces.


France

Deuxième Régiment Étranger de Parachutistes (2e RÉP)

The *2e Régiment Étranger de Parachutistes* (2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment) is one of nine regiments of the French Foreign Legion. *2e RÉP* is assigned to the 11th Parachute Division. Based at Camp Raffalli, near Calvi in Corsica, the *2e RÉP* was reorganized from a standard airborne infantry regiment into a rapid-deployment air-commando regiment in the late 1960s. Its selection standards are similar to those of the U.S. Special Forces (p. 26). Most enlisted personnel are foreign rather than French nationals; the officers are mostly French. Its training parallels that of the U.S. Rangers (p. 25) and British SAS (p. 40), but experts suggest that the regiment is actually somewhat inferior to the SAS in training and experience. The missions for which it is designed are foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance and direct action; it has functioned well in the foreign internal defense role in Chad and Djibouti.

Troops chosen for the regiment are trained in their specific specialties in the companies to which they are assigned. First Company specializes in anti-armor, urban combat and night-fighting techniques, Second Company in mountain and arctic warfare, Third Company in amphibious operations, and Fourth Company in sabotage and demolition. Advanced training in communications, demolition, medical and weapons specialties is provided to selected troops. The character template appears on p. 60.

2e RÉP Unit Organization. The *2e RÉP* consists of a headquarters and services company, a reconnaissance and support company (composed of a reconnaissance platoon, a mortar platoon, two Milan anti-armor platoons, an anti-aircraft artillery platoon and a pathfinder platoon), and four rifle companies. The total complement is approximately 1,300 officers and men.



WHO DO I SEND?

Special ops units have distinctly different capabilities; matching the force to the mission is an important part of planning. Different countries have different organizations and titles, but the functional missions are similar to those of the United States, described below.

75th Ranger Regiment

The Rangers train for two distinct missions. The first is long range reconnaissance, using four-man teams that are intended to go deep behind enemy lines and stay for several days without resupply. A team can be ready to go in less than 24 hours. The second mission is raiding, usually in forces of no less than 100. Such a raid takes meticulous, long-term planning, usually several months at least. Ranger units have no vehicles and no weapon heavier than a light mortar. They have very little administrative or logistical support within the unit, and will need outside support within a few days of being committed.

Special Forces

Special Forces units are designed for the long haul. They are committed to their training and organizing mission only if the U.S. anticipates a long-term presence in the target area. A Special Forces group at full strength may have several thousand personnel, not all of them Special Forces qualified. Its heaviest organic weapons are heavy mortars and infantry anti-tank weapons, but it has the administrative and logistical resources to establish a permanent base. It would take several months of planning and transportation to deploy Special Forces on this scale, but they could then stay indefinitely. A small Special Forces team (three to six A-Teams and some supporting troops) could be deployed in a few days, but they would have to be supported and supplied from outside.

Continued on next page . . .

WHO DO I SEND?

(Continued)

Delta Force (1st SFOD-Delta)

Delta Force started out as a dedicated counterterrorist and hostage-rescue force. It has recently been tasked with more standard military special ops missions, however. Its exact strength is classified, but probably less than 100. It does not have its own long-term administrative or logistical resources. Its normal equipment is limited to small arms. It can be on its way to anywhere in the world in under four hours, but must be supported with outside resources. It usually depends on the host country or other U.S. units for this support.

Special Operations Air Units

Air Force and Army Aviation special ops units are intended to provide transportation and fire support for surface elements. They are seldom committed on their own. They have enough organic parts and maintenance personnel to operate for several days, but will need fuel from outside sources. Exact size is dependent on the aircraft and the mission, but as a rule of thumb, there are 10 to 30 people for each operating aircraft. An aircraft can fly to the limit of its range and return for one mission with nothing but the flight crew (two to six, depending on type), but is dependent on outside support for any sustained operation. This may be several hundred people per aircraft for large, complex systems. Deployment time depends on how far the unit is going and what facilities are already in place. Most units can be ready to move in under 24 hours. Personnel have small arms, most rotary-wing craft have at least defensive machine guns, and most fixed-wing special ops planes (except gunships) are unarmed.

Navy SEALs

SEAL Teams are intended for reconnaissance, assassination, clearing underwater obstacles and underwater sabotage. Their raiding missions can be prepared fast; they could move a detachment of a dozen or so in a few hours. They can deploy in times ranging from a few hours for a dozen swimmers to weeks for a large force. SEALs have a lot of bulky equipment and need a lot of supplies. They usually work from ships that are part of a navy task force, which is where most of their logistical support comes from. A fully equipped navy task force has the tools and people to do just about any job.

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Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN)

Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) was formed in 1974, in response to the growing threat of terrorism in Europe. Since that time, GIGN has conducted nearly 700 counterterrorist operations and freed over 500 hostages. Throughout this period, GIGN has lost fewer than 10 of its own operatives, although many have been wounded.

GIGN is a civilian police unit, but in many ways its training mirrors that of a number of military special operations units, such as 1st SFOD-Delta. GIGN operatives are trained to function not only in urban environments, but also in climates from desert to near-alpine conditions. Most are proficient in either parachute or scuba insertions.

Only members of the French *Gendarmerie* (National Police) are accepted into GIGN. Volunteers must have at least three years' experience to be eligible for consideration. They must then pass a rigorous selection course including, among other things, an escape and evasion segment, a rugged obstacle course and even an encounter with an attack dog (although the applicant is provided with a protective suit for this part of the testing). It is estimated that less than 10% of all applicants are accepted into the training program.

GIGN training lasts 10 to 11 months and covers a variety of topics, including marksmanship, surveillance, riot control, VIP protection and counterterrorism. A number of specialized courses are available to GIGN operatives after completing the basic skills training, such as free-fall parachuting, mountaineering, skiing and high-speed driving. The template for GIGN operators is on p. 61.

GIGN Unit Organization. From its inception, GIGN was intended as a small force. At present, it has 87 operators and has never had more than 90 at any one time. The unit is organized into a command cell, a support/training detachment, four operational groups (designated 1-4) and a negotiation cell. Each operational group contains 15 members and specializes in either free-fall parachute or scuba insertions.

Germany

Bundesgrenzschutzgruppe-9 (GSG-9)

Bundesgrenzschutzgruppe-9 (Federal Border Police Group 9, abbreviated GSG-9) was formed in 1973 by a West German government deeply concerned over the failure of its police and armed forces to deal successfully with the terrorist attack on the Olympic Village in Munich in 1972. While technically a police – not military – organization, GSG-9 is regarded as one of the most proficient counterterrorist special ops units in the world. Its recruits are selected from among volunteers from the Federal Border Police. Members of the armed forces must leave the service and become members of the Federal Border Police before they are eligible to join GSG-9.

The selection and training program for GSG-9 is much like that of the British SAS (p. 40) which, in conjunction with Israel's *Sayeret Matkal* (p. 37), assisted in organizing the unit. The initial selection and training program is 22 weeks long. The first 13 weeks are spent learning the fundamentals of police and counterterrorist operations, with a greater amount of academic work than is found in most other counterterrorist organizations. The last 9 weeks are used to develop individual skills and advanced antiterrorist tactics. The course is very demanding – a failure rate of over 75% is the norm. Many GSG-9 troops have also completed the SAS training program, and exchanges between the two units are frequent. The character template is on p. 62.

GSG-9 Unit Organization. GSG-9 is broken down into three units, each with its own area of responsibility: GSG-9/1 is tasked with standard urban counterterrorism operations, GSG-9/2 is responsible for conducting maritime counterterrorism, and GSG-9/3 is dedicated to airborne operations. GSG-9/1 and GSG-9/2 each have approximately 100 operators; GSG-9/3 maintains only half that strength. GSG-9 teams operate in five-man patrols. The unit is currently headquartered near Bonn, Germany, in a Federal Border Guard compound.



Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK)

GSG-9 has proven itself more than capable of handling counterterrorist activities on German soil. When 11 German nationals were taken hostage during the Rwandan civil war in 1994, though, Germany – which had possessed no active military special operations force since World War II – had to turn to Belgium and France to rescue its citizens. Based on this experience and the changing global political climate, senior German officials authorized the creation of the *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK).

Although the KSK does maintain a Hostage Rescue Team, its primary mission focus is military in nature, not counterterrorist. GSG-9 cannot legally participate in counterterrorist activities outside of Germany, though, so it is a logical assumption that the KSK will assume responsibility for such incidents. In addition to hostage rescue, the missions of the KSK include direct action and special reconnaissance.

The three-month long training and selection process of the KSK is strikingly similar to that of both the British SAS (p. 40) and U.S. Army Special Forces (p. 26). Both units were actively involved in developing the KSK program. The KSK template is on p. 62.

KSK Unit Organization. As of late 1996, 20 soldiers were trained and the unit was scheduled to be activated by early 1997. The KSK should be fully operational by the year 2000, with a projected strength of 1,000 men. It will be organized into a unit of approximately battalion size, consisting of an HQ and signals company, a long-range reconnaissance company, a training platoon, a service and support company, and four commando companies. Each commando company will contain four commando platoons, each with 18 soldiers. KSK commandos will operate in four-man teams, with each soldier having a specialty: communications, demolition, medical or intelligence/operations (most likely filled by the team leader, who will usually be an officer).

WHO DO I SEND?

(Continued)

Marine Corps Force Recon

Force Recon specializes in scouting landing sites; in sustained land campaigns, they do long-range reconnaissance patrols. They operate in small teams, usually four men. They have only small arms. They are not equipped or trained to support themselves for an extended period. They are intended to operate as part of a larger Marine force and use its resources. A recon team could be loaded and on the way in less than four hours, but must be supported.

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)

A Marine Expeditionary Unit is the big muscle of special ops. It is a force of 2,500 (including about 600 navy personnel), with organic tanks (five), 155mm howitzers (eight) and aircraft (20 to 30 helicopters, and sometimes eight AV-8 VTOL attack jets and two KC-130 tankers). It has supplies and equipment for 15 days of operation; with resupply, it can maintain itself indefinitely. It has hospital facilities, administrative personnel, heavy equipment and a field laundry. MEUs are normally deployed at sea, on three to five transports. They can be ready to land in less than 24 hours.

A "DAMNED CLOSE THING" AT MOGADISHU

The Somali night air was stifling and sweat dripped from the faces of the men of the GSG-9 assault team as they approached the rear of the hijacked Boeing 737. Only an hour before, the President of Somalia had been persuaded by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to permit an attempt to rescue the 79 passengers held captive by four terrorists on the Lufthansa flight. With the murder of pilot Juergen Schumann – whose body the terrorists had dumped on the tarmac shortly after arriving at Mogadishu – a peaceful resolution seemed to be ruled out.

The GSG-9 men approached the plane from the rear, to avoid being spotted by the terrorist leader in the cockpit, and held their aluminum ladders beneath the emergency doors. At the signal, the doors were blown. Hurling stun grenades and shouting for the passengers to hit the floor, the team clambered aboard.

Continued on next page . . .



A "DAMNED CLOSE THING" AT MOGADISHU

(Continued)

For the next eight minutes, they found themselves in a desperate firefight. Two of the four terrorists were in the rear of the aircraft when the attack began. Each hurled a grenade at the GSG-9 commandos. One, later found to be a smoke grenade, failed to explode. The other, a fragmentation grenade, rolled safely beneath a passenger's seat; the terrorist, in panic, had neglected to pull the pin. Another terrorist, returning fire, charged down the aisle from the cockpit to aid her comrades. A burst of submachine-gun fire caught her in the chest and flung her onto a group of cowering passengers.

The terrorist leader put his gun to the co-pilot's head and ordered him to take off as GSG-9 commander Ulrich Wegener hurtled down the aisle toward the cockpit. Kicking the door open, Wegener emptied a pistol into the terrorist's back. The terrorist calmly turned and leveled his weapon at Wegener as a blast from another commando's MP5, fired over Wegener's shoulder, cut him down. The terrorists were dead. Only one hostage — a stewardess — was wounded in the assault, and no GSG-9 casualties were taken.

Told afterward of the grenades and Wegener's encounter with the terrorist, one of the SAS observers who had accompanied GSG-9 from Dubai was reported to have remarked, "A damned close thing, wasn't it? But aren't they all?"

Israel


Kommando Yami

This unit is responsible for naval special warfare operations for the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). Israel has compulsory military service, and takes pains to identify potential candidates for its elite units prior to their induction into the IDF. Soldiers scoring high on pre-conscription aptitude tests and psychological batteries may be given the opportunity to enter selection for *Kommando Yami*, the naval commandos. Despite the extensive testing, only 30% of invited candidates pass the week-long *gibush* (selection process).

Training begins with a basic paratroop course and assignment to a team of comrades. Soldiers then attend courses on combat marksmanship, communications, intelligence reporting, hand-to-hand combat, and infiltration and exfiltration techniques. They also receive extensive training in seamanship, scuba and underwater navigation. The qualification period lasts 24 months. The soldiers arrive at their parent unit as a cohesive team with years of experience working together.

Kommando Yami serves a similar function to the U.S. Navy SEAL Teams (p. 30). The unit conducts special reconnaissance and direct action missions against coastal targets, as well as maritime counterterrorist activities. It also assists in preparing beachheads for amphibious assaults. The template for *Kommando Yami* appears on p. 63.

Kommando Yami Unit Organization. *Kommando Yami* is commanded by a naval captain, and has an operating strength of approximately 300 servicemen (including headquarters, service and support elements).



Sayeret Tzanchanim

Sayeret Tzanchanim is the *sayeret* (Hebrew for "reconnaissance company") attached to the 35th Paratroop Brigade of the IDF. While acting as the reconnaissance element of its assigned command, *Sayeret Tzanchanim* also serves as the special operations force for the brigade. The other two active infantry brigades of the IDF have reconnaissance companies attached as well. These units, *Sayeret Golani* and *Sayeret Giv'ati*, are similar in training and mission to U.S. Army Rangers (p. 25).

Sayeret Tzanchanim draws volunteers only from those who have already been accepted into the Paratroop Brigade, and only about 40% of those manage to pass the three-day *gibush*. Training begins with paratroop basic training (lasting six months), during which the volunteers are formed into teams and each soldier is

assigned a role on the team. The soldiers remain in the same team for the duration of their training.

Land navigation, marksmanship, demolition, infiltration (including free-fall parachuting) and a variety of other commando skills are taught during the course. The entire process takes nearly 20 months, so by the time the team finishes the training period, its members have already spent nearly two years working together. The character template appears on p. 64.

Sayeret Tzanchanim Unit Organization. Details on the organization of *Sayeret Tzanchanim* are not currently available. It is known that the unit has a strength of about 200 soldiers, including headquarters, service and support elements. Operational teams contain between 12 and 16 soldiers.

Sayeret Matkal

Sayeret Matkal is the IDF's premier special operations and hostage rescue unit. It falls under the control of the IDF's director of military intelligence. The role of this *sayeret* is to provide a direct action, special reconnaissance and CSAR capability to the IDF, as well as to support *Mossad* (Israeli intelligence) operations abroad.

Candidates are solicited from among personnel who score highly on pre-conscription tests, as in *Kommando Yami* (p. 36). Once invited, candidates must pass a *gibush*, lasting five days, that tests the soldiers' physical strength, endurance, leadership and ability to perform under stress. The evaluations are subjective and, combined with test scores, form the basis for selection. Only 10% of those invited to the *gibush* are given the option of serving.

Like *Sayeret Tzanchanim* trainees, those training for *Sayeret Matkal* must attend paratroop basic training and commando skill training. They are also trained in counterterrorist tactics. The *Sayeret Matkal* character template is found on p. 65.

Sayeret Matkal Unit Organization. Officially, little has been revealed about the organization and strength of *Sayeret Matkal*. It is believed to be similar in size to *Sayeret Tzanchanim*: about 200 men, commanded by a lieutenant colonel. *Sayeret Matkal* contains an elite counterterrorist force known as Unit 269. This unit probably serves a function similar to that of the U.S. Army's 1st SFOD-Delta (p. 28).

Russia

Spetsnaz

The "Special Purpose" (*Spetsalnaya Naznacheniya*, or *Spetsnaz*) units are the primary special operations forces of the Russian military. These units are currently controlled by the Chief Intelligence Directorate (*Glavnoye Razvedivatelnoye Upravlenie*, or GRU) of the armed forces. There has been much discussion among high-ranking members of the Russian military as to the role of *Spetsnaz* units, however. Whether these units will continue to be considered an intelligence asset or re-classified with a broader mission remains to be seen.

During the Soviet regime, only the best airborne troops were selected for *Spetsnaz* units. Since the downfall of the Soviet Union, though, new conscripts have actually been able to request *Spetsnaz* training. It seems that the once highly secretive special ops force is becoming a recruitment tool! Even so, the qualifications for *Spetsnaz* troopers are strict, and while the selection process isn't publicized, it's safe to assume it is at least equivalent to that of the U.S. Army Rangers (p. 25).

PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

The 1990s saw turmoil caused by the sweeping reform (or outright overthrow) of existing governments in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. This left numerous highly trained professional soldiers without a steady source of income. It wasn't long before enterprising ex-soldiers found a way to market their unique skills, forming mercenary groups that are sometimes euphemistically called "private security companies."

Until recently, the largest and most successful of these was South Africa-based Executive Outcomes (EO). Formed by former SAS commandos and members of the South African Defense Force (SADF), EO had access to a fleet of three Boeing 727s, four surplus Soviet military helicopters (including two Mi-24 Hinds), and a variety of other rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. Reports at one point placed its readily available manpower at over 2,000 men. It recruited exclusively from honorably discharged members of the military or police.

Although it was claimed that EO did, on occasion, take direct action itself, the directors of the corporation insisted that they performed only training and advisory missions. The training offered by EO ranged from basic infantry skills to combat air patrolling to special ops skills. They also consulted on equipment-purchasing and security issues.

Executive Outcomes was a prosperous endeavor during the early 1990s, winning many contracts throughout sub-Saharan Africa. It played roles in stabilizing governments in both Angola and Sierra Leone. Using contacts gained during its missions, the directors were able to negotiate favorable contracts for subsidiary service companies related to EO. The London offices for EO listed more than a dozen such businesses, whose specialties included mining, energy production and private airlines. In 1998, though, EO announced that it would dissolve its corporate structure at the start of 1999. No reason was given, but some suggest it was due to growing political pressure from South Africa.

Executive Outcomes' success was great, but nowhere has the "private security company" been so popular as in Eastern Europe — particularly the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In 1994, 6,605 such organizations were registered in Russia. As staggering as that number may seem, Poland had more than 7,000 by the end of 1997! Many of these agencies end up as private armies for individuals or organizations — or worse, turn to organized crime or espionage themselves. With the growing incidence of drug and arms smuggling in Eastern Europe, Western governments are beginning to consider these companies as dangerous wild cards in an already volatile game.

FUNNY FOREIGN HATS

The beret is a very old style of headgear, but it acquired military connotations only in the 20th century. The elite French *Chasseurs Alpins* (mountain infantry) wore blue berets in WWI. In the 1930s, the German *Panzer* (armored) troops adopted black berets; it was easy to put on headphones over a beret. German *Panzer* berets also had a heavily padded inner cap to cushion the head when it hit the side of a tank!

In WWII, the beret was widely adopted as headgear for soldiers. It was easy to produce, looked fairly neat under most circumstances and was easy to wad up and stick in a pocket while wearing a helmet. Elite units soon realized that berets in unique colors could raise morale.

Beret recognition is an arcane art; its principles differ from country to country. In most of Western Europe, red is the color for airborne units. French-influenced forces have a true red; those following the British (including the U.S.) use a dark maroon.

Green is often the choice of special operations units. It is used by the U.S. Special Forces (whence "Green Berets"), the French Foreign Legion paratroopers and the Royal Marine Commandos. Special Forces had a long fight with the U.S. Army to get permission to wear the green beret; from 1956 to 1960, it was forbidden to wear "berets or other foreign-type headgear" in the U.S. Army. Special Forces continued to wear it at every opportunity and almost suffered mass courts-martial.

Black is the color for armored troops in most countries. In the U.S., it is also associated with special operations. American naval personnel assigned to coastal and riverine operations wore the black beret in Vietnam. Since then, it has been the mark of the Ranger units.

The British Special Air Service wears sand-colored berets, possibly to commemorate their original organization in the North African campaigns of World War II. Other Commonwealth countries follow suit.

Russian Airborne troops, including *Spetsnaz*, wear sky-blue berets. Naval *Spetsnaz* wear navy blue so dark it looks black.

No major military force has adopted a beret of camouflage pattern, but they have been widely produced and worn unofficially. Since armies now accept and issue berets, many elite units are looking for some other type of headgear. SEALs seem to favor the wool watch cap, and a long-billed camouflage cap – common in African armies – is the latest in military chic.


The training course covers marksmanship, small-unit tactics, parachuting, survival and demolition, among other topics. *Spetsnaz* soldiers (*spetsnazovtsi*) also receive training geared toward intelligence collection, such as interrogation methods. Like the members of most Russian elite units, they receive a good deal of training in hand-to-hand combat, both armed and unarmed. Knife fighting is emphasized, as is the use of the entrenching tool as a weapon.

Missions assigned to *Spetsnaz* units closely resemble those of the U.S. Army Rangers. Primarily direct action in nature, they include strategic strikes, deep raids and the disruption of lines of communication and supply. *Spetsnaz* units conduct special reconnaissance missions as well. There is also a unit of naval *Spetsnaz*, roughly equivalent to U.S. Navy SEALs in training and mission focus. The *Spetsnaz* skill template is on p. 65.

Spetsnaz Unit Organization. Command and control over regular army *Spetsnaz* units is exercised by the GRU, although such units are attached to each Russian military district's 2nd Directorate (Intelligence). Each such district (or front, in wartime) has a *Spetsnaz* brigade assigned; each army has an independent *Spetsnaz* company. As of 1993, the Russian Army had eight active *Spetsnaz* brigades (the 2nd, 3rd, 12th, 14th, 16th, 22nd, 24th, and 67th) and a training unit in Pechori, Russia (1071st Tng. Regiment). The number of independent companies is not well known.

There is currently a single naval *Spetsnaz* brigade, also under GRU control. In wartime, however, it is likely that a brigade would be deployed for each fleet (the naval equivalent of a front). The naval *Spetsnaz* brigade consists of a headquarters company, a midget submarine group, a *Spetsnaz desant* (paratroop) battalion, two combat swimmer battalions, a signals company, and a supply and support company. This brigade is located on the Black Sea, at Ocharkov.

See the sidebar on p. 39 for typical *Spetsnaz* company and team composition.



Alpha Group

In 1974, the KGB reorganized V-Group, its secret assassination unit. Two new units – Alpha Group, specializing in counterterrorism, and Beta Group, charged with assassination missions – were formed to replace V-Group. A third unit, Vympel Group, was later added to the roster of KGB special operations units.

In 1979, members of Alpha Group, along with operatives from both Beta and Vympel, were selected to form the *Kaskad* assault group. This group played an

integral part in the attack on the Taj-Bek Palace during the Soviet overthrow of the Afghan government in 1979 (see p. 21). During the late 1980s, Alpha Group performed a number of counterterrorist operations, dealing with everything from aircraft hijackings to kidnappings.

During the 1991 coup attempt, the Soviet Defense Minister and Chief of the KGB ordered Alpha Group, with the assistance of Soviet troops, to seize the Soviet White House and arrest President Boris Yeltsin and Russian Parliament leaders. In an unexpected and uncharacteristic move for KGB operatives, the two Alpha Group detachment commanders allowed their men to vote on the mission. The response was nearly unanimous: the orders were unconstitutional and illegal. Alpha Group refused to carry out the mission and seize the White House. Most of the other military units involved returned a similar response to the coup plotters. Combined with the popular support that the Russian leaders enjoyed, these refusals crushed the coup attempt.

In recent years, the KGB has been dismantled and replaced by a number of smaller intelligence services. At present, Alpha Group is subordinate to the Russian Federal Security Service – *Federal'naya Sluzhba Beznopasti* (FSB) – roughly equivalent to the U.S. FBI, and responsible for investigating domestic espionage and terrorism, and for fighting organized crime. Alpha Group is similar to the U.S. Army's 1st SFOD-Delta in mission and training. The Alpha Group character template is on p. 66.

Alpha Group Unit Organization. Details on Alpha Group are sketchy. It reportedly consists of a main group of 250 personnel stationed in Moscow, with smaller detachments in Yekaterinburg, Kasnodar and Khabarovsk.

OMON Troops

In late 1977, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del*, or MVD), hoping to avoid a repeat of the 1972 Munich incident, created a small counterterrorist company to respond to any such threat during the upcoming Moscow Olympics. The unit was named the Special Operations State Militia (OMON). Although it remained a small detachment for a decade, OMON was tremendously expanded in 1988, and additional units were placed in every major Soviet city. OMON was publicly tasked with combating violent crime and providing assistance in times of natural disaster, but one of the main reasons for its augmentation was a concern among Soviet leadership over political discontent.

OMON troops – often called “black berets” (not to be confused with the Naval Infantry, who wear similar headgear) – soon gained a reputation for ruthless violence in rebellious areas. In 1991, attacks against public buildings in both Latvia and Lithuania were carried out by OMON troops. Although the commander of the Lithuanian detachment decried Moscow's order to attack the Lithuanian facilities, it bears noting that he was promoted from captain to major following his unit's action. OMON troops became known for their heavy-handed tactics in dealing with civil unrest.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many OMON units were turned over to local control. OMON units in five major Ukraine cities formed the core of that county's Berkut (Golden Eagle) counterterrorist unit.

Members of OMON units receive training similar to that of SWAT teams and other Western counterterrorist units. OMON units are now used in a variety of law-enforcement roles, from battling organized crime to drug interdiction to counterterrorism.

OMON Unit Organization. Organization varies from unit to unit. The structure may resemble either SWAT or light infantry, depending on the mission. The average OMON unit has about 150 members divided into five smaller squads.



SPETSNAZ COMPANY ORGANIZATION

The organization of *Spetsnaz* companies under the Soviet Union was not fixed, unlike that of many Western special operations forces. It varied from command to command, primarily guided by mission. A company could contain from 17 to 62 soldiers. Within the company, a two-man headquarters element directed the operation of three to five teams, each consisting of 5 to 12 soldiers. Duties were broken down as follows:

- Team Leader (1 Officer)
- Assistant Team Leader (1 Warrant Officer or NCO)
- Radio Operator (1 or 2 Enlisted)
- Weapons Specialist (1 or 2 Enlisted)
- Demolition Specialist (1 or 2 Enlisted)
- Reconnaissance Specialist (0 to 4 Enlisted)

It bears noting that only the Team Leader and Assistant Team Leader were likely to be career soldiers. The other members of the team were usually first-term conscripts. This is in stark contrast to a U.S. Army SF A-Team (p. 31), where only experienced NCOs (or at least enlisted personnel of “promotable” status) are allowed to attend the selection and qualification courses.

A SELECTION- COURSE TRAGEDY: MAJOR MIKE KEALY

The SAS selection course has a reputation for ferocity, but few who have attempted it have died in the process. Unfortunately, it did claim the life of one of the Regiment's most illustrious officers.

On February 1, 1979, Major Mike Kealy joined volunteers for the 40-mile endurance march which caps the second phase of the SAS selection course. Kealy, the heroic commander of the SAS garrison at Mirbat whose ten men held off hundreds of Omani insurgents in 1972, was not required to take the course, but chose to try it – after returning to the regiment from administrative duty – to see if he could still meet the standards. Unlike the recruits, who carried waterproof storm gear and extra clothing in their rucksacks, Kealy followed a tradition of the period when he had first completed the course; he carried bricks to bring his rucksack up to the required 55 pounds.

As Kealy and the recruits set off, blinding torrents of rain and sleet reduced visibility to a few yards as they trudged through snow and ice. Despite the poor visibility, which made accurate compass sighting almost impossible, Kealy decided to proceed – as was the participant's choice to make – alone. Drenched by freezing rain, Kealy pressed on, but was discovered by other participants some time later, wandering lost. Despite his protestations that he was doing well, Kealy demonstrated some odd behavior, throwing away a pair of gloves given to him by one recruit, permitting a field jacket draped over him to blow away in the high winds, and instructing the recruits to "bugger off." Whether Kealy's judgment had already been clouded by hypothermia or whether he was simply caught up in the bravado of an officer having to be better at what he does than other ranks will never be known.

Less than seven hours after the march began, two other recruits – a captain and a corporal – discovered Kealy, unconscious in the snow. They dug a snow-hole and placed Kealy in a sleeping bag. The corporal huddled with him in the bag to provide body warmth while the captain went off to seek help. Once the alarm was given, the search for Kealy and the corporal took nearly 19 hours – complicated by horrendous weather conditions which necessitated cancellation of the march, bad visibility which hampered helicopter searches, and the obstinate refusal of the senior SAS officer on the scene to request civilian police and rescue teams to aid in resolving a problem which the SAS could not. Kealy died before help arrived; the corporal survived.

United Kingdom

The Royal Army's 22nd Special Air Service Regiment and the 3 Commando Brigade, Special Boat Squadron and Comacchio Group of the Royal Marines are Great Britain's primary special operations forces.

British Army

22nd Special Air Service Regiment

Originating in the campaign against Rommel's Afrika Korps, the Special Air Service (SAS) has justifiably come to epitomize elite special operations troops in the public mind. Today, the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment remains the elite of the British Army, setting standards for special ops units which have been imitated by many nations, including the United States (1st SFOD-Delta, p. 28) and Germany (GSG-9, p. 34).

The SAS is the only regiment of the British Army that doesn't recruit directly from the public. Only troops already serving in the British Army may apply for service with the SAS; most of these volunteers come from the Parachute Regiment or the Guards Regiments, although recruits are accepted from a wide variety of units.

The selection process is gruelling. Phase 1 subjects recruits to ten days of physical training and land navigation on the Brecon Beacons of Wales – a barren wasteland of rocky crags and bogs where, it is said, a good day is counted as one on which it rains or snows only intermittently. The day begins early each morning and concludes late at night, with the objective of testing the recruit's stamina and ability to think clearly under the corrosive effects of sleep deprivation and constant stress.

Selection culminates in a 40-mile forced march (Phase 2). The recruit, equipped with a 55-pound rucksack and his combat gear, must successfully negotiate this complex land navigation and endurance test – for which the map coordinates of rendezvous points must be memorized, not committed to writing – in less than twenty hours. Those who have passed this phase are then given fourteen weeks of intensive combat training (Phase 3) at the Regiment's base in Hereford, including weapons familiarization, marksmanship and small-unit tactics. Additional training in first aid, close-quarters battle (CQB), demolition and sabotage is also provided.

Four weeks of standard British Army parachute training (Phase 4) are provided at RAF Brize Norton in Somerset, culminating in seven jumps, including three combat jumps and one night combat jump. Parachute training is followed by combat survival and resistance-to-interrogation courses (Phase 5), lasting three weeks, conducted at Hereford and at the Joint Services Interrogation Unit at Exmoor, Wales. Standard survival training is punctuated with realistic – indeed, often physically and psychologically brutal – interrogations at the hands of the JSIU cadres. Those who pass the fifth phase, usually 5-17% of the original volunteers, are accepted into the Regiment, receiving the beige beret and winged dagger unit crest. Oddly enough, new members of the Regiment also receive a drop in rank and pay until they've qualified in several additional skills!

Those who have been selected for the Regiment, in reality, have only begun their training. Each SAS recruit must undergo intensive training in one of the four operational specialties of the Regiment: HALO parachute operations, amphibious operations, mountaineering and arctic operations, or overland/desert operations. A six-week HALO parachuting course, consisting of forty jumps under varying conditions at altitudes of 12,000' to 25,000', is offered to troops who opt to enter this



"KEENI MEENI" OPERATIONS IN ADEN

During the British campaign against the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, Major Frank Kitson developed what he called the "countergang" tactic of organizing units of native police and Mau Mau defectors – posing as Mau Mau guerrillas – to range deeply through suspected centers of insurgent support. Their mission was to conduct reconnaissance, locate Mau Mau strongholds and gather intelligence on guerrilla supporters in the civilian population. Kitson's success in Kenya – imitated by British "Q" units in Cyprus – quickly led to a reputation as one of Britain's premier counterinsurgency experts; he later served for several years as an advisor to the British government on anti-IRA operations in Northern Ireland.

The commander of the SAS squadron assigned to foreign internal defense operations in Aden in 1964, recognizing the unlikelihood that FLOSY (Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen) guerrillas could be coopted into countergangs, sought to refine Kitson's tactics. Twenty SAS men, mainly Fijians and a few Britons who could pass as Arabs, were formed into an undercover squad. Their mission was to penetrate the warrens of the Sheikh Othman and Crater quarters of the city of Aden and kill FLOSY targets of opportunity. Beyond the ability to blend into the native population, another skill was required of participants in these operations: the ability to put six of 13 rounds through a playing card at 15 yards while rapid-firing a Browning 9mm automatic pistol.

These operations soon came to be known as "Keeni Meeni" operations, from a Swahili phrase describing the movement of a snake in high grass, which had come to connote undercover work in general. The chief target of Keeni Meeni operatives was a network of FLOSY guerrillas who were assassinating Special Branch officers and their intelligence contacts. The usual tactic was to bring a European in military uniform into the backwaters of urban Aden as a decoy and eliminate the FLOSY guerrillas who sought to kill him. This tactic worked remarkably well, and was imitated by other British units in Aden.

Such imitation was not, however, without drawbacks. On at least one occasion, a Keeni Meeni team wounded two members of the Royal Anglian Regiment's Special Branch Squad on a similar mission after mistaking them for armed FLOSY guerrillas in the Sheikh Othman district.

specialty. A similar amphibious operations course, conducted jointly with the Royal Marines and the Special Boat Squadron (p. 43), provides the necessary swimming, boating and waterborne combat skills. Advanced training in mountaineering and arctic warfare, including cross-country skiing, is provided in northern Norway. An overland/desert operations training course, conducted in Oman, emphasizes orienteering and survival skills.

After completing operational specialty training, SAS recruits hone the military sub-specialty skills necessary for their complete integration into the four-man patrols into which each SAS Troop is organized: weapons, medical, demolition and communications. The courses are similar to those provided to U.S. Special Forces (p. 26) soldiers in these military occupational specialties, although the weapons training concentrates more on CQB – assaulting and clearing buildings, aircraft, etc. – than the more conventional Special Forces course. In this respect, CQB training resembles that provided in the 1st SFOD-Delta Operator's Course (indeed, SAS CQB training was originally used as a model for this component of the Operator's Course).

SAS soldiers are frequently cross-trained in more than one military sub-specialty. Intensive language training, tailored to SAS needs, is provided at the Royal Army Education Corps School of Language at Beaconsfield, and mission-tailored intelligence training is also available. The SAS template appears on p. 67.

22nd SAS Regiment Unit Organization. The Regiment, based at Hereford (although it will likely move to a new location in the very near future), consists of four "Sabre" squadrons, a signals squadron, a training wing, an operations research cadre, a planning and intelligence cadre, and the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) Team.

GOOD SOLDIERS AND GOOD SPECIAL OPS SOLDIERS

Many professional soldiers dislike the concept of "elite" units, and with reason. By siphoning off experienced leaders, such units reduce the combat readiness and effectiveness of line units. By placing higher demands on scarce resources and training facilities, they deprive line soldiers of equipment and training. By creating an artificial and disparaging distinction between the good soldier in a line unit and "elite" soldiers, they create unnecessary and undeserved problems of morale. In addition, line soldiers often feel that "elite" forces don't pay back the enormous investment of manpower, equipment and money that they require for operational success.

Despite these legitimate concerns, most armed forces today maintain highly trained, specialized units which – to the public – appear to be "elite" forces. The reason is simple: some essential missions are sufficiently specialized that they require extraordinary training and demand highly experienced soldiers with abilities above and beyond those required of line troops.


A good line soldier is a "company man." He is attentive to orders. He knows his job and he does it well, but he does it in the security of a large unit, knowing that fire support and reinforcement from his parent command will be available if needed, knowing that if most of the 100 to 200 men around him in his company do their jobs, he has little reason to fear anything but the sheer randomness of violent combat. A good line soldier follows "the book." Army doctrine and standard operating procedures provide him with the assurance of success if most parts of the military machine perform as expected. Such soldiers are not to be disparaged; they are the lifeblood of every army.

Good special ops soldiers differ from good line soldiers precisely in that their missions usually involve situations where "the book" is more an obstacle than an aid. They function in an environment where the well-oiled military machine cannot easily reach. "The book" is little help to a five-man patrol deep in enemy territory, beyond the reach of friendly support, confronting problems never before envisioned in army doctrine, or to an 18-man counterterrorist unit dealing with military and political difficulties beyond the scope of traditional military doctrine.

Continued on next page . . .

Each "Sabre" squadron, consisting of four troops – ten officers and 64 enlisted men – is commanded by a major. Each troop specializes in an infiltration method (HALO, amphibious, mountaineering or desert), is composed of two officers and 16 men, and is further divided into four-man patrols and a command element. A full squadron is always on stand-by alert at Hereford for any contingency. This duty, like that of the squadron assigned to Northern Ireland, is rotated among the "Sabre" squadrons at regular intervals.

The CRW Team, consisting of 20 men selected from the Regiment's "Sabre" squadrons and its planning and intelligence cadre on a rotation basis, provides ongoing intelligence analysis and operational planning and training for counterterrorist missions, as well as liaison to the counterterrorist units of friendly nations.



Royal Marines

In a sense, since all Royal Marines undergo commando training, they can be considered special operations troops with respect to the special reconnaissance and direct action missions. For this reason, 3 Commando Brigade is described, as well as the more distinctly special ops-oriented Special Boat Squadron, Raiding Squadrons and Comacchio Group.

3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines

Since the Second World War, all Royal Marines (except members of the Band Service) have been trained as commandos and are expected to function as special ops troops – particularly for reconnaissance and raiding – in addition to their conventional missions. The Royal Marine Commandos, like all British regular units, are a volunteer force.

Basic military training for Royal Marines lasts 13 weeks and is conducted at Lymington, near Exeter. Recruits receive vigorous physical training, orientation to military life and basic military skills such as marksmanship, communications and small-unit tactics. After the completion of BMT, recruits receive an additional 13 weeks of advanced training in air- and amphibious-assault techniques, mountaineering, weapons, demolition, first aid and arctic survival.

Upon completion of this training, the recruit becomes a Royal Marine Commando. Volunteers may then receive more advanced instruction in amphibious operations at Poole in Dorset, or in parachuting, HALO and air-assault operations at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton. Volunteers may also be selected for training in scuba and oxygen rebreathing equipment for underwater operations.

Since the primary NATO tasking of the Royal Marine Commandos is reinforcement of Norway on NATO's northern flank, most Commando units participate in three months of arctic exercises in Norway each winter. The Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre is an elite unit of specialists who train other Commandos and provide a reaction force for operations in such environments.

The character template appears on p. 68.

Royal Marine Commando Unit Organization. 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, consists of the 40, 42 and 45 Commando Groups, the 845, 846 and 847 Naval Air Squadrons, the 539 Assault Squadron, a logistics and supply regiment, and an HQ/signals squadron. Each Commando Group, roughly equivalent to a battalion, has 35 officers and 545 enlisted men, organized into three commando troops, a headquarters and headquarters troop, and a support troop. Artillery and engineering support is provided by British Army units attached to the brigade: 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery, the 20 Commando Battery, Royal Artillery, and the 56 and 131 Independent Commando Squadrons, Royal Engineers.

Special Boat Squadron and Raiding Squadrons

Royal Marine Commandos receiving amphibious and underwater operations training may volunteer for service with the Special Boat Squadron (SBS). Since the SBS operates primarily in support of the SAS, such volunteers receive an additional year of training with the SAS, as well as ski training with the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre in northern Norway and hard-hat diving and underwater demolition training at Poole. Selection for the SBS follows the pattern of SAS selection and vetting. Commandos assigned to the three Royal Marine Raiding Squadrons receive training similar to that of the SBS.

SBS Unit Organization. The precise unit organization of the Special Boat Squadron is classified information. It is believed to be configured along the lines of an SAS squadron, subdivided into four troops of two officers and 16 enlisted men each. The SBS provides transportation and support for the SAS in amphibious operations, and works closely with the boat squadron of the SAS.

The Comacchio Group

Formed in May 1980, to protect Great Britain's offshore oil operations against terrorist attack and sabotage, the Comacchio Group consists of Royal Marine Commando volunteers specially trained in counterterrorist operations. Their selection and training is similar to that of the SBS, with whom they frequently train and exercise.

Comacchio Group Unit Organization. As with the SBS, the precise unit organization of the Comacchio Group is classified information. Unclassified sources, however, suggest that the unit – based at Arbroath, Scotland – consists of 100 to 150 officers and ratings.

GOOD SOLDIERS AND GOOD SPECIAL OPS SOLDIERS

(Continued)

Good special ops soldiers need the abilities of good line soldiers, but they also need more. They need a heavy streak of independence and self-confidence. They need the ability to work closely with a small team of self-reliant soldiers. They need exceptional psychological stability and physical stamina to deal with the extraordinary stress and physical demands of their missions. They require an aptitude for foreign languages and the ability to adapt to foreign customs and cultures. If special ops troops are "elite," it is because the missions they are called upon to perform require qualities which are commonly associated with combat excellence.

UNIT OJT: TRAINING AS A WAY OF LIFE

Despite the detail and difficulty of the training courses, the bulk of the training which creates real special ops troops comes "on the job."


For all professional soldiers, it is a truism that training is a way of life. For special ops soldiers, training is *the* way of life. In special ops units, field and command post exercises – opportunities to sharpen skills under the most realistic circumstances available – are the daily rule. When not on exercises, the day is not spent in the busy work of motor pool and area police duty like in regular line units (although some of this is unavoidable), but undergoing refresher courses and cross-training in needed skills.

The training schedule for such units is often fearsome. U.S. Special Forces units run, on average, five to ten miles at the start of each working day for physical training; a weekly 20- to 40-mile march with full equipment is not exceptional. This on-the-job training plays an extraordinary role in acclimating the special ops soldier to the requirements of real missions in the real world. With this in mind, when generating *experienced Special Ops* characters, remember that the skill levels appropriate to training (see Chapter 3) reflect the minimum standards. As a result of unit OJT, they are frequently exceeded – certainly not in all skills, but assuredly in the soldier's areas of specialization and cross-training.

CHAPTER 3

CHARACTERS

Certain abilities are (or aren't) particularly appropriate for believable special operations soldiers. These guidelines are not ironclad rules; the requirements of the campaign, and the interests of the players and GM, will determine the extent to which any particular game follows them. Not everyone in a Special Ops campaign will necessarily be part of a special ops unit, either. Assets - intelligence agents, technicians and others with esoteric skills useful to the mission, or even grunts brought along as extra bodies - may accompany special ops troops in the field. Since these people have not been subjected to special ops selection and training, these guidelines do not apply to them.



Special operations soldiers are rigorously screened and highly trained. The standards by which they are evaluated are severe. Only physically and mentally exceptional people can be special ops soldiers, and only a modern government (or perhaps a multinational corporation) has the resources to train them. Thanks to the rigors of training and selection, and the continual testing to keep up standards, they could be viewed as “superhuman” – in the limited areas of their specialties.

The point totals for modern special ops soldiers will thus be justifiably higher than those for most characters. Realistically, most of these points should go into skills; special ops soldiers on active duty spend all of their time training. In *GURPS*, though, attributes are improvable and include “learned” as well as inborn ability – both of which these soldiers have in abundance – so this training is represented using exceptional DX and IQ in addition to skill points.

The set of skills acquired by a special ops character should bear some relationship to what is realistically possible, as discussed in Chapter 2. Cross-training and exchanges between units do take place, but there are limits to what any individual soldier can do in a single career. One way to handle this is to construct a “personnel file” (p. 70) for each PC, listing his training and previous assignments. These experiences will justify the point totals and skill levels on his character sheet, and can add depth and background to a campaign. The GM should work with his players to create this background.


Point Totals

Realistic Soldiers

A character’s point total should reflect his age, experience and training. A 19-year-old PFC in a Ranger company shouldn’t have the same skills as a 40-year-old master sergeant with 20 years’ experience in Special Forces. Beginning *Special Ops* characters, fresh from training, can be generated with 150 points. With the GM’s permission, veteran characters – with long service and preferably combat experience – can start with up to 200 points, as can members of truly elite units (e.g., Delta Force, SEALs, *Sayeret Matkal*, Alpha Group or the SAS). Should the campaign start with the characters in training, they could begin with as little as 100 points.

Action Heroes

These guidelines assume *realistic* special operations soldiers with believable levels of training. They are not one-man armies: they must rely on one another or be killed. It is a staple of pulp stories and action movies to portray these troops as true supermen, however. “Action heroes” should be built on at least 300 points (400+ points if experienced), and even raw trainees should get 150 points! All of the other guidelines still apply, but action heroes should take more of everything – especially attributes, advantages and Combat/Weapon skills. A campaign like this, while unrealistic, can be fun if it doesn’t take itself too seriously.



The “Gentler” Sex

Special operations units have historically been exclusively male. The reasons for this are partly sexism and partly military tradition. Most special ops soldiers do not believe that women belong in their line of work. In some cases, they are not wholly without rationale. For instance, menstruation is a real danger to a swimmer or diver in shark-infested waters, which is why there are no female SEALs (p. 30). The reasons for the exclusion of women from other units are less clear-cut.

As of 1998, the rules have started to change: 1st SFOD-Delta (p. 28) has five full-time female operatives for special missions. Women serve in counterterrorist units in several nations. Guerrilla movements use women for special ops and have been doing so for years. Given these trends, women will probably play an increasingly large role in special operations in the next millennium – although it is important to realize that this won’t appear on the evening news, since detailed information about the composition of special ops units is generally classified.

A female special ops soldier can be played in a contemporary *Special Ops* campaign if her personnel file (p. 70) explains why she was selected by old-school evaluators whose opinions were formed decades ago. This usually means an exemplary service record in the regular forces *and* special qualifications (languages, technical skills, etc.). In a pre-

1990s campaign, a female PC must be a member of regular military or police force on temporary duty with a special ops unit for a single mission. She will be given enough training to carry out her role, then returned to her original assignment at mission's end. Female "action heroes" (p. 45) are not bound by realism, of course!

Attributes

Special operations soldiers are selected for both physical and mental potential, and well-rounded recruits are preferred. Their attributes should reflect these standards. A special ops soldier should have one or two excellent attribute scores (13 or higher), and *must* have a score of at least 11 in *all* attributes. All of the character templates on pp. 56-69 meet these crite-

ria. Civilians or soldiers attached to a special ops unit for a particular mission – e.g., a CIA operative or a grunt from a line infantry unit – may have whatever attributes are appropriate, since the selection process to which they have been subjected is different from that of special ops soldiers.

Advantages

A number of advantages are particularly useful to special operations troops.

Required Advantage

Fit

see p. C125

All special ops soldiers *must* have this advantage. It is conferred by constant physical training – especially running. Note that this running does not necessarily improve Running skill; it is training for stamina, not speed. All of the templates on pp. 56-69 include Fit.

Desirable Advantages

Given the standards against which special operations troops are evaluated and the considerable danger their missions entail, the following advantages seem particularly desirable. The templates on pp. 56-69 include 15 to 30 points to spend on these advantages; soldiers created without templates should consider spending a similar number of points on these traits. Point costs are given in brackets []:

Absolute Direction (p. B19) [5], Absolute Timing (p. B19) [5], Acute Senses (p. B19) [2/level], Alertness (p. B19) [5/level], Ambidexterity (p. B19) [10], Breath Holding 1-2 (p. C121) [2/level], Charisma* (p. B19) [5/level], Combat Reflexes (p. B20) [15], Common Sense (p. B20) [10], Danger Sense (p. B20) [15], Double-Jointed (p. B20) [5], Extra Fatigue 1-4 (p. C124) [3/level], Extra Hit Points 1-4 (p. C124) [5/level], Fearlessness (p. C125) [2/level], Hard to Kill 1-2 (p. C125) [5/level], High Pain Threshold (p. B20) [10], Intuition (p. B20) [15], Language Talent (p. B20) [2/level], Less Sleep 1-5 (p. C127) [3/level], Luck (p. B21) [15 or 30], Manual Dexterity (p. C127) [3/level], Night Vision (p. B22) [10], Peripheral Vision (p. B22) [15], Reputation*† (p. B17) [varies], Resistant to Poison (p. C129) [5], Strong Will (p. B23) [4/level], Temperature Tolerance 1-2 (p. C130) [1/level], Toughness (p. B23) [10 or 25], Voice* (p. B23) [10]; any of

Collected (p. C122) [5], Composed (p. C122) [5] or Imperturbable (p. C126) [10]; either Disease Resistant (p. C124) [5] or Immunity to Disease (p. B20) [10]; either Rapid Healing (p. B23) [5] or Very Rapid Healing (p. C131) [15]; improve Fit [5] to Very Fit (p. C131) [15].

* Especially useful for officers and NCOs. A positive reaction makes command easier!

† Some decorations (below) give an instantly recognized Reputation.

Decorations

Medals, badges and distinctive insignia are morale-building tools. For a soldier – who can't show off his property or bank account – they are visible symbols of the worth of his service. An experienced soldier can read a lot about another soldier by an examination of his decorations. It is against regulations and (more importantly) a gross violation of custom to wear decorations that have not been properly awarded.

Medals

Most countries award campaign medals simply for having taken part in a military action. The U.S. is typical: It awards the National Defense Service Medal to everyone in the armed forces during designated times of national emergency (e.g., the whole period of the Vietnam War). Extended conflicts are recognized by a specific medal (e.g., there is a Vietnam Campaign Medal for anyone who actually served in country). The Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal is awarded for actions against a hostile force that do not get a separate decoration (e.g., Grenada). Separate campaigns are recognized by metal stars on the ribbon.

Medals for valor or distinguished service are awarded to individuals and units. The U.S. Army is somewhat more generous with awards than most, but its awards are typical. The Purple Heart is awarded for being wounded in combat. The Army Commendation Medal (ARCOM, also called the Green

Wienie) and the Bronze Star are awarded for exceptional service; if a small metal "V" is attached, the award is for valor in combat. ARCOMs and Bronze Stars were so widely awarded in Vietnam that they are not very impressive; the "V" device gets a little more respect.

The Silver Star, the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) and the Medal of Honor (*not* "Congressional Medal of Honor," despite a century of misuse) are awarded *only* for valor in combat. The Silver Star usually means quite a bit if awarded to an enlisted man or junior officer; for senior officers, it may or may not. The DSC (Navy Cross for the Navy and Marines, Air Force Cross for the Air Force) and the Medal of Honor are only awarded after careful investigation, and are always highly respected.

There is a group of medals – the Army Achievement Medal, the Legion of Merit and the Distinguished Service Medal – that are awarded only for non-combat service. The Soldiers Medal is awarded for bravery not involving combat (e.g., to a helicopter crewman who pulls someone from a burning wreck).

Additional awards of the same medal are shown by metal leaves, called Oak Leaf Clusters, on the ribbon.

Badges

Qualification badges exist for almost every significant skill. Parachutists, marksmen, drivers, divers and medics all have a badge to prove that they have passed their course. The Combat Infantry Badge is awarded to those who have taken part in infantry combat. Special Forces are only allowed to sew a flash to their berets after they have completed the MOS qualifications for the unit.

Unit Insignia

Each major unit, such as a division, has a distinctive patch which is worn on the left sleeve of the uniform. Troops who have served with a unit in combat can continue to wear its patch on the right sleeve (called a combat patch or right-sleeve patch) for their entire career.

Reputation Value of Decorations

Certain decorations are effectively a Reputation among soldiers and knowledgeable civilians. These give a reaction bonus and have a point cost. For U.S. decorations, this is:

Medal of Honor (+4 reaction): 20 points.

DSC, multiple Silver Stars (+3 reaction): 15 points.

Silver Star, multiple Bronze Stars with "V" (+2 reaction): 10 points.


Bronze Star with "V," multiple ARCOMs with "V," Combat Infantry Badge (+1 reaction): 5 points.

Military Rank and Grade

What civilians call "rank" – staff sergeant, second lieutenant, brigadier general, etc. – is called "grade" in the modern U.S. military. Officially, "rank" is one's seniority in grade: a soldier's date of rank (the date on which he was last promoted) determines who he is superior to and subordinate to

within his grade. Even in the military, however, there is a tendency to slip into talking about "rank" rather than "grade." In *Special Ops*, the terms are used interchangeably.

There are nine possible Military Rank levels (see p. B22), ranging from 0 (private) to 8 (general). Each level of this advantage costs 5 points.



Promotion and Time-in-Grade

Promotion in most military organizations – including special ops units – has standardized requirements. The soldier must serve for a certain amount of time and must be recommended by a promotion board consisting of senior officers (or officers and NCOs, for NCO promotion). They review the candidate's personnel file, including recommendations from the candidate's chain of command, and often conduct a personal interview. If the board recommends promotion, this recommendation is sent up the chain of command and the promotion becomes effective when an opening occurs in that grade. Soldiers on the promotion list but not yet promoted may list their current rank, followed by the letter "P" (for "promotable") in parentheses.

Outstanding job performance will eventually be reflected in promotion in most cases, but battlefield promotions for heroics are rare; a highly recommended NCO or officer is more likely to be promoted "below the line." In the U.S. Army, efficiency reports are graded on an Army-wide basis. In any year, a soldier in the top 5% of persons in his grade can be promoted before he would otherwise be eligible.

The policy on promotion in the United States military is "up or out": If promotion is not achieved within a certain amount of time, the soldier is involuntarily separated. This applies to both officers and enlisted men, but the policy is implemented somewhat differently for each group (see pp. 48-49).



Demotion

Enlisted men can lose a grade or so (but never more than one Military Rank) without too much effect on their career. It is more or less expected that aggressive troops will sometimes step over the line. For an officer to be demoted is much more serious. A military court is more likely to remove an officer from service (or give him the opportunity to resign) than to reduce him in rank. Officers are held to a higher standard of conduct than enlisted men; it is part of the price of their privileges. See *Military Justice* (p. 71) for more on this subject.

Enlisted Men

Enlisted men serve for a contracted number of years (an "enlistment" or "hitch"). They cannot resign from the service, although they can sometimes be separated early for "compassionate reasons" (e.g., due to the death of a parent that leaves them sole supporter of an invalid). The enlistment can be for two to 12 years, depending on which army at what time. If a soldier is not promoted at an acceptable rate, he is not allowed to reenlist.

Military Rank 0 consists of privates and the most junior of NCOs (lance corporals and corporals). In the U.S. service, it is the first four enlisted grades (E-1 to E-4); most people will not be allowed a second term unless they have reached at least E-4.

Military Rank 1 is junior NCOs – grades E-5 (sergeant) and E-6 (staff sergeant) in the U.S. Army. In line units, these are squad leaders, gun section chiefs, tank commanders and helicopter crew chiefs. A professional NCO usually spends

eight to 15 years of his service as a junior NCO. It is possible but unlikely for a soldier to put in 20 years and retire as a junior NCO. This usually means that at some point in his service he was reduced in rank ("busted") for some military offense. Many special ops units (like a Special Forces A-Team) have only soldiers of grade E-5 or above.

Military Rank 2 is the backbone of any professional army – the senior NCOs. In the U.S. service, these are sergeant first class, master sergeant and sergeant major. (A first sergeant is an E-8, the same grade as a master sergeant, who is assigned as senior NCO of a company.) From the platoon level up, they are an officer's advisors and his principal contact with the day-to-day life of the enlisted men. Almost no one reaches Rank 2 (at least grade E-7 in U.S. service) without at least six years in; no one makes 30 years *without* having reached Rank 2. These NCOs are the principal repositories of an army's expertise in peace or war.

Other armies don't follow the exact pattern of the U.S. The British don't have as many pay grades; the French Foreign Legion has no up-or-out policy and welcomes career privates; most Russian junior NCOs are two-year conscripts with little more training than their subordinates. However, the rough division into enlisted (Rank 0), junior NCO (Rank 1) and senior NCO (Rank 2) is universal.

Warrant Officers

Warrant officers outrank all enlisted men and are junior to all commissioned officers. They all have Military Rank 3. Different armies use warrant officers in different ways. In the U.S., they are officers who specialize in some skill – flying helicopters, assisting physicians, maintaining vehicles, administering personnel records, etc. – instead of commanding troops. In the Russian army, warrant officers (*praporshchik*) help make up for the lack of career NCOs.

Officers

Officers are not enlisted for a fixed term of service; in most armies, they are permitted to resign their commissions. They may be contracted to a minimum term of service and not allowed to resign before that term is completed, however (e.g., graduates of the U.S. Military Academy must serve four years on active duty). They do not reenlist at regular intervals. If they are on extended active duty after meeting a commitment, they continue in service until they or the army takes action to change their status.

U.S. Army officers have two kinds of commissions. Regular commissions guarantee service in commissioned status until pension time unless the officer does not meet promotion standards, is convicted of a crime or chooses to resign. Graduates of the Military, Naval and Air Academies, and selected graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (at civilian colleges) and Officer Candidate School (which trains enlisted men as officers), are given regular army commissions. Reserve officers can request a regular commission.

The other class of active duty officers is reserve officers on extended active duty, called "career reservists." They have no guarantee of length of service, but they qualify for a pen-

sion if they serve for over 20 years. When the services are forced to cut back commissioned personnel (a "reduction in force," pronounced "riff"), some "riffed" officers continue to serve as NCOs. Special operations forces are particularly likely to have senior NCOs who have been officers and who still hold commissions in the reserves.

Military Rank 3 is the lowest level for commissioned officers. In the U.S. Army and Air Force, they are 2nd lieutenants and 1st lieutenants; in the U.S. Navy, they are ensigns and lieutenants, junior grade. They have junior staff jobs, or command platoons of 10 to 50 soldiers (depending on branch of service). The maximum time for an active service officer to be a lieutenant is about six years.

Military Rank 4 (captains and majors; navy lieutenants and lieutenant commanders) is normally the highest Rank available for a beginning character. At this level, officers hold responsible staff positions, or command companies (50 to 300 men). In the U.S., Rank 4 officers usually have at least two years' service and have to be promoted to Rank 5 by the time they have 15 years' service.

Military Rank 5 officers (lieutenant colonels; navy commanders) command battalions of 1,000 to 2,000 men, or hold staff jobs. In the navy, they command small ships. In the U.S., most career officers retire at Military Rank 5; an officer can go all the way to 30 years in that Rank.

Military Rank 6 officers (colonels; navy captains) command regiments or brigades with a strength of several thousand men. In the navy, they command one large ship, such as an aircraft carrier or battleship, or a group of smaller ships. As staff officers, they are very senior – they are the officers who brief heads of state, supervise the development of new weapons, or head major special operations forces. The commander of all the Special Forces in Vietnam was a Rank 6 officer; so is the commander of Delta Force.

Military Rank 7 officers (brigadier generals and major generals; navy rear admirals) command divisions of 6,000 to 20,000 men, or hold equivalent positions. They have great influence as Patrons (below). In the U.S., they are the first level of officer likely to serve on active duty for longer than 30 years. Rank 7 officers in the U.S. are nominated by the President, but their promotion must have the consent of Congress. The commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is Rank 7 (a major general). It is rare to have Rank 7 with less than 20 years of service.

Military Rank 8 is the highest possible. In the U.S., it consists of the three-star (lieutenant general or vice admiral) and four-star (general or admiral) grades. These officers command several divisions, or an entire theater of operations. At any one time, there are fewer than 200 Rank 8 officers amongst the almost 2,000,000 U.S. military personnel. The commander of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is Rank 8 (a general).

Rank in Other Armies

In some countries, notably the U.K., service with a special operations unit often involves temporary demotion. The table of organization of the 22nd SAS Regiment has relative-

ly few positions for senior NCOs. Since most recruits who volunteer for service with the SAS are already NCOs, they must take a lower temporary grade. The lowest grade of any SAS soldier is corporal, but many senior sergeants have gladly given up their grade to temporarily serve in the SAS as a corporal – with the pay and allowances of a corporal, of course. This temporary demotion does not apply to commissioned officers.

Promotion in the Russian armed forces is much more rigidly bureaucratic in nature. Time-in-grade requirements prevail, and an officer must currently hold an assignment appropriate to the new grade in order to be promoted. For example, a major seeking promotion to lieutenant colonel must have served four years as a major and must currently command a battalion or its equivalent. *Spetsnaz* officers and NCOs require only half the time-in-grade of non-special ops soldiers.

Patrons

The military does not count as a Patron for a soldier. It is an employer that provides housing, clothing, food and equipment as part of his remuneration . . . but it does this equally for all its employees. (Likewise, the military's enemies are not its soldiers' personal Enemies.) Military Patrons should be much more personal than that.

Military organizations are rife with cliques, old-boy networks and remember-when alliances. Knowing and befriending or impressing someone who may sit on your promotion board, or who can obtain a choice assignment for you, is one of the most important factors in a successful military career. The efficiency rating systems of military organizations make this kind of networking essential.

Most officers who have achieved the rank of general were aides to general officers who gave them high ratings in their youth. The unofficial West Point Protective Association (a.k.a. "ring knockers," from the U.S. Military Academy class ring that most graduates wear) has saved the career of many an officer who has run afoul of the system. The same is true of NCOs; a sergeant major can accomplish more than most generals by picking up the telephone and calling his counterparts throughout the military. The buddy system is a key to career survival in military organizations.

Patrons should be appropriate to the character concept, of course. A 20-year-old corporal is unlikely to have the President of the United States or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a Patron. A full colonel – the commander of a successful, elite special operations unit – might have either one. A young sergeant might have a senior NCO as Patron, if something significant brought him to the Patron's attention. If he wants the Chief of Staff of the Army as a Patron, he had better have a *good* explanation, like kinship or relation by marriage (but remember that senior officers will often go out of their way to avoid the appearance of favoritism toward friends and relatives).

Military Patrons use the rules for Patrons (p. B24); a sample Patron is described on p. 97.

Disadvantages

A number of disadvantages are prohibited to special operations troops, while others are tolerated or even tacitly encouraged.

Required Disadvantage

Extremely Hazardous Duty see p. C78

This disadvantage is *mandatory* for all special ops soldiers in active military service (including reservists who are recalled to service), and does not count against the disadvantage limit for the campaign. One reason this duty is appropriate is that special ops *training* is as dangerous as many battlefield situations. The templates on pp. 56-69 include Extremely Hazardous Duty.

Desirable Disadvantages

Professional soldiers – and special operations troops are always professionals – often choose the military as a career precisely because its regimented, authoritarian and patriotic nature appeals to deep-rooted psychological needs. When it comes to duty, dedication, honor and country, most special ops soldiers are straight arrows, regardless of their extracurricular hell-raising exploits. Recruiters, commanding officers and promotion boards favor soldiers who show the traits listed below. The templates on pp. 56-69 include disadvantage points to be selected from this list; soldiers built without templates should also select at least -20 points from the following:

Code of Honor (see below) [-10], Fanaticism (see below) [-15], Honesty (p. B33) [-10], Sense of Duty (p. B39) (Comrades in arms or Unit) [-5] or (Service or Country) [-10], Truthfulness (p. B37) [-5], Workaholic (p. C195) [-5].

Code of Honor see p. B31

The following codes of conduct are appropriate for military men. These are ideals to live up to; in reality, the system (and politics) often gets in the way.

Enlisted Man's Code of Honor: Be willing to fight and die for the honor of your unit, service and country; follow orders; look out for your buddies; take care of your kit; treat an honorable enemy with respect (a dishonorable enemy deserves a bullet); wear the uniform with pride. -10 points.

Officer's Code of Honor: Be tough but fair; bring honor to your unit, service and country; follow orders; lead from the front; look out for your men; observe the "rules of war"; wear the uniform with pride. -10 points.

Ranger Creed: See p. 27. This mentality is common to all special ops units, not just the Rangers. -10 points.

Fanaticism see p. B33

Fanaticism – about one's country, service or unit – is common. If you doubt this, burn a U.S. flag near the main gate at Fort Bragg, or call a SEAL a "squid" to his face. You'll be

sorry once you regain consciousness. More seriously, check the percentage of Medal of Honor winners who served in special operations units in World War II, Korea and Vietnam.

Acceptable Disadvantages

Bad Sight (p. B27) at -10 points (e.g., correctable) is acceptable in most military units. Civilian agencies sometimes have stricter requirements, and often insist on uncorrected "20/20" (average) vision or better.

Bloodlust (p. B31) is not uncommon among special ops troops; they are professionals at killing, and frequently think that the best enemy is a dead enemy. Indiscretion, or the bad luck to have a news photographer in the wrong place, can lead to an "incident," but a good commanding officer will stand up for his men.

Callous (p. C186) is common among seasoned troops. Terrorists can be women and children a lot like a trooper's own wife and kids. If he can't pull the trigger, he's a danger to himself and his unit.

Chummy (p. C187) troops can improve morale and unit cohesion.

Compulsive Behavior (p. B32) of certain kinds, notably Compulsive Gambling and Carousing, is common in the military. This is tolerated as long as it doesn't interfere with the mission.

Dependents (p. B38) are common for special ops soldiers, but should not appear often. It is rare for a Dependent to be found in a war zone and highly unlikely that one would be the victim of a terrorist operation; SOP would exclude a special ops soldier from participating in a counterterrorist mission involving a family member in any case. Many professional soldiers are family men, though, and concern for their families weighs heavily upon their minds. A family man might be reluctant to take one more chance and run the risk of leaving his wife a widow with three children; on the other hand, if he doesn't take that risk, an important mission may fail and men who are counting on him may die. It's a tough choice.

Gluttony (p. B33) is unlikely but not impossible.

Greed (p. B33) can be very interesting, especially if the greedy one has access to classified information . . .

Gullibility (p. B33) is the disadvantage of a stock character in war movies: the naive, unsophisticated young soldier. This personality is *not* incompatible with the highly trained special ops trooper! A soldier can be a military wonder without knowing much about life outside the army.

Impulsiveness (p. B33) can be interpreted as the "can-do" attitude ingrained in professional soldiers taken a bit further than usual.

Intolerance (p. B34) is not uncommon among special ops troops. *Spetsnaz* soldiers – mostly ethnic Russians – are often intolerant of the other cultures of the former Soviet Union. Israeli troops frequently have little time for Arabs. A common form of Intolerance is of civilians, who are sometimes seen as

overweight, overpaid whiners who couldn't last five minutes among "real men."

Laziness (p. B34) in a special ops soldier might be considered mad industry anywhere else, but every unit has its "get over" artist who always tries for the job that can be done sitting down.

Lecherousness (p. B34) is a hallowed military tradition.

Obsession (p. CI93) with promotion, joining an elite unit or earning a specific qualification is regarded as "healthy ambition" in special ops forces; most other forms of Obsession are frowned upon.

Odious Personal Habits (p. B26) and *quirks* (p. B41) are as much a part of the military as of any other lifestyle, but remember that what are harmless annoyances in peace may have lethal consequences in the stress of war. Superstitions are extremely appropriate quirks for soldiers of all types.

Overconfidence (p. B34) is obviously appropriate here! Much of the training received by these troops convinces them that they can master any task and accomplish any mission – they *have* to believe this or they couldn't do much of what they are called upon to do. The more severe form, *Glory Hound* (p. CI90), should be prohibited. Special ops soldiers are under strict orders not to reveal details to the media; seeking the limelight would result in swift expulsion from most units.

Stubbornness (p. B37), if roleplayed appropriately, can enhance a soldier's performance – particularly when dealing with outsiders (nonspecial ops types).

Unluckiness (p. B37) *might* be appropriate, given the historical propensity for special ops plans to go awry in the heat of action – but think carefully before taking it. Even with large amounts of Luck, the tasks required of special ops units can be exceedingly lethal. A soldier with a reputation for unluckiness will be shunned!

Prohibited Disadvantages

It is improbable that anyone with a serious psychological or physical handicap would be recruited to a special operations unit. Indeed, many of the disadvantages available in *GURPS* would disqualify one from enlistment in most *regular* armies.

Mental Disadvantages


The security clearances which special operations soldiers hold are considered vital. Losing your clearance means leaving the unit. The security vetting procedures – exhaustive background investigations and interviews (frequently involving polygraphs) – make it extremely unlikely that a person with any of the following disadvantages would be permitted to serve in a special ops unit:

Addiction (to any illegal substance; tobacco is acceptable), Alcoholism, Amnesia, Berserk, Cannot Learn, Chronic Depression, Delusions (major or severe), Dyslexia, Flashbacks, Kleptomania, Lunacy, Manic-Depressive, Megalomania, Non-Iconographic, Paranoia, Prefrontal Lobotomy, Pyromania, Short Attention Span, Split Personality, Voices.

The need for close teamwork in special ops units and their ongoing evaluation processes also make it unlikely that anyone with any of the following disadvantages would be retained for long:

Combat Paralysis, Confused, Cowardice, Edgy, Glory Hound, Indecisive, Low Empathy, Low Self-Image, On the Edge, Pacifism, Phobias, Post-Combat Shakes, Reclusive, Trickster.

At the GM's discretion, if it is appropriate for the scenario (e.g., a character flaw on the part of a LRRP soldier, discovered in combat in the bush), one or more of these disadvantages may be taken by a special ops soldier. They might also appear in a scenario set in Vietnam before the LRRP companies were designated Rangers, when selection and training was significantly looser than they are today.



Physical Disadvantages

It is virtually impossible for anyone with any of the following disadvantages to serve as a special ops soldier:

Bad Back, Bad Sight (at -25 points), Blindness, Color Blindness, Deafness, Delicate Metabolism, Dependency, Dwarfism, Epilepsy, Fat, Giantism, Hard of Hearing, Hemophilia, Hunchback, Lamé, Mute, Night Blindness, No Depth Perception, One Arm, One Eye, One Hand, Quadriplegic, Terminally Ill, Tourette's Syndrome, Unfit, Very Unfit, Weak Immune System.

A special ops soldier who gained any of these traits would be separated as soon as it became known. If it was caused by wounds, he would receive a Purple Heart and a medical discharge; he might find special ops-related work in the intelligence community or as a mercenary, but he would not be allowed to remain in the military. Those attached to special ops units for specific missions *may* have some of these disadvantages – but remember, regular military units, intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies also have relatively high physical standards.

Skills

Special operations troops are probably best defined by their skills. Some special rules apply to these skills.

Skill Acquisition

Skills come from three main sources for a special ops soldier:

1. The skill levels on the template for his unit (U.S. Special Forces, Russian *Spetsnaz*, British SAS, etc.) *must* be taken. The templates on pp. 56-69 include the minimum skill levels he receives from his training. Choices on the templates reflect specializations: communications, demolition, intelligence, medical, weapons, etc.
2. If an experienced (and often high-ranking) character is being created, his template skill levels should be raised to account for on-the-job training. This is likely to add new skills as well, as he attends more training courses. Soldiers like this can have up to 50 points more to spend on added abilities.
3. Most soldiers come to the military with civilian skills, hobbies and other interests. These should be used to customize the template and round out the character.



Age Limit on Beginning Skills

The standard age limit on points spent on skills (p. B43) does not apply to template skills for special ops soldiers. This reflects the intensive training that these troops receive. By the same token, points spent on *non*-template skills cannot exceed the character's age (i.e., half the standard amount). This means that outside his military skills, a special ops character will not be much more knowledgeable or skilled than a "standard" 100-point *GURPS* character. See *Skill Degradation* for additional rules governing skills learned through intensive training.

Skill Improvement

In a long-running *Special Ops* campaign, PCs will have the opportunity to go "back to school" between missions. Constant training is a way of life for these troops. Bad performance will earn remedial training; good performance will qualify the character for special courses (see Chapter 2).

A soldier earns one character point per 100 hours spent in a special school. Assume that a day is 12 hours long. These character points may be spent only on the skill(s) covered by that school, as determined by the GM. This is twice the normal rate at which skills are learned. The difference is due to the lavish training materials, the quality of the teachers and the attention demanded of the students.

Special ops troopers on active duty also train constantly, but this is directed more toward *maintaining* skills. Allow one character point – to be spent only on template skills – for each month of active duty.

Recognizability of Skills

Military training tends to be deep but narrow; a trained special ops soldier knows the mechanics of his job very well but usually has only a limited background in the theory behind it. For instance, a Special Forces Weapons Sergeant knows how to operate and maintain a long list of weapons, but is seldom a trained gunsmith. A graduate of the Desert Survival course has learned a lot of techniques for staying alive in that environment, but not much about the complex interactions of desert ecology.

Under stress, people tend to do not what is best or most logical, but what they have practiced; therefore, anyone familiar with the training techniques of a military force has a good chance of recognizing the "signature" in operations conducted by those who have received this training. At the GM's discretion, special ops soldiers may roll vs. IQ (+2 for a graduate of the same course) to identify the background of someone who has set a particular kind of ambush, built a particular kind of terrorist device or used a particular technique of survival. Non-special ops types roll vs. Intelligence Analysis skill (p. B66) instead.

Skill Descriptions

Certain skills from *Basic Set* and *Compendium I* require further discussion in a *Special Ops* campaign; these are addressed below. Other skills of importance include Cryptanalysis (p. CI156), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (p. CI150), Hard-Hat Diving (p. CI152), No-Landing Extraction (p. CI151), Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Warfare (p. CI151), Orienteering (p. CI153), Scuba (p. B48), SIGINT Collection/Jamming (p. CI151), Traffic Analysis (p. CI151) and Traps (p. B68).

Administration

see p. B62

The armed services of most nations are highly bureaucratic entities. NCOs and officers will need this skill at level 12 or higher to do their jobs. The templates on pp. 56-69 reflect this.

Camouflage

see p. B65

Effective camouflage takes time; a fully camouflaged fighting position can take several hours to prepare.

Modifiers: -5 for quick camouflage (less than 15 minutes), -3 to -10 for limited natural materials (the most skilled camouflage expert would be hard-pressed to effectively conceal himself on an exposed, flat, barren surface). All modifiers are cumulative.

Camouflage or the detection of camouflage is also a matter of familiarity with the environment. In the Quick Contest of Skill to spot a camouflaged target, the less familiar party has a penalty of -1 to -4 (GM's decision). Anyone with ½ point or more in Survival for an environment is familiar with it. The GM may also rule on familiarity based on the background story of the character.

Climbing

see p. B57

Climbing is part of the curriculum of every special ops unit; getting to a target often involves a climb: up, down or both. One of the techniques of downward climbing is *rappelling* – descending with a rope and harness. Special ops units use it to enter buildings and to descend from helicopters as well as for its more traditional uses. Rappelling is limited by the length of rope available; no amount of skill can go farther.

Rappelling is very easy to learn, and is not a separate skill; roll vs. Climbing at +3 (so the default is DX-2 or ST-2) to rappel down a vertical surface. A rappel from a free-hanging rope is made at only +1. Roll once per rappel. A failed roll indicates the rope stuck, hanging the trooper in midair; a critical failure indicates a fall.

A soldier “on rappel” descends with a stop-and-start motion. Gravity limits the distance he can cover in a given time. In one second of free-fall, he could go no more than 16 feet. Given the friction of the rope, he actually covers somewhat less. In general, it takes one second to rappel 15 feet or less, and two seconds to rappel between 15 and 30 feet. Longer rappels average 20 feet per second. A rappelling soldier is hard to hit; a foe would target him at -4 (-3 for speed, -1 for slightly unpredictable movement).

If you have a rappel harness, it takes 2 seconds to fasten it to the rope and 2 seconds to release it. It takes 4 seconds to rig a bare rope for rappelling by wrapping it around you; this gives -2 to skill, or -5 if you lack gloves or hand protection!

See p. B89 for further discussion of climbing.

Demolition/TL

see p. B65

This skill includes sabotage and arson, but is mostly concerned with explosives at TL4+. It includes the skills of mining and booby trapping. With the right equipment and time to use it, a demolition man can build a booby trap with a higher effective skill than his own: +1 to +10 (GM's discretion) for exotic multiple-fuse systems, unstable explosives, etc.

Detect Lies

see p. B65

This skill is *strongly* recommended for senior NCOs (Rank 2) and intelligence specialists, but it is never required.

Driving/TL

see p. B68

All special ops soldiers know Driving (Automobile), which covers the operation of any three- or four-wheeled ground vehicle weighing 5 tons or less: cars, jeeps, trucks, ATVs, etc. Individual soldiers may have other specialties: *Construction Equipment* for combat-engineering machinery, *Heavy Wheeled* for big rigs (and airliners moving on the ground – useful during hostage-rescue missions), *Halftrack*

for snowmobiles and *Locomotive* for trains. Troops drawn from mechanized infantry or armored cavalry units may have Driving (Tracked).

Each specialty requires a separate qualification course and counts as a unique skill. Differences between the equipment of different nations – or between 18-wheelers and 747s – are handled according to *Familiarity* (p. B43).

Electronics Operation/TL

see p. B58

The most important specialization in *Special Ops* is Electronics Operation (Communications). Radios are the nervous system of 20th-century special ops; they make coordination, supply, fire support and extraction possible with a flexibility and precision unknown to previous generations of warriors. The use of this skill depends heavily on equipment; even the most skilled operator can't get more range out of a set than the system will allow, or repair a bullet-riddled transmitter without some source of parts.

Electronics Operation (Computers), (Security Systems) and (Sensors) are also useful skills for late 20th-century special ops troopers. Future combatants may need other specialties, while campaigns set at TL6 will have only (Communications) available.

Engineer/TL (Combat)

see p. B60

This skill is used to erect or demolish fortifications, barricade or clear roads (or create new ones), lay bridges, etc. No special skill is required to dig a hole or lay sandbags, however; anyone with basic infantry training will know how to do that.

Forward Observer/TL

see p. CI151

Since special ops units are often out of contact with friendly ground forces, they are more likely to use air support than conventional artillery. The skill is the same. A more detailed treatment of artillery observation can be found on pp. HT80-88; air support is addressed on pp. HT90-92.

Intelligence Analysis/TL

see pp. B66, CI161

Rolls against Intelligence Analysis should always be made by the GM (one roll per game day). On a success, he will give a true statement about enemy capabilities or intentions. The better the roll, the more valuable the piece of information. On a failure, he will tell the player “You have no idea” or give him a piece of information that may or may not be true (GM's choice; the worse the roll, the less reliable it should be). On a critical failure, the GM gives false information with the most sincere expression and manner he can manage.

The quality of analysis depends on the amount and validity of information available. It also depends on the analyst's background; one who is brilliant at predicting the intentions of NVA regulars may have no insight into the Provisional IRA.

Modifiers: -1 to -10 for enemy countermeasures; -1 to -5 for a rushed analysis; -1 to -10 for an area unfamiliar to the analyst; all modifiers on p. CI161. These modifiers are cumulative.

Note that a simple Sense roll (p. B92) will let a soldier spot maps, photographs, documents, uncamouflaged materiel, etc., when infiltrating an enemy installation. Intelligence Analysis is the skill of *using* this information (along with satellite data, interrogation reports, etc.). It is taught only to "intelligence troops" like *Sayeret Matkal*, *Spetsnaz* and intelligence specialists in other forces.

Interrogation

see p. B66

This also covers skill at resisting interrogation. The victim may resist using the *higher* of his IQ or Interrogation skill. If he can make an additional successful skill roll, the interrogator's bonuses for using lengthy interrogation, threats or torture (but not drugs) will be halved. SERE school (p. 27) teaches resistance, while intelligence school teaches interrogation; there is a -2 unfamiliarity penalty (p. B43) to use the skill in a way other than that learned. Those with both qualifications may ignore this penalty.

Knife

see p. B51

Almost every special ops trooper carries a knife for its utility as a tool. Sometimes they are used as weapons. The mystique of cold steel is such that most units teach the art of knife fighting.

There are as many styles of knife fighting as there are revealed religions, and the devotees of each style are just as mutually intolerant. At the GM's option, a character has a -1 to active defenses unless he knows his opponent's style (he attended the same course or was specifically trained to counter it). This familiarity costs 1 point per style; see *Style Familiarity* (p. CI30). Fashions in knife fighting come and go; what is taught to one class may be changed completely by the next. The GM, as always, is the final authority.

The most common combat use of knives in special operations is to silence sentries. This takes two rolls. The first is against Stealth (to approach the sentinel undetected), or Acting or Sex Appeal (to approach openly without arousing suspicion). If this roll fails, the sentry may challenge the intruder or precipitate combat. Otherwise, roll vs. Knife skill using the rules for unaware victims in the sidebar on p. B126. If the sentry is not immediately incapacitated or killed, he may give the alarm or die noisily.

Leadership

see p. B63

Leadership must be taken at level 12 or higher by any NCO or officer who plans to lead troops in combat. The templates on pp. 56-69 reflect this.

Parachuting

see p. B48

A failed Parachuting roll is not necessarily fatal; only a critical failure indicates an actual fall, and even then a reserve 'chute can save you. Failures and even critical failures for *Special Ops* PCs should cause embarrassment and pain: hard landings, treatable injuries, a missed drop zone (DZ) or being hung up in a tree. One possibility is that the main 'chute fails

but the reserve 'chute opens. This is definitely worth a Fright Check! Nobody should die on the initial jump except "canonfodder" NPCs.

Special ops parachutists have three familiarities (p. B43) not normally used by the civilian jumper. The unfamiliarity penalty for these special techniques is -5 as opposed to the usual -2; 50 hours of military training or 100 hours of civilian practice *per technique* will eliminate this penalty.

HAHO. "High-Altitude High-Opening" parachute operations. The jumper exits at 25,000' to 30,000', using breathing apparatus and a specially designed parachute. With this 'chute, he can pilot himself long distances to a DZ. If the DZ is more than five miles from the exit point, roll at -1 per mile after the fifth. Apply a further -1 to -10 (GM's discretion) for adverse weather or the size, location or condition of the DZ (a DZ of 50 square feet on top of a sheer cliff completely surrounded by high-voltage wires would be -10). Jumping without oxygen is at an extra -4.

HALO. "High-Altitude Low-Opening" parachute operations, using breathing apparatus. Special physical maneuvers are used to guide one's movement while free-falling from 25,000' or more, until the parachute opens at 4,000' or lower. Jumping without oxygen is at an extra -4.



LALO. "Low-Altitude Low-Opening" parachute operations, usually from an altitude of 300' to 500'. It requires iron nerves and extraordinary dexterity to prevent serious injury, as the speed achieved by the jumper is considerably greater than for any other maneuver. All LALO attempts are made at -3, and any roll of 16+, or failure by 8 or more, is a critical failure! Reserve parachutes are rarely carried on LALO jumps: If the main 'chute fails, there isn't enough time for a reserve to deploy before the hapless paratrooper "augers in."

Powerboat/TI.

see p. B69

SEALs and Force Recon units use all sorts of powerboats. SEALs also use a vehicle that counts as a powerboat: the swimmer delivery vehicle (SDV). The SDV is a small, free-flooding submarine designed to be launched from a larger, submerged submarine (see p. 88). SDV is considered a "familiarity" of Powerboat skill (p. B43). Those unfamiliar with it have a -2 penalty; 100 hours of military training will eliminate this. Scuba (p. B48) or Hard-Hat Diving (p. CI152) rolls are required to keep breathing while piloting the SDV.

Running **see p. B48**

Running is not a required skill on any of the character templates. Special ops soldiers run all the time, but it is a slow, lung-searing pace designed to develop endurance, which is why all special ops soldiers have HT 11+ and the Fit advantage.

Savoir-Faire (Military) **see p. C1160**

All special ops *soldiers* will have at least ½ point in this skill, but non-military characters (e.g., members of border patrols, SWAT units and hostage rescue teams run by civilian police forces) will not.

Scrounging **see p. B67**

Scrounging covers the procurement of equipment through unconventional channels, including “midnight requisitions” (see p. 95). NCOs and warrant officers should have this skill at above default level.

Shortsword **see p. B52**

This skill has two uses for the 20th-century special ops soldier. First, special ops units drawn from the police rather than the military are almost certainly trained to use police batons. Second, many missions take place in jungle or forest areas where the terrain helps equalize the firepower advantage of conventional units; as a result, the machete is very common among special ops units. Both weapons use Shortsword skill in combat.

Spear **see p. B52**

Fixed bayonets are used with Spear skill. Reach varies: an M1903 Springfield with a 17” bladed bayonet has Reach 1, 2; an M16, with less than 4” of blade sticking past the flash suppressor, has Reach 1. Even shorter weapons (e.g., a bayonet-equipped Steyr AUG or Sterling submachine gun) also have Reach 1, but give -1 to Spear skill *if used in melee combat*;

they are just as efficient at sticking unresisting targets. A bayoneted weapon can be thrown, but the combination is both heavy and unbalanced. At best, it is -4 to Spear Throwing, and may be worse (e.g., a Nambu Light Machine Gun is -6) at the GM’s discretion.

Strategy **see p. B64**

This skill isn’t likely to be important in a *Special Ops* campaign: strategic decisions are made far over the heads of those who do the fighting. If officers of Rank 5+ are permitted as PCs, though, they should have Strategy at level 12 or better.

Tactics **see p. B64**

All but the greenest troops should have at least ½ point in this skill, if only to reflect the theory presented in basic training. NCOs and officers who are expected to lead troops in combat must learn it at level 12 or higher. The templates on pp. 56-69 reflect this.

Telegraphy **see p. B55**

Before TL7, most long-distance radio messages, especially in clandestine operations, were in Morse code or “CW.” That is, they were sent by radio-telegraphy rather than by radio-telephony (voice). Even well into TL7, military operators were taught to send and receive Morse code with a hand-operated key.

Underwater Demolition/TL **see p. B68**

This skill is dependent on changing technology. Before the development of SCUBA (self-contained underwater breathing apparatus), underwater demolition missions were limited to a few minutes except in rare circumstances where hard-hat diving techniques (p. C1152) could be used. See also *Holding Your Breath* (p. B91) and *Diving Equipment* (pp. 91-92).

Character Templates

A character template is a list of attributes, advantages, disadvantages and skills that a player can choose from in order to quickly build a character without neglecting important abilities or getting bogged down in game mechanics. The point costs of these traits are listed and the sum is given as the “template cost.” The player pays this cost, specifies the options he wants, copies the template abilities to his character sheet and spends any remaining points to customize his character.

The templates on pp. 56-69 all meet the minimum attribute requirement of 11 (p. 46), and include Fit (p. 46) and Extremely Hazardous Duty (p. 50). The skills on each template are based on actual training for that unit (see Chapter 2). These templates are intended to generate top-notch versions of already “elite” soldiers for use as heroic player characters. The GM can lower DX or IQ by one or two (to a minimum of 11, or 12 for a 200-point template) for “typical” NPCs; this

will reduce related skills by the same amount. “Action heroes” (p. 45) should start with the abilities on these templates and inflate them mercilessly!

A trooper must meet or exceed the listed *relative* skill levels (“DX+1,” “IQ-2,” etc.) to be accepted for duty with that unit. No one completes training without demonstrating, to very hard-to-please graders, that he meets these standards. Lower *numerical* skill levels are acceptable if the GM has reduced template DX or IQ, as mentioned above.

Note that a player never has to use a template. Characters made using templates are completely compatible with characters cut from whole cloth. A PC built in accordance with the guidelines in this chapter can serve in a given unit as long as he meets the skill minimums on that template. These requirements cannot be met by default, though; every character with a special ops background must spend at least ½ point per template skill.

Skills

Basic Skills are skills absolutely required by all members of a unit. *MOS Skills* are specific to an MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) or equivalent; this is usually a choice, and some templates will require more than one choice. *Special Skills* reflect officer, warrant officer, NCO or service school training; these always have an extra cost, which will be noted. All "TL" skills (p. B42) are TL7. Skills are listed in the following format:

Skill Name (Difficulty) Relative Level [Point Cost]-Actual Level

Customizing Templates

Once a template has been purchased, the player must customize it. First, he must select the specific skill packages for his MOS, unit of assignment, etc. Officers and graduates of special schools will cost a little more, since they will have Special Skills packages that reflect their additional training.

Second, the player must spend any remaining character points (in most cases, 150 points minus template cost) to customize his character. The template does not influence how these points are spent. If the template has fewer than -60 points in disadvantages (-40 points of personal disadvantages plus -20 points for Extremely Hazardous Duty), additional *Desirable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) may be taken, up to this limit. *Prohibited Disadvantages* (p. 51) may not be chosen. Five quirks may be taken as well. Any extra points gained this way can be used to customize the character.

Special Ops characters will have relatively few points left over for customizing with. This is realistic! Most of these soldiers start training as young adults and have little time for outside interests. Since skill points in non-template skills cannot exceed age (p. 52), this actually isn't as limiting as it might first appear.

U.S. Army

Airborne Rangers

117 points

All Rangers (p. 25) must have the Basic Skills below. If the character is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, or has attended SERE, foreign language, or waterborne, arctic or jungle operations training, he will also have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 13 [30], IQ 13 [30], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -20 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-13, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-13, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-13, Demolition (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Electronics



Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-10, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-10, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-13*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-12, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Orienteering (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Parachuting (P/E) DX-1 [½]-12, Photography (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Scrounging (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Spear (P/A) DX [2]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-14, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ+2 [6]-15, Swimming (P/E) DX-1 [½]-12, Tactics (M/H) IQ [4]-13, Throwing (P/H) DX+1 [8]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-13.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

Special Skills:

Arctic Operations (+3 ½ points): Add Skiing (P/H) DX-2 [1]-11, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

*Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer*** (+5 ½ points): Increase Leadership to 14 [3½]; add Administration (M/A) IQ [2]-13.

Foreign Language (+2, 4 or 6 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ [2]-13 (Basic), IQ+1 [4]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+2 [6]-15 (Advanced).

Jungle Operations (+4 points): Increase Orienteering to 15 [2] and Survival (Jungle) to 14 [2].

NCO** (+2½ points): Increase Leadership to 13 [1½]; add Administration (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12.

SERE (+3½ points): Add Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-12, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

Waterborne Operations (+2 points): Add Boating (P/A) DX-2 [½]-11, Navigation (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-10, Powerboat (P/A) DX-2 [½]-11, Seamanship (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12.

**** Military Rank** [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: Spend your remaining points (33 points, in a 150-point campaign) to customize your character. Another -20 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get a further 25 points.

Special Forces

140 points

A Special Forces (p. 26) soldier must have the Basic Skills below and an MOS. If he is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, or has attended intelligence, SERE, foreign language, or waterborne, arctic or jungle operations training, he will also have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-14, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-14, Demolition (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Knife (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-14, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Orienteering (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Parachuting (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Spear (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-15, Swimming (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Tactics (M/H) IQ [4]-14, Teaching (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and spend a *total* of 8 points on it as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills (above)

must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

Communications: Increase Electronics Operation (Comm); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).

Demolition: Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat), Traps; add Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H), Underwater Demolition (M/A).

Medical: Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H), Surgery (M/VH).

Weapons: Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns (LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol), Knife.

Special Skills:

Arctic Operations (+2 points): Add Skiing (P/H) DX-3 [½]-11, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer** (+½ point): Increase Administration to 13 [½].

Foreign Language (+1, 2 or 4 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13 (Basic), IQ [2]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+1 [4]-15 (Advanced).

Intelligence (+11 points): Add Cryptanalysis (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Lockpicking (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Photography (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, Traffic Analysis (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13.

Jungle Operations (+3 points): Increase Orienteering to 15 [2] and Survival (Jungle) to 14 [1].


NCO** (+0 points): No additional requirements.

SERE (+2 ½ points): Add Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Escape (P/H) DX-2 [1]-12, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

Waterborne Operations (+2 points): Add Boating (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Navigation (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, Powerboat (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Seamanship (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13.

**** Military Rank** [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: Spend your remaining points (10 points, in a 150-point campaign) to customize your character. Another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get a further 20 points. Some soldiers learn a secondary MOS on the job; these skills count as template skills and must meet the guidelines for basic MOS skills.



1st SFOD-Delta (Delta Force) 185 points

The Basic Skills for a soldier of 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (p. 28) appear below. If the character is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, or has attended SERE, foreign language, or waterborne, arctic or jungle operations training, he will have the appropriate Special Skills package(s) as well, which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 12 [20].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 30 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Boating (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Brawling (P/E) DX+1 [2]-15, Camouflage (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-15, Climbing (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Criminology (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Demolition (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-12, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-13, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/A) IQ-1 [2]-13, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX+1 [1]-15*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+3 [2]-17*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+3 [2]-17*, Guns (Rifle) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-12, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-14, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Lockpicking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Motorcycle (P/E) DX [1]-14, No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Orienteering (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-15, Parachuting (P/E) DX [1]-14, Photography (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Spear (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Swimming (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Tactics (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-15, Throwing (P/H) DX+1 [8]-15, Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-14.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

Special Skills:

Arctic Operations (+2 points): Add Skiing (P/H) DX-3 [½]-11, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

*Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer*** (+½ point): Increase Administration to 13 [½].

Foreign Language (+1, 2 or 4 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13 (Basic), IQ [2]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+1 [4]-15 (Advanced).

Jungle Operations (+2½ points): Increase Orienteering to 16 [2] and Survival (Jungle) to 13 [½].

*NCO*** (+0 points): No additional requirements.

SERE (+½ point): Add Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

Waterborne Operations (+1½ points): Add Navigation (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, Powerboat (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Seamanship (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13.

** Military Rank [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: This template is intended for use in a 200-point campaign; spend the remaining 15 points to customize your character. Another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get a further 20 points. Former Special Forces troops retain their MOS skills. These count as template skills and must meet the guidelines for MOS skills in the Special Forces template (p. 57).

U.S. Marine Corps

Force Recon

115 points

Soldiers in U.S. Marine Corps Force Recon (p. 30) must have the Basic Skills below. If the character is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, or has attended SERE, foreign language, or waterborne, arctic or jungle operations training, he will also have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 13 [30], IQ 13 [30], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -20 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Boating (P/A) DX [2]-13, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-13, Camouflage (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Climbing (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Demolition (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ [4]-13, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-13*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-12, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Navigation (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-10, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Orienteering (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Parachuting (P/E) DX-1 [½]-12, Powerboat (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Scrounging (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Scuba (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Seamanship (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-14, Shadowing (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Skiing (P/H) DX-2 [1]-11, Spear (P/A) DX [2]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX-2 [½]-11, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Survival (Island/Beach) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Survival

(Mountain) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX [1]-13, Tactics (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-11, Throwing (P/H) DX+1 [8]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Underwater Demolition (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

Special Skills:

Arctic Operations (+2 points): Increase Survival (Arctic) to 13 [1½]; add Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

*Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer*** (+6 points): Increase Administration to 13 [1½], Leadership to 14 [3½] and Tactics to 12 [1].

Foreign Language (+2, 4 or 6 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ [2]-13 (Basic), IQ+1 [4]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+2 [6]-15 (Advanced).

Jungle Operations (+4 points): Increase Orienteering to 14 [2] and Survival (Jungle) to 14 [2].


*NCO*** (+2 points): Increase Administration to 12 [½] and Leadership to 13 [1½].

SERE (+3 ½ points): Add Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-12, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

Waterborne Operations (+½ point): Add No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

** Military Rank [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: Spend your remaining points (35 points, in a 150-point campaign) to customize your character. Another -20 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get a further 25 points.



U.S. Navy

SEALs

200 points

The Basic Skills for U.S. Navy SEALs (p. 30) appear below. NCOs, warrant officers or commissioned officers, and characters who have attended SERE, foreign language, or arctic or jungle operations training, will have the appropriate Special Skills package(s) as well, which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 12 [20], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 12 [20].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 30 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1

[1]-13, Boating (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-14, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-14, Demolition (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, Escape (P/H) DX-3 [½]-11, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-14, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Navigation (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-15, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Orienteering (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Parachuting (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Powerboat (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Scuba (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-15, Seamanship (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-15, Spear (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Streetwise (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Island/Beach) (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-15, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX+1 [2]-15, Tactics (M/H) IQ [4]-14, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Underwater Demolition (M/A) IQ [2]-14.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: SEALs do not receive MOS-specific training, but each soldier has a specialty on the team. Spend a *total* of 8 points on a closely related group of Basic Skills or relevant new skills. The MOS skills of other templates in this section are common choices, but unorthodox specialties are also possible (GM's option).

Special Skills:

Arctic Operations (+2 points): Add Skiing (P/H) DX-3 [½]-11, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

*Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer*** (+½ point): Increase Administration to 13 [½].

Foreign Language (+1, 2 or 4 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13 (Basic), IQ [2]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+1 [4]-15 (Advanced).

Jungle Operations (+3 points): Increase Orienteering to 15 [2] and Survival (Jungle) to 14 [1].

*NCO*** (+0 point): No additional requirements.

SERE (+1½ points): Increase Escape to 12 [½]; add Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

** Military Rank [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: This template is intended for use in a 200-point campaign. There will be no points left over, but another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get 20 points to customize with.

France

2^e Régiment Étranger de Parachutistes

150 points

A soldier in France's 2^e Régiment Étranger de Parachutistes (p. 33) must have the Basic Skills below, and must choose an MOS and a unit (company) of assignment: anti-armor/urban combat/night fighting, mountain and arctic warfare, amphibious operations, or sabotage and demolition. Finally, if he is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, or has attended SERE, foreign language, or arctic or jungle operations training, he will have those Special Skills as well, which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 13 [30], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 15 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-14, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-13, Climbing (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Demolition (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-11, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Fishing (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Jumping (P/E) DX [1]-14, Knife (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Orienteering (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Parachuting (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-13, Spear (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Stealth (P/A) DX [2]-14, Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Tactics (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-14, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and a unit of assignment, then spend a *total* of 35 points on them as follows: Any skill that appears in the Basic Skills above must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

1. MOS:

- *Communications:* Increase Electronics Operation (Comm); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).
- *Demolition:* Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat), Traps; add Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H), Underwater Demolition (M/A).
- *Intelligence:* Add Cryptanalysis (M/H), Intelligence

Analysis (M/H), Interrogation (M/A), Photography (M/A), SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H), Traffic Analysis (M/H).

- *Medical:* Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H), Surgery (M/VH).
- *Weapons:* Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns (LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol), Knife, Throwing.

2. Unit of Assignment:

- *Amphibious:* Increase Fishing, Swimming; add Boating (P/A), Navigation (M/H), Powerboat (P/A), Scuba (M/A), Seamanship (M/E), Survival (Island/Beach) (M/A).
- *Demolition:* Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat); add Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H), Underwater Demolition (M/A).
- *Mountain:* Increase Climbing, Survival (Mountain); add Skiing (P/H), Survival (Arctic) (M/A).
- *Urban:* Increase Guns (LAW).



Special Skills:

Arctic Operations (+3 points): Add Skiing (P/H) DX-3 [½]-11, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

*Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer*** (+6 points): Add Administration (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14.

Foreign Language (+2, 4 or 6 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ [2]-13 (Basic), IQ+1 [4]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+2 [6]-15 (Advanced).

Jungle Operations (+4 points): Increase Orienteering to 15 [2] and Survival (Jungle) to 14 [2].

*NCO*** (+3 points): Add Administration (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-13.

SERE (+2 ½ points): Add Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Escape (P/H) DX-2 [1]-12, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

** Military Rank [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: In a 150-point campaign, there will be no points left after purchasing this template; however, another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get 20 points to customize with.

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS WATERCRAFT

Combat Rubber Reconnaissance Craft (CRRC)

The CRRC is a small, inflatable boat used for clandestine reconnaissance missions. It can carry up to four soldiers and their personal equipment. It is powered by modified outboard motors that use pump jets instead of normal propellers. A deflated CRRC can be compressed into a block 59 in. × 28.5 in × 24 in.

■ **Dimensions:** Length 15 ft. 4 in., beam 6 ft. 3 in., height 2 ft. 6 in. (inflated).

■ **Weight:** 265 lbs.

Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB)

The RIB is designed to provide special ops units with a relatively lightweight boat that is still able to handle moderate speeds on choppy water. It comes in several lengths, the most common being 24 ft. and 30 ft., and has a glass-reinforced plastic hull with an inflatable inner collar. The craft is powered by a 175-horsepower outboard motor. The data below are for the 24-ft. version, which can transport 18 personnel (including the three-man crew).

■ **Dimensions:** Length 23 ft. 9 in., beam 9 ft.

■ **Displacement:** 5,600 lbs (empty), 7,500 lbs. (loaded).

■ **Speed:** 25 mph (max.).

■ **Range:** 175 miles.

Mark V Special Operations Craft

The Mark V is used by the U.S. Navy to transport SEAL teams into and out of hostile environments. It has a crew of five, and can transport a fully equipped 16-man SEAL team. It is equipped with radio transmitters, satellite communications, and a secure laptop computer, printer, and fax. Its four small-caliber gun mounts can carry Mk. 19 grenade launchers, or M2HB .50-caliber or M60 7.62mm machine guns. For air defense, the crew uses shoulder-fired Stinger SAMs. A ramp allows rapid launch and recovery of CRRCs, up to four of which can be carried on the rear deck of the Mark V and inflated using built-in air hoses. The Mark V can also tow two RIBs at speeds near its normal maximum. It can be broken down and loaded onto two C-5 aircraft, which allows it to be delivered anywhere in the world within 24 hours.

■ **Dimensions:** Length 82 ft., beam 17 ft. 6 in.

■ **Weight:** 114,000 lbs. (empty).

■ **Speed:** 57 mph (max.), 35 mph (cruising).

■ **Range:** 690 miles.

After-Action Debriefing

When exfiltration is successfully completed and the unit returns to base, all participants in the mission are subjected to a detailed after-action debriefing. This is to collect relevant intelligence while it is fresh in the soldiers' minds, and to evaluate planning and execution so as to perfect future operations of the same type. Most special ops troops recognize the need for these debriefings, but would prefer a hot meal and some sleep after coming in from the field. These things must usually wait until after the debriefing.

A standard debriefing report form must be filled out after any special ops mission. That required for a reconnaissance patrol is typical, and must include:

1. The patrol's designation.
2. A date/time group indicating when the report was prepared.
3. Map references for the patrol's area of operations.
4. The size and composition of the patrol.
5. The task of the patrol.
6. The time of departure and return.
7. The routes out and back taken by the patrol.
8. A detailed description of the terrain in the area of operations.
9. A detailed description of the strength, disposition, condition of defense, equipment, weapons, attitude, morale, exact location and movement of enemy forces observed, including times at which the activity was observed and exact map coordinates.
10. A list of any map corrections.
11. A report of results of any contact with the enemy (enemy prisoners and casualties, captured equipment, etc.).
12. A report of the condition of the patrol, including disposition of dead, wounded, and captured.
13. Conclusions and recommendations, including the extent to which the task was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics.
14. Any additional comments by the debriefing interrogator.

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Operations - Warts and All

Special operations rarely go as planned. The frictions of war place a high premium on the ability to improvise. Unforeseen contingencies arise, and well-made plans go awry under conditions of great stress and when faced with an unpredictable enemy. Furthermore, such operations rarely go "by the book." SOPs are followed, to be sure, but corners are frequently cut by experienced operators, and unofficial channels are sometimes more effective than official ones.

Official and Unofficial Channels: Inter-Service and International Liaison

The command and control systems of most countries attempt to provide means of efficient inter-service liaison; the existence of joint special operations commands is evidence of this. Inter-service rivalry plays a large role in special

Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) 150 points

A member of France's *Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale* (p. 34) must have the Basic Skills below, and must choose an MOS and a unit of assignment: parachute or waterborne. If he is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, he will also have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Boating (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-14, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-14, Criminology (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Demolition (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Guns (Rifle) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-12, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-14, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Lockpicking (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Orienteering (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Photography (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Skiing (P/H) DX-3 [½]-11, Spear (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Streetwise (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Swimming (P/E) DX [1]-14, Tactics (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-15, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-14.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose both an MOS and a unit of assignment, then spend a *total* of 12 points on them as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills (above) must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

1. MOS:

- *Communications:* Increase Electronics Operation (Comm); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).
- *Demolition:* Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat), Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Traps.
- *Medical:* Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H), Surgery (M/VH).
- *Weapons:* Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns



(LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol), Guns (Rifle), Knife.

2. Unit of Assignment:

- *Parachute:* Add Parachuting (P/E).
- *Waterborne:* Increase Boating and Swimming; add Powerboat (P/A), Scuba (M/A), Seamanship (M/E), Underwater Demolition (M/A) (if MOS is Demolition).

Special Skills: Military Rank [5/level] is required for the packages below: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer (+½ point): Increase Administration to 13 [½].

NCO (+0 points): No additional requirements.

Customization Notes: In a 150-point campaign, there will be no points left after purchasing this template; however, another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get 20 points to customize with.

Germany

Bundesgrenzschutzgruppe-9

(GSg-9)

150 points

A member of Germany's *Bundesgrenzschutzgruppe-9* (p. 34) must have the Basic Skills below and must choose a unit of assignment: airborne, maritime or urban. If he is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, he will also have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Boating (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-14, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-14, Criminology (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Demolition (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX [2]-14, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-13, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-12, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Jumping (P/E) DX [1]-14, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-14, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Lockpicking (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Orienteering (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Photography (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Skiing (P/H) DX-3 [½]-11, Spear (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Streetwise (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Swimming (P/E) DX [1]-14, Tactics (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-15, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-14.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose a unit of assignment and spend a *total* of 9 points on it as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills (above) must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

Airborne: Increase Survival (Arctic) and Survival (Mountain); add Parachuting (P/E).

Maritime: Increase Boating and Swimming; add Navigation (M/H), Powerboat (P/A), Scuba (M/A), Seamanship (M/E), Survival (Island/Beach) (M/A), Underwater Demolition (M/A).

Urban: Increase Climbing, Driving (Automobile), Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Guns (Light Auto); add Shadowing (M/A).

Special Skills: Military Rank [5/level] is required for the packages below: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer (+½ point): Increase Administration to 13 [½].

NCO (+0 points): No additional requirements.

Customization Notes: In a 150-point campaign, there will be no points left after purchasing this template; however, another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get 20 points to customize with.

Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK) 150 points

Members of Germany's *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (p. 35) must take the Basic Skills below and must choose an MOS. NCOs, warrant officers or commissioned officers, and those who have attended SERE, foreign language or jungle operations training, will have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -20 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Boating (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-14, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-14, Demolition (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX [2]-14, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-13, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Knife (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-14, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Orienteering (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Parachuting (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Spear (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Tactics (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-15, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and spend a *total* of 11 points on it as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills (above) must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

Communications: Increase Electronics Operation (Comm);

add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).

Demolition: Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat), Traps; add Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H), Lockpicking (M/A).

Intelligence: Increase Interrogation; add Cryptanalysis (M/H), Intelligence Analysis (M/H), Lockpicking (M/A), Photography (M/A), SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H), Traffic Analysis (M/H).

Medical: Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H), Surgery (M/VH).

Special Skills:

Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer** (+½ point): Increase Administration to 13 [½].

Foreign Language (+1, 2 or 4 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13 (Basic), IQ [2]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+1 [4]-15 (Advanced).

Jungle Operations (+2½ points): Increase Orienteering to 15 [2]; add Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

NCO** (+0 point): No additional requirements.

SERE (+½ point): Add Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

**** Military Rank [5/level]** is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers. Most intelligence specialists will be officers.

Customization Notes: In a 150-point campaign, there will be no points left after purchasing this template; however, another -20 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get 25 points to customize with.

Israel

Kommando Yami

150 points

Members of Israel's *Kommando Yami* (p. 36) have the Basic Skills below. NCOs, warrant officers or commissioned officers, and characters who have attended SERE or foreign language training, will also have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 13 [30], IQ 13 [30], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Boating (P/A) DX+1 [4]-14, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-13, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-13, Climbing (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Demolition (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ [4]-13, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-12, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ [4]-13, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12,

Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-13*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-12, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Navigation (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-14, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Orienteering (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Parachuting (P/E) DX-1 [½]-12, Powerboat (P/A) DX+1 [4]-14, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Scrounging (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-14, Scuba (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Seamanship (M/E) IQ+2 [4]-15, Spear (P/A) DX [2]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-14, Survival (Island/Beach) (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX+1 [2]-14, Tactics (M/H) IQ [4]-13, Throwing (P/H) DX+1 [8]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Underwater Demolition (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

Special Skills:

Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer** (+4½ points): Increase Administration to 13 [½] and Leadership to 14 [3].

Foreign Language (+2, 4 or 6 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ [2]-13 (Basic), IQ+1 [4]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+2 [6]-15 (Advanced).

NCO** (+1½ points): Increase Administration to 12 [½] and Leadership to 13 [1].

SERE (+1 point): Add Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

**** Military Rank [5/level]** is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: In a 150-point campaign, there will be no points left after purchasing this template; however, another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get 20 points to customize with.



Sayeret Tzanchanim

133 points

Use this template for soldiers in Israel's airborne *Sayeret Tzanchanim* (p. 36). A character must have the Basic Skills below and must choose an MOS. If he is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, or has attended SERE or foreign language training, he will have those Special Skills as well, which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 13 [30], IQ 13 [30], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -20 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-13, Camouflage (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-13, Demolition (M/A) IQ-1

[1]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-11, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX+1 [1]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Jumping (P/E) DX [1]-13, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-13, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Orienteering (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Parachuting (P/E) DX [1]-13, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Scrounging (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-14, Spear (P/A) DX [2]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-14, Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX [1]-13, Tactics (M/H) IQ [4]-13, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-13, Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-13.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and spend a *total* of 20 points on it as follows: Any skill that appears in the Basic Skills above must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

Communications: Increase Electronics Operation (Comm); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).

Demolition: Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat), Traps; add Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H), Underwater Demolition (M/A).

Intelligence: Add Cryptanalysis (M/H), Intelligence Analysis (M/H), Interrogation (M/A), Photography (M/A), SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H), Traffic Analysis (M/H).

Medical: Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H), Surgery (M/VH).

Weapons: Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns (LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol), Knife, Throwing.

Special Skills:

Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer** (+6 points): Add Administration (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14.


Foreign Language (+2, 4 or 6 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ [2]-13 (Basic), IQ+1 [4]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+2 [6]-15 (Advanced).

NCO** (+3 points): Add Administration (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-13.

SERE (+3 ½ points): Add Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-12, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11.

** Military Rank [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: Spend your remaining points (17 points, in a 150-point campaign) to customize your character. Another -20 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get a further 25 points.



Sayeret Matkal

185 points

Soldiers in Israel's *Sayeret Matkal* (p. 37) must have the Basic Skills below and must choose an MOS. NCOs, warrant officers or commissioned officers, and those who have attended SERE or foreign language training, will have those Special Skills as well, which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 30 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Boating (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Brawling (P/E) DX+1 [2]-15, Camouflage (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-15, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-14, Demolition (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-13, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX+1 [1]-15*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, Interrogation (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-15, Jumping (P/E) DX [1]-14, Knife (P/E) DX+1 [2]-15, Leadership (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Orienteering (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Parachuting (P/E) DX [1]-14, Photography (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Powerboat (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Scuba (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Spear (P/A) DX [2]-14, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-15, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX [1]-14, Tactics (M/H) IQ [4]-14, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-14.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and spend a *total* of 15 points on it as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills (above) must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

Communications: Increase Electronics Operation (Comm); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).

Demolition: Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat), Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Traps; add Underwater Demolition (M/A).

Intelligence: Increase Intelligence Analysis, Interrogation, Photography; add Cryptanalysis (M/H), SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H), Traffic Analysis (M/H).

Medical: Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H), Surgery (M/VH).

Weapons: Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns (LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol), Knife, Throwing.

Special Skills:

*Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer*** (+1½ points): Increase Administration to 13 [½] and Leadership to 14 [1].

Foreign Language (+1, 2 or 4 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13 (Basic), IQ [2]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+1 [4]-15 (Advanced).

*NCO*** (+0 point): No additional requirements.

SERE (+½ point): Add Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

** Military Rank [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: This template is intended for use in a 200-point campaign. There will be 15 points left with which to customize your character, and another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and up to five quirks can be taken to get a further 20 points.



Russia

Spetsnaz

150 points

A Russian *Spetsnaz* (p. 37) trooper must have the Basic Skills below and must choose an MOS. If he belongs to a Naval *Spetsnaz* (p. 38) unit, is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, or has foreign language or jungle operations training, he will have the appropriate Special Skills as well, which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 13 [30], IQ 13 [30], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Boating (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-13, Camouflage (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-13, Demolition (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX [2]-13, Driving (Heavy Wheeled) (P/A) DX [2]-13, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-11, Escape (P/H) DX-2 [1]-11, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-11, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX+1 [1]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-12, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-12, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ+2 [6]-15, Orienteering (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Parachuting (P/E) DX [1]-13, Powerboat (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Scrounging (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Scuba (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Spear (P/A) DX [2]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+2 [8]-15, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ+2 [6]-15, Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ+2 [6]-15, Swimming (P/E) DX [1]-13, Tactics (M/H) IQ [4]-13, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-13, Traps (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and spend a *total* of 12 points on it as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills (above) must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

Communications: Increase Electronics Operation (Comm), Mechanic (Gasoline Engine); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).

Demolition: Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat), Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine), Traps; add Underwater Demolition (M/A).

Weapons: Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns (LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol).

Special Skills:

Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer** (+4½ points): Increase Administration to 13 [1½] and Leadership to 14 [3].

Foreign Language (+2, 4 or 6 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ [2]-13 (Basic), IQ+1 [4]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+2 [6]-15 (Advanced).

Jungle Operations (+4 points): Increase Orienteering to 15 [2]; add Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ [2]-13.

Naval Spetsnaz (+22 points): Increase Boating to 14 [3], Powerboat to 14 [3], Scuba to 14 [3] and Swimming to 15 [3]; add Hard-Hat Diving (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Navigation (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-14, Seamanship (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-14, Survival (Island/Beach) (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-14, Underwater Demolition (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12. *Reduce* Survival (Mountain) to 12 [-5]; *remove* Survival (Desert) [-2].

NCO** (+1½ points): Increase Administration to 12 [½] and Leadership to 13 [1].

**** Military Rank** [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: In a 150-point campaign, there will be no points left after purchasing this template; however, another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get 20 points to customize with. Naval *Spetsnaz* characters are comparable to U.S. Navy SEALs (p. 30), and are more appropriate for 200-point campaigns.

Alpha Group

190 points

The Basic Skills for a soldier in Russia's Alpha Group (p. 38) appear below; he must also select an MOS. If he is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, he will have the appropriate Special Skills package(s) as well, which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 25 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Boating (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Brawling (P/E) DX+1 [2]-15, Camouflage (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Climbing (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Criminology (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Demolition (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX [2]-14, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-12, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-13, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/A) IQ-1 [2]-13, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Guns (Rifle) (P/E) DX+2 [1]-16*, Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-15, Interrogation (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-15, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Knife (P/E) DX+1 [2]-15, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Orienteering (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-15, Parachuting (P/E) DX [1]-14, Photography (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Shadowing (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Skiing (P/H) DX-1 [2]-13, Spear (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Streetwise (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Swimming (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Tactics (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-15, Teaching (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Throwing (P/H) DX+1 [8]-15, Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-14.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and spend a *total* of 13 points on it as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills

(above) must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

Communications: Increase Electronics Operation (Comm); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).

Demolition: Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat), Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Traps; add Underwater Demolition (M/A).

Intelligence: Increase Intelligence Analysis, Interrogation, Photography; add Cryptanalysis (M/H), Lockpicking (M/A), SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H), Traffic Analysis (M/H).

Medical: Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H), Surgery (M/VH).


Weapons: Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns (LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol), Knife.

Special Skills: Military Rank [5/level] is required for the packages below: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer (+½ point): Increase Administration to 13 [½].

NCO (+0 points): No additional requirements.

Customization Notes: This template is intended for use in a 200-point campaign. Spend your remaining 10 points to customize your character. Another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get a further 20 points to customize with.



U.K.

22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS)

180 points

Those serving in Great Britain's 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (p. 40) must take the Basic Skills below, and must have both an MOS and a squadron of assignment: HALO/HAHO, amphibious operations, mountaineering/arctic operations or overland/desert operations. NCOs, warrant officers or commissioned officers, and those who have attended intelligence, SERE, foreign language or jungle operations training, will have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 12 [20].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 30 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -25 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Boating (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-14, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-14, Demolition (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-13, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Interrogation (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Knife (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-14, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Orienteering (M/A) IQ [2]-14, Parachuting (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Scuba (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Spear (P/A) DX-2 [½]-12, Stealth (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Tactics (M/H) IQ+1 [6]-15, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-14, Traps (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and a squadron of assignment, then spend a *total* of 23 points on them as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills (above) must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

1. MOS:

- **Communications:** Increase Electronics Operation (Comm); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).
- **Demolition:** Increase Demolition, Engineer (Combat), Traps; add Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H), Lockpicking (M/A).
- **Medical:** Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H), Surgery (M/VH).
- **Weapons:** Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Brawling, Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns (LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol), Knife.

2. Squadron of Assignment:

- **Amphibious Operations:** Increase Boating, Scuba, Swimming; add Navigation (M/H), Powerboat (P/A), Seamanship (M/E), Survival (Island/Beach) (M/A), Underwater Demolition (M/A) (if MOS is Demolition).
- **HAHO/HALO:** Increase Parachuting, Survival (Jungle); add Survival (Arctic) (M/A).



- *Mountain/Arctic*: Increase Climbing, Survival (Mountain); add Diagnosis (M/H), Skiing (P/H), Survival (Arctic) (M/A).
- *Overland/Desert*: Increase No-Landing Extraction, Orienteering, Survival (Desert), Survival (Jungle); add Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A), Navigation (M/H), Photography (M/A), SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H).

Special Skills:

*Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer*** (+½ point): Increase Administration to 13 [½].

Foreign Language (+1, 2 or 4 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13 (Basic), IQ [2]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+1 [4]-15 (Advanced).

Intelligence (+1½ points): Increase Interrogation to 13 [½]; add Cryptanalysis (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, Lockpicking (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Photography (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Shadowing (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13, Traffic Analysis (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-13.

Jungle Operations (+2 ½ points): Increase Orienteering to 15 [2] and Survival (Jungle) to 13 [½].

*NCO*** (+0 point): No additional requirements.

SERE (+½ point): Add Tracking (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12.

** Military Rank [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: This template is intended for use in a 200-point campaign. There will be 20 points left with which to customize your character, and another -15 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and up to five quirks can be taken to get a further 20 points.

Royal Marine Commandos 134 points

A soldier in Great Britain's Royal Marine Commandos (p. 42) must have the Basic Skills below and must select an MOS. If he is an NCO, warrant officer or commissioned officer, or has completed parachuting, amphibious or underwater operations, or mountain and arctic warfare training, he will also have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 13 [30], IQ 13 [30], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -20 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Boating (P/A) DX+1 [4]-14, Brawling (P/E) DX+1 [2]-14, Camouflage (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX+1 [4]-14, Demolition (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-13*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-14*, Jumping (P/E) DX [1]-13, Knife (P/E) DX [1]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Navigation (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-10, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ [2]-13, No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-11, Orienteering (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Powerboat (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Scrounging (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-14, Scuba (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Seamanship (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-12, Skiing (P/H) DX-3 [½]-10, Spear (P/A) DX [2]-13, Stealth (P/A) DX [2]-13, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Survival (Island/Beach) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ [2]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX+1 [2]-14, Tactics (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-12, Throwing (P/H) DX [4]-13, Tracking (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-12, Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-13.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and spend a *total* of 16 points on it as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills (above) must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

Communications: Increase Electronics Operation (Comm); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).

Demolition: Increase Demolition, Traps; add Engineer (Combat) (M/H), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H), Underwater Demolition (M/A).

Intelligence: Add Cryptanalysis (M/H), Intelligence Analysis (M/H), Interrogation (M/A), Photography (M/A), SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H), Traffic Analysis (M/H).

Medical: Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H).

Weapons: Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns (LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol), Knife.

Special Skills:

Amphibious Operations (+12 points): Increase Boating to 15 [4], Navigation to 13 [3½], Powerboat to 13 [1], Seamanship to 13 [½], Survival (Island/Beach) to 13 [1] and Swimming to 15 [2].

*Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer*** (+4½ points): Increase Administration to 13 [1½] and Leadership to 14 [3].

Mountain and Arctic Warfare (+11 points): Increase Climbing to 15 [4], Skiing to 13 [3 ½], Survival (Arctic) to 13 [1] and Survival (Mountain) to 14 [2]; add Teaching IQ-2 [½]-11.

*NCO*** (+1½ points): Increase Administration to 12 [½] and Leadership to 13 [1].

Parachuting (+1 point): Add Parachuting (P/E) DX [1]-13.

Underwater Operations (+8 points): Increase Powerboat to 13 [1], Scuba to 14 [3] and Swimming to 15 [2]; add Underwater Demolition (M/A) IQ [2]-13.

**** Military Rank** [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: Spend your remaining points (16 points, in a 150-point campaign) to customize your character. Another -20 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get a further 25 points to customize with.

Special Boat Squadron and Raiding Squadrons

150 points

Soldiers serving in the Special Boat Squadron or Raiding Squadrons (p. 43) must take the Basic Skills below and choose a basic MOS. Those in the Comacchio Group (p. 43), NCOs, warrant officers or commissioned officers, and those who have received foreign language or jungle operations training will also have the appropriate Special Skills package(s), which will increase template cost.

Attributes: ST 11 [10], DX 14 [45], IQ 14 [45], HT 11 [10].

Advantages: Fit [5], and 20 points in additional ST or HT, *Desirable Advantages* (p. 46), *Decorations* (p. 46), *Military Rank* (p. 47) or *Patrons* (p. 49).

Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20], and -20 points selected from the *Desirable Disadvantages* list (p. 50).

Basic Skills: Administration (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Boating (P/A) DX+1 [4]-15, Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-14, Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Climbing (P/A) DX [2]-14, Demolition (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Driving (Automobile) (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Electronics Operation (Comm) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Escape (P/H) DX-1 [2]-13, First Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Forward Observer (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX [½]-14*, Guns (Grenade Launcher) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (LAW) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Light Auto) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Guns (Pistol) (P/E) DX+1 [½]-15*, Jumping (P/E) DX [1]-14, Knife (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Leadership (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Navigation (M/H) IQ-3 [½]-11, NBC Warfare (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, No-Landing Extraction (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Orienteering (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Parachuting (P/E) DX-1 [½]-13, Powerboat (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [½]-13, Scrounging (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Scuba (M/A) IQ+1 [4]-15, Seamanship (M/E) IQ [1]-14, Skiing (P/H) DX-3 [½]-11, Spear (P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Stealth

(P/A) DX-1 [1]-13, Survival (Arctic) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Survival (Island/Beach) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Jungle) (M/A) IQ-2 [½]-12, Survival (Mountain) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Swimming (P/E) DX+1 [2]-15, Tactics (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-12, Throwing (P/H) DX-1 [2]-13, Traps (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13.

* Includes +2 for IQ.

MOS Skills: Choose an MOS and spend a *total* of 14 points on it as follows: All skills that appear as Basic Skills (above) must be increased by at least one skill level; all new skills must be learned at level 13 or better.

Communications: Increase Electronics Operation (Comm); add Telegraphy (M/E) or a second Electronics Operation specialty (M/A).

Demolition: Increase Demolition, Traps; add Engineer (Combat) (M/H), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (M/H), Underwater Demolition (M/A).

Intelligence: Add Cryptanalysis (M/H), Intelligence Analysis (M/H), Interrogation (M/A), Photography (M/A), SIGINT Collection/Jamming (M/H), Traffic Analysis (M/H).

Medical: Increase First Aid; add Diagnosis (M/H).

Weapons: Increase Armoury (Small Arms), Gunner (Machine Gun), Guns (Grenade Launcher), Guns (LAW), Guns (Light Auto), Guns (Pistol), Knife.



Special Skills:

Comacchio Group (+2 points): Add Hard-Hat Diving (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13, Professional Skill (Occupying & Defending Offshore Oil Rigs) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13.

Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer** (+2 points): Increase Administration to 13 [½] and Leadership to 14 [1½].

Foreign Language (+1, 2 or 4 points): Add Language (any) (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-13 (Basic), IQ [2]-14 (Intermediate) or IQ+1 [4]-15 (Advanced).

Jungle Operations (+1 point): Increase Orienteering to 13 [½] and Survival (Jungle) to 13 [½].

NCO** (+½ point): Increase Leadership to 13 [½].

**** Military Rank** [5/level] is required: Rank 1-2 for NCOs, Rank 3 for warrant officers and Rank 3+ for commissioned officers.

Customization Notes: In a 150-point campaign, there will be no points left after purchasing this template; however, another -20 points in *Acceptable Disadvantages* (p. 50) and five quirks can be taken to get 25 points to customize with.

Military Personnel File

Modern armed services maintain a personnel file on every single soldier. In the U.S. Army, this is called a "201 File": a manila folder filled with copies of orders, efficiency reports, decorations, commendations and other records of the life and service of the soldier involved. It goes with the soldier to every assignment; a duplicate is maintained in a central records center. This record includes information that can help determine what a reasonable history and point total for the character should be. It also contains some of the details that flesh him out and make him more than a list of numbers.

Personnel File Summary

The format for a personnel file summary is given below. It assumes an American soldier, but other nations would use a similar format. This is the sort of information that a commanding officer might have a clerk draw up when a soldier joins his unit, in order to get the new man's background in a nutshell. The GM should work with his players to create a summary like this for each PC. These summaries are useful in play, and can often give instant answers to questions that no one thought of during character creation. For instance:

"Why do you think your character should get a bonus to his Streetwise roll to find a tattoo parlor in San Diego?"

"Because his personnel file says he spent a year on duty with the shore patrol there after boot camp."

"Why couldn't my character have learned to drive bulldozers in the army? The army has lots of bulldozers!"

"According to his personnel file, he went straight from basic and AIT to Ranger training, from there to the Defense Language Institute, and from there to a Ranger company. That is a pretty busy schedule; I don't see any time for him to have learned 'dozer driving."

PERSONNEL FILE SUMMARY DATE SURNAME, GIVEN NAMES

"DATE" is the date the file was prepared, in DD MMM YY format; e.g., "18 DEC 98." The U.S. military prefers to use the three-letter code for months rather than the number; it saves confusion when dealing with countries that use a different date sequence.

Grade: (Pay grade. In ascending order: E-1 through E-9 for enlisted personnel, W-1 through W-4 for warrant officers, and O-1 through O-10 for commissioned officers. It is considered rude to refer to a commissioned officer by pay grade rather than by the name of his position.)

SSN: NNN-NN-NNNN (Since 1968, the U.S. military has used the Social Security Number as a service number; most soldiers still call it a "serial number.")

DOB: DD MMM YY (DOB means "date of birth.")

The preceding items make up the "Geneva Convention" information, which prisoners of war are required to give to their captors and which is the only information that captors can demand from their prisoners. The Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war has been in effect since 1929; not all countries consider themselves bound by it.



Place of Birth: City, State

Entered on Active Duty From: State

Permanent Home of Record: City, State

Next of Kin: Full Name (Relationship), City, State

The services keep this information for several reasons. On separation from active duty, the government provides transportation to the permanent home of record. The serviceman must pay income tax to the state which is his permanent home of record. If the service releases a news bulletin about him (e.g., he is awarded a decoration), it is reported to his home-town newspaper. The next of kin gets the body of someone who dies in service, and is usually the beneficiary of his G.I. insurance. If anyone deserts or goes AWOL, the military record gives the most likely place to find him – at home.

In a game, the home of record and next of kin give both player and GM hooks on which to hang the character conception.

Civilian Education:

High School Graduate

Degree 1, Field, Institution

Degree 2, Field, Institution

In chronological order. Almost all special ops soldiers are high school graduates, many have degrees from military academies (these still count as civilian education), and a few have civilian degrees. A regular officer in the peacetime service must have a Bachelor's degree to be promoted past Military Rank 4.

Military Service:

All military service should be listed in chronological order. Entries can include:

- **Military education.** (E.g., "United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1975-1979.")
- **Special operations training.** (E.g., "Assigned to SEAL training, JAN 86-OCT 86.")
- **Service schools.** (E.g., "Assigned as Student, Defense Language Institute, FEB 82-AUG 82. Language studied: Chinese (Mandarin). Proficiency: fully fluent.")
- **Commissions.** (E.g., "Commissioned Ensign, U.S. Navy, JUN 79.")
- **Promotions.** (E.g., "Promoted Lieutenant, Junior Grade, JUL 81." "Promoted Lieutenant, JUL 84." "Promoted Lieutenant Commander, MAY 88.")
- **Service with a military unit.** (E.g., "Assigned to USS Dailey, Sixth Fleet (in the Mediterranean), AUG 79-DEC 81." "Assigned to SEAL Team 6, NOV 86.")

- **Special assignments.** (E.g., "Assistant Defense Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, People's Republic of China, NOV 82-NOV 85.")
- **Temporary duty.** (E.g., "TDY from SEAL Team 6 to Joint Special Operations Command HQ, AUG 89.")

The record of military service shows when a soldier was where, and therefore who and what he could reasonably be expected to know. It also shows those times he could reasonably be expected to have spent in out-of-unit training.

Awards and Decorations:

In chronological order. Qualification badges (e.g., Expert Rifle, Expert Pistol) and relatively minor decorations (e.g., Commendation Medals) will simply be listed in the file. An important award (e.g., DSC) is usually accompanied by a citation describing the action for which it was given. If this is absent, knowledgeable people reading the file will realize that the soldier was involved in something hush-hush.

Special Ops Characters in Play

Military Pay

Military pay in a developed nation is enough to live on but never much more. It is also never poverty. When the various fringe benefits are taken into account, it amounts to "Average" wealth in game terms. An individual soldier may also have family wealth or extra income, of course.

A U.S. soldier's paycheck is composed of a number of different allowances: base pay, basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) if he has permission not to live in the barracks, an allowance for separate rations (BAS) if the soldier has permission to mess separately from military facilities (called "separate rats"), hazardous duty pay, jump pay (for maintaining his airborne qualification), etc. Not all soldiers receive all these allowances, but most special operations troops in the U.S. do. No one gets rich in special ops (unless he is engaged in some criminal enterprise – which is not out of the question), but the U.S. philosophy is that since more is demanded of special ops soldiers, they should receive higher pay. In the U.S., a soldier's pay goes up with his grade, his time-in-grade and his time-in-service.

The Russian attitude toward special ops pay is similar – indeed, it is rather more generous, at least for officers. Commissioned and warrant officers in *Spetsnaz* units earn 50% higher pay than their counterparts in other units.

The British, on the other hand, believe that service in an elite special ops unit like the 22nd SAS Regiment is a reward in itself. Soldiers often accept a temporary demotion to serve in the regiment, and their pay is that appropriate to their new temporary grade; e.g., a sergeant earning the equivalent of \$15,000 in base pay in his original unit will receive the equivalent of \$9,125 in base pay as a temporary corporal when he is accepted into the SAS. Officers are somewhat better off, retaining grade and pay as they move to and from the SAS.


Military Justice

In every country, military personnel are subject to a court system that is in some respects different from that of the civilian world. Some things that would never come before a court in civilian life (sleeping on duty, failing to report on time, careless use of equipment, leaving work without permission) are considered military crimes.

Armies have two kinds of punishment: that awarded by the unit commander and that ordered by a military court. The U.S. military calls the former *non-judicial punishment*. Colloquially, it is called "Article 15," from the section of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that governs it. It is limited to extra duty, small fines and similar minor punishments.

Courts-martial of various grades can award penalties including dismissal from the service, imprisonment and death. The strictures surrounding a military court vary from country to country. In the U.S., the military is bound by rules of evidence and procedure that are nearly identical to those of the civilian courts. In Russia, a military court, especially in time of war, can do just about as it pleases.

The military view of crime and punishment is motivated less by an interest in justice than by an interest in unit efficiency. Commanders tend to be lenient toward offenders who don't hurt the command, vindictive toward those who do.



“Pulling the Pin”: Life After Special Ops

Like all professional soldiers, special operations troops eventually retire. Many complete 20 or 30 years of active duty, while others are retired for medical reasons such as injuries, poor health or even psychological impairment from long clandestine service. Some simply quit after their term of enlistment to pursue other interests.

Most of those who retire receive a generous pension, determined by their grade at separation and their number of years of active duty. Many stay in touch with friends still on active duty, and continue to work for the military as civilian employees and consultants. Others enter intelligence agencies, or become “security consultants” in the private sector. A few even become mercenaries, although their governments generally try to discourage this.

For many former special ops people, life in retirement is difficult. The best – or at least the most vivid – of their times are past. They are often envious of those still able to serve. They may be open to any suggestion that promises to bring back a bit of the old thrill.


Skill Degradation

The intensive training and testing of a special ops unit hones the soldier’s mind and body to a keen edge and keeps them there. Regardless of will and dedication, it takes the financial resources of a government to sustain that level of training and testing. Hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, tons of fuel and thousands of man-hours, plane-hours and computer-hours go into perfecting and maintaining the soldier’s skills. Skilled and dedicated trainers give constant personal attention to every man, and nothing less than complete attention to training is tolerated among the students. In the absence of such resources and pressures, skills tend to atrophy.

All template skills begin to decay as soon as the soldier is no longer on active special ops duty. From one month to one year after departure from active duty, all template skills are reduced by 1. From one year to three years, they are reduced by 2. From three years to six years, they are reduced by 4. After six years, they are reduced by 5. Since high DX and IQ are used on character templates to reflect intensive training, the GM may elect to handle the first level of skill degradation by lowering these attributes by one level each *instead* of reducing skills directly. This won’t be popular with most players, but it is realistic. A cinematic “action hero” (p. 45) never suffers from any form of skill degradation, of course!

Note that given the overconfidence common to special ops personnel, the soldier may not realize how much his skills have slipped. The GM should keep an eye on such skills and use the correct numbers . . . but it might be very good role-playing if the soldier behaves as though he still has all of his old abilities.

A common character in fiction (and not unknown in fact) is the one-time special ops soldier suddenly called on to use his skills after years of peace. With a little bookkeeping, the



character templates and skill degradation rules can realistically define the skill levels of a former soldier. As a newly created character, he would only have to pay the point cost for the degraded values. Any skill that has degraded below the half-point level would be known only at default. Technical skills that require constant retraining (like Cryptanalysis and SIGINT Collection/Jamming) have *no* default; the soldier’s knowledge would be so out of date that he would be effectively untrained.

Time-in-Service and Pensions

The United States military allows retirement at 20 years, with a pension of roughly half the base pay of grade at retirement. The retired soldier also retains the right to shop at military stores (PX and commissary) and has a health-care plan. Service past 20 years increases the amount of pension up to a maximum of about $\frac{3}{4}$ of base pay. Service past 30 years requires a waiver; it is rare for anyone but a general officer to serve more than 30 years on active duty.

U.S. MILITARY MONTHLY BASIC PAY, PROJECTED 1999

GR.	YEARS OF SERVICE														
	<2	2	3	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18	20	22	24	26
O-10	\$7838.70	\$8114.40	\$8114.40	\$8114.40	\$8114.40	\$8425.80	\$8425.80	\$8892.60	\$8892.60	\$9528.90	\$9528.90	\$10167.00	\$10167.00	\$10167.00	\$10800.00
O-9	6947.10	7129.20	7281.00	7281.00	7281.00	7466.10	7466.10	7776.90	7776.90	8425.80	8425.80	8892.60	8892.60	8892.60	9528.90
O-8	6292.20	6481.20	6634.50	6634.50	6634.50	7129.20	7129.20	7466.10	7466.10	7776.90	8114.40	8425.80	8633.70	8633.70	8633.70
O-7	5228.40	5583.90	5583.90	5583.90	5834.40	5834.40	6172.50	6172.50	6481.20	7129.20	7619.70	7619.70	7619.70	7619.70	7619.70
O-6	3875.10	4257.30	4536.60	4536.60	4536.60	4536.60	4536.60	4536.60	4690.80	5432.40	5709.60	5834.40	6172.50	6381.00	6694.20
O-5	3099.60	3639.30	3891.00	3891.00	3891.00	3891.00	4008.00	4224.30	4507.50	4845.00	5122.20	5277.90	5462.40	5462.40	5462.40
O-4	2612.40	3181.20	3393.30	3393.30	3456.30	3608.70	3855.30	4071.90	4257.30	4444.80	4566.60	4566.60	4566.60	4566.60	4566.60
O-3	2427.60	2714.10	2901.90	3210.60	3364.50	3484.80	3673.80	3855.30	3949.50	3949.50	3949.50	3949.50	3949.50	3949.50	3949.50
O-2	2117.10	2312.10	2777.70	2871.30	2930.40	2930.40	2930.40	2930.40	2930.40	2930.40	2930.40	2930.40	2930.40	2930.40	2930.40
O-1	1838.10	1913.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10	2312.10
W-5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4221.30	4380.90	4507.80	4697.70
W-4	2473.20	2653.80	2653.80	2714.10	2838.00	2962.80	3087.30	3303.03	3456.30	3577.80	3673.80	3792.00	3918.90	4041.00	4224.30
W-3	2247.90	2438.40	2438.40	2469.90	2498.70	2681.70	2838.00	2930.40	3023.40	3114.00	3210.60	3335.70	3456.30	3456.30	3577.80
W-2	1968.90	2130.30	2130.30	2192.10	2312.10	2438.40	2531.10	2623.80	2714.10	2809.50	2901.90	2993.10	3114.00	3114.00	3114.00
W-1	1640.40	1880.70	1880.70	2037.90	2130.30	2221.50	2312.10	2407.20	2498.70	2591.70	2681.70	2777.70	2777.70	2777.70	2777.70
E-9	—	—	—	—	—	—	2877.30	2942.10	3008.40	3078.00	3147.00	3207.60	3375.90	3507.30	3704.70
E-8	—	—	—	—	—	2412.60	2482.50	2547.30	2613.60	2682.90	2743.80	2811.30	2976.60	3108.90	3308.40
E-7	1684.80	1818.90	1885.50	1952.10	2018.70	2082.90	2149.50	2216.70	2316.60	2382.60	2448.60	2480.40	2647.20	2778.90	2976.60
E-6	1449.30	1579.80	1645.50	1715.40	1779.90	1844.10	1911.60	2010.00	2073.30	2140.20	2172.60	2172.60	2172.60	2172.60	2172.60
E-5	1271.70	1384.20	1451.40	1514.70	1614.30	1680.30	1746.30	1811.10	1844.10	1844.10	1844.10	1844.10	1844.10	1844.10	1844.10
E-4	1185.90	1252.80	1326.60	1428.60	1485.30	1485.30	1485.30	1485.30	1485.30	1485.30	1485.30	1485.30	1485.30	1485.30	1485.30
E-3	1117.80	1179.00	1225.80	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70	1274.70
E-2	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80	1075.80
E-1	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40	959.40
E-1*	887.70														

* With less than 4 months of service.

Military pay is subject to regular federal, state and local taxes. Military personnel pay state income taxes in their permanent home of record. In addition, special ops soldiers may qualify for bonuses for airborne status (\$110.00 per month), hazardous duty (\$110.00 per month) or flight status (\$400.00 per month). The U.S. Senate has approved a bill that will raise pay for all military personnel by 4.8%, starting in January 2000.

U.S. MILITARY RANK STRUCTURE

GRADE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	MARINES
O-10	General	Admiral	General	General
O-9	Lieutenant General	Vice Admiral	Lieutenant General	Lieutenant General
O-8	Major General	Rear Admiral, Upper Half	Major General	Major General
O-7	Brigadier General	Real Admiral, Lower Half	Brigadier General	Brigadier General
O-6	Colonel	Captain	Colonel	Colonel
O-5	Lieutenant Colonel	Commander	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel
O-4	Major	Lieutenant Commander	Major	Major
O-3	Captain	Lieutenant	Captain	Captain
O-2	First Lieutenant	Lieutenant, Junior Grade	First Lieutenant	First Lieutenant
O-1	Second Lieutenant	Ensign	Second Lieutenant	Second Lieutenant
E-9*	Command Sergeant Major of the Army	Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy	Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force	Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps.
E-9**	Command Sergeant Major	Master Chief Petty Officer	Chief Master Sergeant	Sergeant Major
E-9	Sergeant Major	—	—	Master Gunnery Sergeant
E-8***	First Sergeant	Senior Chief Petty Officer	Senior Master Sergeant	First Sergeant
E-8	Master Sergeant	—	—	Master Sergeant
E-7	Sergeant First Class	Chief Petty Officer	Master Sergeant	Gunnery Sergeant
E-6	Staff Sergeant	Petty Officer First Class	Technical Sergeant	Staff Sergeant
E-5	Sergeant	Petty Officer Second Class	Staff Sergeant	Sergeant
E-4	Corporal (Specialist)	Petty Officer Third Class	Sergeant	Corporal
E-3	Private First Class	Seaman	Airman First Class	Lance Corporal
E-2	Private	Seaman Apprentice	Airman	Private First Class
E-1	Private	Seaman Recruit	Airman Basic	Private

* Only one enlisted soldier of this grade may hold this rank at a time.


** This rank is usually assigned to the senior enlisted man in a battalion, wing or similar-sized element.

*** This rank is usually assigned to the senior enlisted man in a company, squadron or similar-sized element.

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONS

Every special operation is performed according to a specific agenda. This will vary from mission to mission, but every successful mission has certain elements in common: strategic and tactical command and control, mission planning and execution, and after-action debriefing.



Strategic Command and Control

"Strategic command and control" are the arrangements by which national governments approve special operations and allot their forces to undertake such operations. These arrangements are quite similar for most countries. The intimate connection between special ops and sensitive political concerns requires that national leaders exercise considerable control over the tasking of special ops units.

Peacetime Strategic Command and Control in the U.S.

In peacetime, the decision to commit U.S. special operations forces for any mission rests with the National Command Authority (NCA) – the President, acting in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff – and subordinate commands acting at NCA instruction.

When the NCA determines that a special operations mission is essential to national policy interests, a report is prepared by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presidential approval. This report, or *tasking*, is then forwarded to the appropriate subordinate commands for action. Since early 1987, the centralized command and control agency for special ops has been the Special Operations Command (SOC/DOD), directly subordinate to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense.

Subordinate to SOC/DOD, there are two general channels through which mission taskings are forwarded: a counterterrorism channel and a channel for all other missions.

Counterterrorism Taskings

The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1981 to provide command and control for hostage rescue and counterterrorism assets of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. At present, its subordinate units include First Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGROUP) and elements of the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment which provide direct aviation support for these units.

Upon receipt of a mission tasking from SOC/DOD, JSOC begins operation planning and coordination for carrying out the mission, issuing "warning orders" (p. 79) immediately to the affected units. Later, it issues an "operations order" (p. 85) assigning each unit tasks for the operation.

Other Mission Taskings

For all other mission taskings, SOC/DOD directs the relevant service commands to issue warning and operations orders to their subordinate units. When more than one service is involved, SOC/DOD coordinates inter-service liaison. Each service maintains one or more commands specifically tasked to control that service's special operations assets.

The U.S. Army's designated command is the 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM), activated at Fort Bragg in October 1983 as a subordinate element of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). Under 1st SOCOM's control are all Special Forces Groups, the 75th Ranger Regiment's three battalions, a large Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs element, and those elements of the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment not assigned to JSOC.

WHAT DOES "CLASSIFIED" MEAN?

The U.S. government recognizes three general security classification designations: Top Secret, Secret and Confidential. The following definitions of each are taken from AR 380-5, *Security*:

TOP SECRET. "Top Secret" shall be applied only to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of "exceptionally grave damage" include armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting national security; the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to national security.

SECRET. "Secret" shall be applied only to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples of "serious damage" include disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national security; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; compromise of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security.


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WHAT DOES "CLASSIFIED" MEAN?

(Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL. "Confidential" shall be applied to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable damage to the national security. Examples of "identifiable damage" include the compromise of information that indicates strength of ground, air, and naval forces in the United States and overseas areas; disclosure of technical information used for training, maintenance, and inspection of classified munitions of war; revelation of performance characteristics, test data, design, and production data on munitions of war.



In addition to these security classification designations, there are other designators – called "caveats" – which indicate the level of clearance needed for access to the material, the source of the material and the like. Examples of such caveats are "UMBRA" (which indicates that the material derives from the most sensitive SIGINT or ELINT sources) and "WNINTEL" – "WARNING NOTICE – Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved." A caveat may also be assigned to a particular operation to indicate that special clearance is required for access to information on that operation. Thus, a document with "TOP SECRET UMBRA WNINTEL KEYSTONE" printed across its top and bottom lines would be something no unauthorized person who enjoys staying out of jail would want to read.

Needless to say, only open, public, non-classified sources were used in compiling this volume, but then, the Freedom of Information Act has put a lot of formerly classified information into the public domain.

The U.S. Navy's designated command is the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM). Directly subordinate to NAVSPECWARCOM are Special Boat Squadrons 1 and 2, the Naval Special Warfare Center, the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, Naval Special Warfare Group 1 (NAVSPECWARGRU 1), based at Coronado, California, and Naval Special Warfare Group 2 (NAVSPECWARGRU 2), based at Little Creek, Virginia. Subordinate to NAVSPECWARGRU 1 are Naval Special Warfare Units (NSWU) 1 and 3, SEAL Teams 1, 3 and 5, and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 1. Subordinate to NAVSPECWARGRU 2 are NSWU 2, 4, 8 and 10, SEAL Teams 2, 4 and 8, and SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team 2.

The U.S. Air Force's designated command is the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), based at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Subordinate elements of AFSOC are 16th Special Operations Wing, 352nd and 353rd Special Operations Groups, Special Operations Detachment 1, and the 720th Special Tactics Group. Also subordinate to AFSOC are the 919th Special Operations Wing (Air Force Reserve) and the 193rd Special Operations Wing (Air Force National Guard).

The U.S. Marine Corps has no special operations capability comparable to that of the U.S. Army or U.S. Navy, but one Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) – a battalion landing team – has been designated for special ops duty (Special Ops Capable) with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. This MEU (SOC) is essentially a conventional forward-deployed force capable of action in support of other special ops assets.

Wartime Strategic Command and Control in the U.S.

It is assumed that the peacetime command and control arrangements for special operations units will be largely retained in wartime. With the parcelling out of special ops assets to theater and subordinate commands, however, considerably greater latitude and less centralized control will be exercised.

An excellent example is the conduct of U.S. special operations in the Vietnam War. Vietnam was the most centrally commanded war the U.S. has ever fought: command decisions which had always been the prerogative of field commanders were routinely reserved for the President and his chief advisors. There were limits to this micro-management, however. The degree and distance of penetration of countries bordering Vietnam was a matter solely for decision in Washington, but the tasking of MACV-SOG (see p. 125) missions and their command and control still remained the responsibility of the commanding officer of MACV-SOG (although the Pacific command and the Joint Staff had veto power over all MACV-SOG operations).

Similarly, while the Pentagon set general guidelines for long-range reconnaissance operations, the actual tasking and conduct was in the hands of maneuver-element commanders, particularly division and brigade commanders, who could order such operations on their own authority within the confines of South Vietnam. Thus, when Company E, 58th Infantry (LRP) was tasked for a mission, that tasking came from the commander of the 4th Infantry Division through his G-2 (intelligence officer) or G-3 (operations officer). If higher headquarters knew about it, that was a result of the mission being reported in the division's daily operations summary, not any special command and control arrangements. Most experts believe that a similar limited decentralization of command and control over special ops units is inevitable in any future war.



Strategic Command and Control in the U.K.

Peacetime command and control of British special operations assets is divided between domestic counterterrorist operations (including Northern Ireland) and other operations.

Domestic counterterrorist operations are authorized by the Prime Minister in conjunction with the COBRA committee, consisting of the Home Secretary, the junior ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, and representatives of MI5, MI6, the police and 22nd SAS Regiment. Once such operations are authorized, command and control is delegated to the Commanding Officer, 22nd SAS – or in the case of terrorist acts involving offshore oil installations, to the Commanding Officer, Comacchio Group, Royal Marines.

For all other special operations, the authorizing authority is the Prime Minister acting in concert with the Chief of the Defense Staff and the First Sea Lord. Specific command and control depends on the services involved, with overall command passing to the senior unit commander.

THE STANDING ORDERS OF ROGERS' RANGERS, 1759

The standing orders issued by Major Robert Rogers to his Ranger companies represent the earliest North American special operations tactical SOP document. Simple, blunt and to the point, these standing orders provide advice – shorn of the bureaucratic verbiage of modern SOPs – which could well save the lives of special ops soldiers even today. The U.S. Army handed out pocket cards with these orders in Vietnam:

1. Don't forget nothing.
2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minute's warning.
3. When you're on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first.
4. Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on you for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don't ever lie to a Ranger or officer.
5. Don't never take a chance you don't have to.
6. When you're on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can't go through two men.
7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so it's hard to track us.
8. When we march, we keep moving til dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us.
9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.
10. If we take prisoners, we keep 'em separate til we have time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between 'em.
11. Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed.
12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a scout twenty yards on each flank and twenty yards in the rear, so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out.
13. Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force.
14. Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries.
15. Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and Indians attack.
16. Don't cross a river by a regular ford.
17. If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.
18. Don't stand up when the enemy's coming against you. Kneel down, lie down, hide behind a tree.
19. Let the enemy come til he's almost close enough to touch. Then let him have it and jump out and finish him up with your hatchet.

STAFF ORGANIZATION

As in most large organizations, efficiency requires that duties be delegated to smaller groups for effective planning and execution. In military units, this is facilitated by the commander's staff. Supervised by the chief of staff (called an *executive officer* in battalion-sized and smaller units), each staff officer attends to the requirements of a particular area. These staff officer functions are designated by a letter and a number.

The letter indicates unit size and type. For large units (corps and larger), or units involving more than one service, the prefix "J" (for joint staff) is used. For single-service units, like army divisions, the prefix "G" (for general staff) is used. For brigade-sized and smaller units, the prefix "S" (for staff) is used. This usage has been standardized among the NATO countries.

The number (1 to 5) indicates the specific responsibilities of the staff officer. These numbers mean the same thing for *all* units; only the prefix changes with the size of the unit. We shall use a battalion- or squadron-sized unit as our example:

S-1: The personnel officer, called the *adjutant*, is responsible for personnel management, headquarters management, morale, health services and maintenance of discipline.

S-2: The intelligence and security officer is responsible for the collection and analysis of intelligence pertaining to the enemy, weather and terrain, and for operations and communications security and counterintelligence.

S-3: The operations officer is responsible for the organization, training, and operational planning and execution of the unit.

S-4: The supply and maintenance officer is responsible for logistical support, equipment maintenance and transportation of combat service support.

S-5: The civil-military operations officer is responsible for all matters pertaining to the political, economic, social and psychological aspects of military operations, particularly liaison with civil authorities.


In wartime, a system similar to that of the United States is used. For example, special operations by 22nd SAS and SBS were authorized and controlled during the Falklands War by the Commander of the Falklands Task Force, the Commander of Land Forces and the Commander of 3 Commando Brigade, depending on the nature and target of the operation.

Tactical Command and Control: Mission Planning

"Tactical command and control" are the arrangements by which commanders of special ops units and their subordinates actively plan and direct the conduct of operations. The arrangements examined in greatest detail are those for U.S. units, but such arrangements are largely uniform around the world – particularly in the case of the NATO countries, which have standardization agreements on tactical command and control.

Standard Operating Procedures

All military organizations develop standard ways of accomplishing tasks, called standard operating procedures (SOPs). These provide uniformity for evaluation and well-practiced routines for performing tasks. Learning SOPs is one purpose of training: each soldier will know exactly how to accomplish tasks under any circumstance. Even when a situation that isn't directly covered by an SOP arises, existing SOPs provide general guidance. All planning begins with SOPs. For many contingencies, operations plans (OPLANs) – contingency plans in the format of an operations order – are already drafted, which can then be tailored to the specific operational situation.



Warning Orders

Upon receipt of a warning order from higher headquarters indicating a particular mission tasking, the special operations unit commander will issue his own warning order to inform his subordinate commanders and their men of the general nature of the operation and the specific requirements relevant to them. Such warning orders may be vague or entirely precise, depending on the overall level of secrecy (operations security) required and each subordinate's "need to know." A warning order is designed to set in motion the process of preparation for an operation.

The Warning Order (WO)

A warning order must contain the following essential information:

1. A classification indicating the degree of secrecy attached to the mission by higher headquarters.
2. A list of exactly which units and personnel are affected by the order.
3. A description of the nature of the operation in sufficient detail to allow the recipients of the order to follow the appropriate SOPs or to plan for deviations from SOPs, subject to operations security requirements.
4. The time and place at which the operations order will be issued and a list of those who must be present for the operations order (an "orders group" for each unit is usually prescribed by SOP).
5. The projected date and time of the operation, to permit recipients to allocate time and set priorities for their preparation.

When the Balloon Goes Up: Mission Planning and Preparation

Receipt of a warning order is known colloquially as "the balloon going up" in the U.S. military, and initiates the mission planning process. Once the warning order from higher headquarters has been received and warning orders issued to subordinate elements, planning and preparation for the operation take top priority. Successful mission planning and preparation require high quality staff work and detailed coordination between the staff and the maneuver elements which will execute the plan. The unit commander calls together his "orders group" – key staff officers and commanders of subordinate elements – to brief them on his concept of the operation. This briefing frequently takes the form of an oral operations order, although it is usually much more sketchy than a formal, written operations order. It gives the staff and subordinate element commanders the information necessary for their role in planning how to accomplish the mission.

Juggling Balls and Robbing Dogs: The Role of the Executive Officer

As operational planning moves into high gear, the unit commander cannot be everywhere and do everything at once. His executive officer, or chief of staff, must coordinate the various staff elements. He should generally ease the commander's job by paying close attention to detail and tidying up the various loose ends which invariably unravel from the best-planned operations. An executive officer requires considerable finesse and diplomacy – as well as the ability to wield a hatchet or bury his jump boot in someone's backside. He is the commander's alter ego.

U.S. FIXED-WING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

The U.S. Air Force has regularly flown several strategic and tactical fixed-wing aircraft in support of special operations. The USAF 2nd Air Division fields the MC-130E/H aircraft, but Air Mobility Command (AMC) C-5Bs, C-130Hs, C-141Bs, and C-9As have also been available for special operations transport.

Lockheed C-5B Galaxy

The USAF's heavy strategic transport jet, the C-5B Galaxy was produced between 1984 and 1989 – a design based on the C-5A, first fielded in 1968. With a crew of seven (and the capacity to carry up to 15 relief personnel), it can carry up to 264,440 lbs. of cargo in the hold, or a total of 360 paratroops on its passenger deck and in its hold. Alternatively, it can carry Special Boat Squadron assault craft, including three river patrol boats (PBR), two mini-armored troop carriers (MATC), or one light special warfare craft (SWCL). It can also accommodate up to eight UH-1N helicopters, partially disassembled.

■ **Dimensions:** Length 247 ft. 10 in., height 65 ft. 1.5 in., wingspan 222 ft. 8 in.

■ **Weight:** 375,000 lbs. (empty), 838,000 lbs. (max. takeoff).

■ **Speed:** 570 mph (max.), 518 mph (cruising).

■ **Service Ceiling:** 34,000 ft.

■ **Range:** 3,749 miles with max. payload, 7,991 miles with max. fuel. Unlimited with aerial refueling.

■ **Takeoff Distance:** 8,300 ft.

Lockheed C-130H Hercules

The C-130H Hercules is the USAF's medium combat transport aircraft. With a crew of four, the C-130H can carry 92 troops (64 paratroops) or 43,811 lbs. of cargo in its hold. It can accommodate one partially disassembled UH-1N helicopter. The C-130H-30 is a stretched-fuselage version that can carry up to 128 troops (92 paratroops). Technical data are given for the C-130H.

■ **Dimensions:** Length 97 ft. 9 in., height 38 ft. 3 in., wingspan 132 ft. 7 in.

■ **Weight:** 75,745 lbs. (empty), 175,000 lbs. (max. takeoff).

■ **Speed:** 375 mph (max.), 345 mph (cruising).

■ **Service Ceiling:** 33,000 ft.

■ **Range:** 2,487 miles with max. payload, 4,721 miles with max. fuel.

■ **Takeoff Distance:** 3,580 ft.

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U.S. FIXED-WING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

(Continued)

Lockheed MC-130E/H Combat Talon I/II

The MC-130E Combat Talon is a C-130 Hercules modified for special ops infiltration and exfiltration missions, including no-landing extraction (which is risky and failure-prone). It can also be configured to perform aerial refueling of helicopters. It is equipped with a multi-mode radar (forward-looking infrared, ground mapping and terrain following) which lets it fly blacked-out, nap-of-the-earth missions; ECM pods let it evade hostile detection. The more advanced MC-130H Combat Talon II has a better radar, and chaff/flare dispensers for active defense. Technical data for both are similar to those for the C-130H, but range is slightly higher due to lighter loads.

Lockheed C-141B Starlifter

The C-141B Starlifter is the USAF's medium logistics transport jet. It is crewed by four and can accommodate 89,152 lbs. of cargo. The aircraft can carry one SWCL.

- **Dimensions:** Length 168 ft. 4 in., height 39 ft. 3 in., wingspan 159 ft. 11 in.
- **Weight:** 148,120 lbs. (empty), 323,100 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 566 mph (maximum), 495 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 41,600 ft.
- **Range:** 2,935 miles with max. payload, 6,390 miles with max. fuel. Unlimited with aerial refueling.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 4,002 ft.

McDonnell Douglas C-9A Nightingale

The C-9A Nightingale is the USAF's primary medevac aircraft. With a crew of three, the C-9A can accommodate up to 40 litters and 40 seated casualties, as well as two nurses and three medical technicians.

- **Dimensions:** Length 119 ft. 3.5 in., height 27 ft. 6 in., wingspan 93 ft. 5 in.
- **Weight:** 59,706 lbs. (empty), 110,000 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 576 mph (max.), 504 mph (cruising).
- **Range:** 1,923 miles with max. payload, 2,280 miles with max. fuel.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 6,850 ft.

Selection of Personnel: The Role of the S-1

Selection of personnel for the mission is the responsibility of the unit commander in conjunction with his S-1 (personnel officer, or adjutant), assisted by the executive officer, S-2 (intelligence and security officer), S-3 (operations officer) and NCOs. The unit commander, executive officer, and S-3 attempt to define the mission personnel requirements as precisely as possible, while the S-1 reviews personnel files for fit to the mission requirements (i.e., relevant skills and experience) and recommends personnel for inclusion. The S-2 examines the manpower requirements and the personnel files for potential security problems. The unit commander and his staff officers will often personally interview prospective candidates for an operation.



Intelligence Support: The Role of the S-2

Flawless, detailed intelligence is an absolute requirement for success in special operations. The S-2 is responsible for coordinating the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence, as well as supervising the maintenance of operations and communications security and counterintelligence.

The nature of the operation dictates its intelligence requirements. Intelligence about enemy order of battle, dispositions and capabilities is essential. Such reports use the SALUTE acronym as a guide: Size, Activity, Location, Unit designation, Terrain, and Equipment. Detailed and accurate maps of the area of operations – indicating terrain, obstacles, points of observation, cover and concealment, and avenues of approach – are also required. Meteorological data – focusing on visibility and anything that might affect transportation – must be compiled and analyzed.

The collection of intelligence may range from routine procurement of reports from intelligence units or agencies to extensive special tasking of tactical and strategic intelligence collection. Such collection can range from prisoner-of-war interrogations, to HUMINT agent penetrations, to SIGINT and ELINT intercept, to photoreconnaissance.

Liaison with intelligence agencies and units is a particularly important role for the S-2. It is rare that a special ops unit has the capability to develop all of the intelligence that its missions require on its own. The extent of this liaison – as well as the requirements of the mission – frequently determines the form in which the intelligence is provided. It can range from summaries of analyses by other agencies to raw, unanalyzed intelligence data. Exchange of raw data between services and agencies is relatively uncommon. With the right priority, however – perhaps a personal request from the Chairman of the JCS or an order from the President – raw data from national technical collection, normally never circulated outside the collecting agency, can be made available.

The S-2 serves as the collection manager for the operation, prioritizing intelligence collection requests and issuing taskings as needed. There are three priority ratings for collection:

- Priority I:* Intelligence without which mission accomplishment or planning is impossible.
- Priority II:* Intelligence without which mission accomplishment or planning will be severely hampered.
- Priority III:* Intelligence which will enhance mission accomplishment or planning.

It is the duty of the S-2 and his staff to analyze and evaluate incoming intelligence. Intelligence reports are graded in terms of their source, the source's reliability and the analyst's judgment as to the accuracy of the information. The U.S. military uses the following designators:

Reliability of Source

- A – Completely reliable.
- B – Usually reliable.
- C – Fairly reliable.
- D – Not usually reliable.
- E – Unreliable.
- F – Reliability cannot be judged.

Accuracy of Information

- 1 – Confirmed by other sources.
- 2 – Probably true.
- 3 – Possibly true.
- 4 – Doubtful.
- 5 – Improbable.
- 6 – Truth cannot be judged.

Thus, an intelligence report bearing the designator "A1" would be from a completely reliable source and confirmed by other sources. A report with the designator "E4" would be from an unreliable source and of doubtful accuracy. As intelligence is gathered and analyzed, an intelligence summary (INTSUM) updates the staff and subordinate element commanders on current intelligence.

The S-2 is also responsible for operations and communications security and counterintelligence. It is common for telephones on a military base to be monitored during preparation for special ops missions to ensure that inadvertent disclosure of information does not take place. In some cases, counterintelligence agents place key personnel under surveillance to ensure security or to prevent an enemy from harming them. These measures – as well as more usual operations and communications security procedures – are designed to prevent the enemy from becoming aware of the operation in the first place and to deny him as much intelligence as possible.

U.S. ROTARY-WING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

Bell UH-1H Iroquois

The UH-1H is a tactical utility helicopter which entered service with the Army in 1967. It was better known as the "Huey" in Vietnam, where it was sometimes configured as a gunship. It has served exclusively in the "slick" (transport aircraft) configuration in more recent times. It can accommodate 14 troops, and often carries a pair of M60 7.62mm machine guns in the doors. It is flown by many nations, including Israel.

- *Dimensions:* Length 41 ft. 10.75 in., height 14 ft. 6 in., main rotor diameter 48 ft.
- *Weight:* 4,667 lbs. (empty), 9,500 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- *Speed:* 161 mph (max.), 138 mph (cruising).
- *Service Ceiling:* 12,600 ft.
- *Range:* 285 miles (max. payload).

Bell UH-1N

The UH-1N was first delivered to the USAF in 1970 and is currently in service with the Navy and Marine Corps as well. Two M-60 machine guns can be mounted in the cabin doors. The USAF uses it primarily in the "slick" configuration, accommodating 14 troops or 3,383 lbs. of cargo.

- *Dimensions:* Length 42 ft. 4.75 in., height 14 ft. 10.25 in., main rotor diameter 48 ft. 2.25 in.
- *Weight:* 6,169 lbs. (empty), 10,500 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- *Speed:* 142 mph (max.), 115 mph (cruising).
- *Service Ceiling:* 15,000 ft.
- *Range:* 248 miles (max. payload).

Bell MH-6B Little Bird

The MH-6 was delivered to the USAF in 1970 for use as a light scout helicopter, and later adopted by the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment as a light multi-purpose aircraft. It has a crew of two, and can carry six passengers, 2-4 litters or a slingload of up to 2,000 lbs. The AH-6 attack version carries no passengers or cargo, but can be armed with 70mm rocket launchers, M134 7.62mm Miniguns, Mk.19 grenade launchers, Stinger air-to-air missiles or Hellfire anti-tank missiles.

- *Dimensions:* Length 29 ft. 10 in., height 8 ft. 5.5 in., main rotor diameter 26 ft.
- *Weight:* 2,833 lbs. (empty), 5,219 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- *Speed:* 174 mph (max.), 115 mph (cruising).
- *Service Ceiling:* 7,400 ft.
- *Range:* 321 miles (max. payload).

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U.S. ROTARY-WING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

(Continued)

Boeing MH-47E Chinook

The MH-47E Chinook is the special ops configuration of the U.S. Army's dual-rotor medium transport helicopter. Closely related to the CH-47D, a descendant of the CH-47B of the Vietnam era, the MH-47E is designed to transport up to 31 fully equipped troops or 14,322 lbs. of cargo in addition to its crew of 4. It can bear up to 22,783 lbs. in an external three-point load. It is equipped with a probe for aerial refueling using a probe-and-drogue system.

- **Dimensions:** Length 51 ft., height 18 ft. 7.75 in., rotor diameter 60 ft.
- **Weight:** 53,000 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 185 mph (max.), 153 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 14,000 ft.
- **Range:** 230 miles with max. internal payload, 1,331 miles with max. fuel.

Sikorsky MH-60A Black Hawk

The MH-60A is the U.S. Army's primary special ops assault helicopter. It is armed with two M-60 machine guns in the cabin doors, and carries a crew of three or four and up to 11 troops. The USAF uses the MH-60 Pave Hawk, a version of the Army's Black Hawk.

- **Dimensions:** Length 50 ft. 0.75 in., height 16 ft. 10 in., main rotor diameter 53 ft. 8 in.
- **Weight:** 10,900 lbs. (empty), 20,250 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 184 mph (max.), 169 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 19,100 ft.
- **Range:** 373 miles with max. payload, 1,380 miles with max. fuel.

Sikorsky HH-60D Night Hawk

The HH-60D Night Hawk is the USAF's modified version of the MH-60A. It is equipped with forward-looking infrared and terrain-following radars. Technical data are as for the MH-60A.

Sikorsky MH-60G Pave Hawk

The Pave Hawk is a medium-lift, twin-engine helicopter operated by AFSOC (p. 32). It carries navigational equipment and ECMs that allow it to operate under a variety of circumstances. The Pave Hawk is armed with two crew-served 7.62mm Miniguns mounted in the cabin windows; two .50-caliber machine guns can be mounted in the cabin doors. Technical data are as for the MH-60A.

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Planning and Training for Execution: The Role of the S-3

Upon receipt of the warning order, the unit commander, the executive officer and the S-3 are responsible for parcelling out the tasks necessary for mission preparation. The S-3 consults with subordinate element commanders and staff to determine what requirements they feel are necessary for performance of their part of the mission. In special ops units, this consultation frequently takes the form of a "briefback."

The Briefback. Upon receiving the assignment, subordinate element commanders brief their troops on their mission objective. An extensive "brainstorming" session – sometimes several – follows. The participants analyze and discuss the resources they need and how these resources can be most efficiently used to achieve the objective. In most special ops units – the British SAS and U.S. Special Forces in particular – this process is highly informal, with experience and expertise counting far more than rank. Each step of the mission is carefully thought through, with particular attention paid to alternative courses of action ("fall-backs") if something goes wrong. While improvisation under pressure is a valued skill, these discussions are to allow those who will perform the mission to explore every possible contingency.

When this process is complete, the subordinate unit commander and his key personnel conduct a "briefback" for the tasking unit commander and his S-3 in which they lay out their plans for achieving the objective. Intense and probing questions are posed by the commander and the S-3 to make certain that all reasonable contingencies have been examined and that the proposed plan has a significant likelihood of success. It is not uncommon for this process to take place more than once, as questions from higher command force the subordinate elements to refine their planning.

Once this step has been completed, it is the job of the executive officer and the S-3 to coordinate the planning and requirement taskings indicated by the briefbacks, letting the other staff sections (S-1 through S-4) know what their requirements will be on the basis of the operational plan. The S-3 must also conduct operational liaison with any other units or services involved in the operation. Communications arrangements have to be made: callsigns, CEOI (see p. 96), frequencies, communications security (COMSEC) equipment, etc. Tactical air or artillery support must be planned and coordinated.

Special operations are not things that sensible men choose to do on the spur of the moment – that is an excellent way to get killed. If at all possible, such operations are practiced – often repeatedly. Standard operating procedures for different kinds of operations are the subject of constant training and practice – the daily responsibility of the S-3. There is no such thing as "the generic embassy to be taken down," however. No matter how often a unit practices the general techniques, vital information – floor plans, hostage locations, terrorist dispositions, etc. – is needed to perfect an operation against a *particular* embassy being held hostage.

The S-3 must organize such specific training for each mission. Preparations almost always include map and floor-plan exercises, often using tabletop models of the operational area and frequently involving practice on full-scale mock-ups of the target. As a general rule, the longer a unit practices its plan in the most realistic environment possible, the more likely it is to succeed.

Supplying the Mission: The Role of the S-4

Military units require constant supply. They must eat and drink, they must be housed and clothed, and they must be issued weapons, ammunition, and whatever other equipment they require to do their jobs – no matter how esoteric that

equipment may be. It is the responsibility of the S-4 and his staff to fulfil the supply requirements of the operation. This can be a complicated and demanding endeavor, for military logistics and supply can be an arcane, often intractable bureaucracy which does not respond well to out-of-the-ordinary requirements. The U.S. Army divides its supply requirements into ten classes:

- Class I:* Subsistence items – food and water.
- Class II:* Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and tool kits, hand tools, and administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment.
- Class III:* Fuels and petroleum products.
- Class IV:* Construction materiel.
- Class V:* Ammunition and explosives.
- Class VI:* Army and Air Force Exchange System items for sale to troops.
- Class VII:* Major end items; e.g., aircraft (VIIA), communications/electronics (VIIG), tactical vehicles (VIK), missiles (VIIL), weapons (VIIM), and combat vehicles (VIO).
- Class VIII:* Medical, dental and veterinary supplies and equipment.
- Class IX:* Repair parts and components required for maintenance support for all equipment (except medical, dental, and veterinary).
- Class X:* Materiel to support non-military programs; e.g., agricultural and economic development projects run in conjunction with civil affairs projects.

Determining the supply requirements for an operation can be a highly complicated business. The unit commander, his staff and the subordinate element commanders and staff are canvassed for their requirements. Detailed lists of needed equipment and materiel are prepared and requisitions forwarded to supply centers. Where needed equipment is not available through the military supply chain, permission is sought to obtain it on the civilian market. These processes can consume valuable time and are replicated hundreds of times for any even slightly complicated operation.

For example, the following is a *partial* list of the Class I, II, V, VII, and VIII equipment required for Operation KINGPIN, the attempt to rescue U.S. POWs at Son Tay (a 56-man ground operation):

2 AN/PRC-41 radios, 10 AN/PRC-77 radios, 24 AN/PRC-88 radios, 92 AN/PRC-90 survival radios, 2 M-16 assault rifles, 48 Colt Commando (CAR-15) assault rifles, 51 M-1911A1 .45 caliber pistols, 4 M-60 general purpose machine guns, 4 M79 grenade launchers, 2 12-gauge shotguns, 213 M-26 fragmentation grenades, 11 demolition charges, 56 combat knives, 19,637 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition, 1,162 rounds of .45 caliber ammunition, 4,300 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 219 40mm grenades, 100 12-gauge shotgun shells, 250 30-round magazines (for the CAR-15s and M-16s), 50 Armalite Singlepoint Night Sights, 11 axes, 11 bolt cutters, 12 wire cutters, a hammer and nails, 2 oxyacetylene torches, 5 crowbars, 2 chain saws, 17 machetes, 34 miner's lamps, a 14-foot ladder, 6 pairs of handcuffs, 2 crash ladders, 5 bullhorns, 6 infrared flashlights, 6 night vision devices, 6 baton lights, 2 cameras, 56 goggles, 56 penlights, 56 survival kits, 56 penflares, 62 strobe lights, 56 compasses, 56 pairs of aviator's gloves, 56 pairs of earplugs, 56 sets of LBE, 56 camouflage sticks, 150 cans of water, 100 poncho-blankets, 100 survival meals, 100 sets of pajamas, robes, and sneakers, and 144 bottles of Heinz baby food (for the rescued POWs), and 18 M-5 medical kits.

This list does not include equipment for the helicopters or supplies provided by USAF and Navy supply chains to their participating units. The task force's supply and communications section was six officers and NCOs.

U.S. ROTARY-WING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

(Continued)

Sikorsky MH-53J *Pave Low*

The MH-53J *Pave Low* is the USAF's primary heavy-lift special ops transport helicopter. It's also the largest and most powerful helicopter in the USAF inventory. With a crew of six, it can accommodate up to 38 troops. Its advanced avionics include terrain-following/avoidance radar, forward-looking infrared and a projected map display. It is armored, and carries a combination of three 7.62mm Miniguns or .50-caliber machine guns.

■ **Dimensions:** Length 67 ft. 2 in., height 17 ft. 1.5 in., main rotor diameter 72 ft. 3 in.

■ **Weight:** 23,485 lbs. (empty), 46,000 lbs. (max. takeoff).

■ **Speed:** 196 mph (max.), 165 mph (cruising).

■ **Service Ceiling:** 16,000 ft.

■ **Range:** 630 miles with max. payload.



EUROPEAN, CANADIAN AND ISRAELI FIXED- WING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

Arbeitsgemeinschaft Transall C.160

The C.160 was built for the French and West German governments between 1967 and 1972 as a general-purpose tactical transport. With a crew of three, it can deliver up to 88 paratroops.

- **Dimensions:** Length 106 ft. 3.5 in., height 40 ft. 6.75 in., wingspan 131 ft. 3 in.
- **Weight:** 63,400 lbs. (empty), 112,435 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 322 mph (max.), 282 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 25,500 ft.
- **Range:** 1,150 miles with max. payload, 5,504 miles with max. fuel.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 3,248 ft.

British Aerospace 748 Andover C.Mk 1

The 748 Andover C.Mk 1 is a STOL utility transport. Crewed by two, it can deliver up to 48 paratroops.

- **Dimensions:** Length 67 ft., height 24 ft. 10 in., wingspan 98 ft. 6 in.
- **Weight:** 25,730 lbs. (empty), 51,000 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 281 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 25,000 ft.
- **Range:** 905 miles with max. payload, 1,474 miles with max. fuel.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 910 ft.

De Havilland Aircraft of Canada DHC-5D Buffalo

The DHC-5D entered service as a STOL utility transport for the RCAF in 1974. It is crewed by three and can deliver up to 34 paratroops.

- **Dimensions:** Length 79 ft., height 28 ft. 8 in., wingspan 96 ft.
- **Weight:** 25,160 lbs. (empty), 49,200 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 290 mph (max.), 261 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 27,500 ft.
- **Range:** 507 miles with max. payload, 2,038 miles with max. fuel.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 850 ft.

Israel Aircraft Industries 201 Arava

The IAI 201 Arava is a native Israeli STOL tactical transport. Crewed by four, it can accommodate up to 16 paratroops and two jumpmasters.

- **Dimensions:** Length 42 ft. 9 in., height 17 ft. 1 in., wingspan 68 ft. 9 in.
- **Weight:** 8,816 lbs. (empty), 15,000 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 203 mph (max.), 198 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 25,000 ft.
- **Range:** 174 miles with max. payload, 806 miles with max. fuel.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 4,002 ft.

Transportation: A Joint S-3/S-4 Responsibility

Transportation of combat service support must be organized. In some cases, transportation assets are organic to the special ops unit; in most cases, they are not. The S-4 must coordinate with the service providing transportation – usually the USAF, for U.S. special operations – to make certain that the units concerned know precisely what will be required of them. This always requires detailed planning of personnel and equipment loads.

Tactical transportation planning and coordination for maneuver and combat-support elements is the responsibility of the S-3, and careful coordination between the S-4 and S-3 is necessary. Ground transportation – both to air transport and on the ground after air delivery – must also be provided, again with the coordinated efforts of the S-3 and S-4.

It should be kept in mind that decisions about the means of transportation are the result of a delicate balance between operational efficiency and available assets – sometimes you *have to go*, even if ideal arrangements are not available. Finessing this balance is a key skill for S-3 and S-4 staffs.

Liaison with the Locals: The Role of the S-5

Many special operations missions, notably counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations, require significant liaison and coordination with indigenous civil authorities, the local police and public safety agencies, electrical power companies, telephone and telegraph companies, and the news media. These tasks are the responsibility of the S-5, the civil-military affairs officer, and his staff. Such missions may also involve psychological warfare operations, which are also the province of the S-5.



The Operations Order (OPORD)

As the planning phase reaches its culmination, a formal, written operations order is drafted by the S-3 and approved by the unit commander. The operations order details the commander's concept of the operation in sufficient detail to permit his subordinates to carry out their actions in coordination to realize that concept. The written OPORD is prepared in a standard five-paragraph format, and summarizes the planning carried out since the warning order. An OPORD must contain the following information:

1. A classification.
2. An indication as to whether the written OPORD differs from the oral OPORD.
3. An originating headquarters indicator, including the designation of the issuing unit, the location of issue, a date/time group indicating when the OPORD was issued, and a message reference number so that subordinate commanders can refer to the OPORD quickly in message traffic with higher headquarters.
4. An OPORD number, assigned by the S-3. Such numbers run serially throughout the year (if the OPORD is based on an existing OPLAN, then the OPLAN code name follows in parentheses).
5. A references indicator, listing any map or document references necessary for understanding the OPORD.
6. A task organization list, indicating the organization for combat for the operation, and listing unit subordination, direct support and attachment for the operation. Units are listed in the following order: combat units (combined arms, infantry, armor), combat support units, support units.
7. A SITUATION paragraph, consisting of three sections:
 - a. Enemy forces: detailing enemy units, their dispositions, and any available relevant intelligence about those units.
 - b. Friendly forces: detailing higher, adjacent supporting, and reinforcing units and their dispositions as applicable.
 - c. Attachments and detachments: detailing units attached to or detached from the operational commander's command.
8. A MISSION paragraph, giving a clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished in a "who, what, when, where and why" format.
9. An EXECUTION paragraph, consisting of three sections:
 - a. The concept of the operation, including maneuver and fires, describing each phase of the operation.
 - b. The elements held in reserve and the circumstances under which reserve elements will be committed.
 - c. Coordinating instructions, outlining the instructions necessary for coordination between two or more elements of the command, including:
 - (1) Essential elements of information (EEI) or specific orders for collection of intelligence.
 - (2) Movement instructions.
 - (3) Any counterintelligence measures not included in SOP.
 - (4) Any troop safety instructions not included in SOP.
 - (5) Any instructions for coordination with attached or supporting units not included in SOP.
10. A SERVICE SUPPORT paragraph, outlining instructions pertaining to:
 - a. General support.
 - b. Materiel and services.
 - c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization.
 - d. Personnel.
 - e. Civil-military cooperation.
11. A COMMAND AND SIGNAL paragraph, including:
 - a. Instructions pertaining to signals, including the index and issue number of the communications-electronics operations instructions (CEOI), signals control and security, and emergency signals.
 - b. Command post locations, designation of alternative command posts and succession of command (who takes over if the commander is lost).
12. Instructions to recipients to acknowledge the OPORD.
13. A signature block containing the signature of issuing commander and the authentication of copies of the OPORD by the S-3.
14. A distribution list indicating all recipients.
15. Any annexes containing supporting documents for clarification of the major paragraphs – e.g., maps, sketches or overlays – or supplementary instructions addressed to specific subordinate elements rather than the unit as a whole.

RUSSIAN FIXED-WING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

These names are NATO designations that predate the fall of the Soviet Union. The technical data are in many cases estimates – an artifact of the Cold War era.

AN-12BP "Cub-A"

The AN-12BP has been the mainstay of Russian paratroop operations since the early 1960s. With a crew of five, it can deliver up to 100 paratroops or 44,092 lbs. of freight.

- **Dimensions:** Length 108 ft. 7 in., height 34 ft., wingspan 124 ft. 8 in.
- **Weight:** 61,728 lbs. (empty), 134,480 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 482 mph (max.), 416 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 33,465 ft.
- **Range:** 2,237 miles with max. payload, 3,542 miles with max. fuel.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 2,300 ft.

AN-32 "Cline"

The AN-32 is an improved version of the AN-26B "Curl" medium transport. With a crew of five, it can deliver up to 30 paratroops or 13,228 lbs. of freight.

- **Dimensions:** Length 78 ft., height 28 ft. 1 in., wingspan 95 ft. 9.5 in.
- **Weight:** 44,091 lbs. (empty), 57,319 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 317 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 31,168 ft.
- **Range:** 497 miles with max. payload, 1,397 miles with max. fuel.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 1,640 ft.

AN-72 "Cooler"

The AN-72 is a STOL light transport which entered service in early 1983. Crewed by three, it can deliver up to 32 paratroops or 35,273 lbs. of freight.

- **Dimensions:** Length 87 ft. 2 in., height 27 ft., wingspan 84 ft. 9 in.
- **Weight:** 31,973 lbs. (empty), 67,240 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 472 mph (max.), 447 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 32,810 ft.
- **Range:** 621 miles with max. payload, 2,361 miles with max. fuel.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 1,095 ft.

IL-76M "Candid"

The IL-76M was introduced in 1974 as the eventual replacement for the AN-12BP. With a crew of seven, it can deliver up to 140 paratroops or 88,183 lbs. of cargo.

- **Dimensions:** Length 152 ft. 10 in., height 48 ft. 5 in., wingspan 165 ft. 8 in.
- **Weight:** 136,684 lbs. (empty), 374,780 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 528 mph (max.), 497 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 50,855 ft.
- **Range:** 3,107 miles with max. payload, 4,163 miles with max. fuel.
- **Takeoff Distance:** 2,790 ft.

FRENCH AND BRITISH ROTARY- WING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

Aérospatiale SA.316B Alouette III

The SA.316B Alouette III is a light utility helicopter, crewed by one, capable of carrying up to six troops. It can be armed with a 7.62mm machine gun, a 20mm cannon or a variety of air-to-surface missiles and rockets.

- **Dimensions:** Length 32 ft. 10.75 in., height 9 ft. 10 in., main rotor diameter 36 ft. 1.75 in.
- **Weight:** 2,513 lbs. (empty), 4,850 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 130 mph (max.), 115 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 10,500 ft.
- **Range:** 335 miles with max. payload.

Aérospatiale SA.330L Puma

The SA.330L Puma is a medium transport helicopter, crewed by two and capable of carrying up to 20 troops for air assault. It can be armed with 20mm cannon, 7.62mm machine guns and a number of missile and rocket combinations.

- **Dimensions:** Length 46 ft. 1.5 in., height 16 ft. 10.5 in., main rotor diameter 49 ft. 2.5 in.
- **Weight:** 7,970 lbs. (empty), 16,315 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 182 mph (max.), 168 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 19,680 ft.
- **Range:** 341 miles with max. payload.

Continued on next page...

Tactical Command and Control: Mission Execution

Executing most missions means getting there, doing the job and getting out: infiltration, tactical execution and exfiltration.

Getting There: Tactical Transportation and Infiltration

The means by which a special operations unit reaches its objective (the locale at which it is intended to carry out its mission) is entirely mission dependent. In general, simplicity and surprise are the guiding principles – although ease (particularly if the task itself is arduous) can certainly play a role. There are four general means of infiltration: fixed-wing aviation, rotary-wing aviation, waterborne, and overland. Each method has both advantages and disadvantages.

Fixed-Wing Aviation Infiltration

This sort of infiltration involves one of four basic types of parachute operations (see also *Parachuting*, p. 54):

Static-line MAMO (Medium-Altitude Medium-Opening) is the type associated with basic airborne military operations: a jump at 800' to 1,200', with the parachute opening almost as soon as the jumper has cleared the aircraft. Its chief advantage is simplicity; almost anyone can be taught enough in a few hours to survive this kind of jump. The drawbacks are that the aircraft must fly at an altitude where it is susceptible to radar detection and enemy surface-to-air missiles, and that the parachutist is almost entirely at the mercy of wind currents – he has very limited steering ability and can easily miss the drop zone (DZ).

LALO (Low-Altitude Low-Opening) involves jumping from the aircraft at 300' to 500'. Even though the parachute is deployed almost instantly, a hard landing awaits a LALO jumper, as there is little time – a few seconds, at best – for his 'chute to function. The chief advantage of this method is that it lets the aircraft evade radar detection by flying nap-of-the-earth. The disadvantages are the high rate of landing injuries and the fact that reserve parachutes are of little use – if the main 'chute does not deploy, there is no time for a reserve to be used before impact.

HALO (High-Altitude Low-Opening) involves exiting the aircraft at altitudes in the 25,000' to 35,000' range, assuming the "starfish" posture (face-down, arms and legs laterally extended, back arched, center of gravity at the solar plexus), with the parachute deploying at 4,000' or below. The advantages of this technique are that a paratrooper in free-fall presents virtually no radar profile and thus is almost impossible to detect, that the aircraft operates above the range of many surface-to-air missile systems, and that the paratrooper can "track" (guide himself to a DZ at a considerable distance from the aircraft's flight path), thus disguising his ultimate destination. There are several disadvantages. First, the paratrooper must be equipped with special breathing and heat-



ing equipment to combat oxygen depletion and freezing temperatures at the exit altitude. Second, the free-fall maneuvers are extremely difficult to perform – particularly when jumping fully equipped to a terminal velocity of 120 mph. If aerodynamic stability is lost, it is almost impossible to regain under such conditions. A civilian skydiver does not carry 110 to 130 lbs. of equipment, nor does he usually jump from above 12,000'; the sport is child's play compared to the military version.

HAHO (High-Altitude High-Opening) involves jumping from 25,000' to 30,000' and deploying a specially designed parachute soon after exit, which operates much like a hang-glider. The advantages are the low radar profile of the paratrooper and the distances that can be "tracked" from the exit point – several dozen miles, if necessary. This is a key advantage if one is attempting to surreptitiously enter another country. The aircraft can skirt the friendly side of the border, while the paratrooper can maneuver to a DZ well inside enemy territory. The disadvantages of HAHO are those of HALO: special equipment and the difficulty of performing the associated maneuvers.

All fixed-wing aviation infiltration methods share one disadvantage in common: once the troops have jumped, they are irretrievable. If the DZ is compromised or the unit is scattered, there is nothing the air crew can do to help the men on the ground – you cannot land an MC-130E just anywhere. The infiltrating unit is on its own.

Rotary-Wing Aviation Infiltration

These infiltration methods are "air assault" techniques. A helicopter, usually flying nap-of-the-earth, delivers the unit to the area of operations (AO). MAMO and LALO operations can be conducted from helicopters, particularly if delivery is to be made at the outer perimeter of the AO, but the more common methods are to rappel from the helicopter as it hovers over the landing zone (LZ) or to jump from it at five to 15 feet above ground. After depositing the men, the helicopter pulls out, again flying nap-of-the-earth. It is rare for a helicopter conducting an air assault to actually touch ground unless unloading heavy cargo.

The chief advantage of rotary-wing infiltration techniques is that a means of extracting the infiltrators is readily available if things go sour at the LZ. The helicopter need merely return and pick them up. There are a few disadvantages. First, helicopters can be detected at great distance and warn targets of their approach. Second, helicopters are susceptible to fatal damage from small-arms ground fire, as well as surface-to-air missiles. Third, helicopters require a relatively flat, unobstructed LZ with a diameter at least 150% of their main rotor diameter.

Waterborne Infiltration

Waterborne infiltration operations are usually conducted in two phases. In phase one, the team is brought to within swimming distance of the target by air or by boat. In phase two, the team proceeds to the target, usually by swimming underwater.

Aerial delivery of swimmers is similar to aerial delivery of ground teams, and can be conducted by fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft. Surface delivery of swimmers can be accomplished by vessels ranging from destroyers to IBS (inflatable boat, small). Among the more common surface delivery vessels are the LCPL (landing craft, personnel, launch) Mk11, the MSSC (medium SEAL support craft), the *Asheville*-, *Trumpy*-, *Osprey*- and *Spectre*-class PTFs (patrol boat, fast), and the Seafox SWCL (special warfare craft, light). The Sea Viking SWCL is in the late stages of development and is expected to replace the Seafox. Surface delivery rarely occurs at speeds in excess of 15 knots.



FRENCH AND BRITISH ROTARY- WING TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

(Continued)

Westland Aircraft HU.Mk 5 Wessex

The HU.Mk 5 Wessex is the general-purpose helicopter used by the RAF. It is crewed by three and can deliver up to 16 troops in air assault. It can be armed with machine guns, rockets and air-to-surface missiles.

- **Dimensions:** Length 48 ft. 4.5 in., height 16 ft. 2 in., main rotor diameter 56 ft.
- **Weight:** 8,304 lbs. (empty), 13,500 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 132 mph (max.), 121 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 14,100 ft.
- **Range:** 478 miles with max. payload.

Westland Helicopters/Aérospatiale Lynx AH.Mk 1

The Lynx AH.Mk 1 is the British army's general-purpose helicopter. Crewed by two, it can deliver up to ten troops in air assault. It can be armed with a 20mm cannon or 7.62mm Minigun in the cabin; two external pylons can carry six to eight air-to-surface missiles or two pods containing Miniguns or rockets (18 68mm or 7 70mm rockets each).

- **Dimensions:** Length 49 ft. 9 in., height 12 ft., main rotor diameter 42 ft.
- **Weight:** 6,144 lbs. (empty), 10,500 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 207 mph (max.), 175 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 25,000 ft.
- **Range:** 235 miles with max. payload.

RUSSIAN ROTARY-WING 'TRANSPORT' AIRCRAFT

Mi-4 "Hound-A"

Although obsolescent, the Mi-4 remains in extensive service as a utility helicopter. It is crewed by two and can deliver up to 14 troops in air assault or 3,525 lbs. of cargo.

- **Dimensions:** Length 55 ft. 1 in., height 14 ft. 5.25 in., main rotor diameter 68 ft. 11 in.
- **Weight:** 11,618 lbs. (empty), 17,196 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 130 mph (max.), 99 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 19,685 ft.
- **Range:** 249 miles with max. payload.

Mi-6A "Hook"

The last production series of the Mi-6, the Mi-6A remains the standard Russian heavy transport and assault helicopter, crewed by five and capable of delivering 65 troops or 26,450 lbs. of cargo. It is armed with one 12.7mm or 14.5mm machine gun in the nose.

- **Dimensions:** Length 108 ft. 10.5 in., height 32 ft. 4 in., main rotor diameter 114 ft. 10 in.
- **Weight:** 60,055 lbs. (empty), 93,700 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 186 mph (max.), 155 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 14,750 ft.
- **Range:** 385 miles with max. payload.

Mi-8 "Hip-C"

The Mi-8 is a medium assault-transport helicopter. It is crewed by three and can carry up to 32 paratroops or 8,818 lbs. of cargo. Its external pylons can be equipped with up to eight 57mm rocket pods or gun pods, as well as air-to-surface missiles.

- **Dimensions:** Length 60 ft. 0.75 in., height 18 ft. 6.5 in., main rotor diameter 69 ft. 10.25 in.
- **Weight:** 15,026 lbs. (empty), 26,455 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 161 mph (max.), 155 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 14,760 ft.
- **Range:** 276 miles with max. payload.

Mi-24 "Hind-A"

The heavily armored Mi-24 armed assault helicopter has become a key asset in Russian air assault doctrine. Crewed by four, the Mi-24 can deliver up to eight troops in air assault. It is armed with a 12.7mm or 14.5mm machine gun in the nose, and can carry four 57mm rocket pods (32 rockets each) and four AT-2 "Swatter" anti-tank missiles.

- **Dimensions:** Length 55 ft. 9 in., height 14 ft., main rotor diameter 55 ft. 9 in.
- **Weight:** 14,300 lbs. (empty), 22,046 lbs. (max. takeoff).
- **Speed:** 200 mph (max.), 170 mph (cruising).
- **Service Ceiling:** 14,760 ft.
- **Range:** 300 miles with max. payload.

Underwater delivery can also be used in phase one. This is accomplished via swimmer delivery vehicles (SDV) – essentially midget submarines – which can infiltrate four to six swimmers at depths of up to 500' (although the SDV must not exceed a depth of 180' when the swimmers are using scuba equipment). The SDVs currently in service include the MkVII Mod-2, the MkVII Mod-6, the EX-VIII and the EX-IX; these last two are entering general service. The U.S. Navy has converted two former Polaris submarines and an attack submarine for use as SDV-launch platforms. These include "dry-deck" shelters that permit the loading and unloading of equipment while submerged.

Surface swimming is realistic only in environments of little risk and no hostile reconnaissance, so the chief means of phase-two infiltration is diving using scuba: self-contained underwater breathing apparatus.


Open-circuit scuba, the most commonly used recreational diving apparatus, is employed only for training and search and rescue. It is limited to a depth of 130' due to the risk of nitrogen narcosis, cannot be used for extended swims, is susceptible to detection, and can accidentally detonate acoustically activated demolition charges.

Closed-circuit (Emerson) scuba is appropriate for long (120 minutes), relatively shallow infiltrations. It cannot, however, be used at pressures greater than two atmospheres, and the breathing bag is extremely delicate. Carbon dioxide build-up limits activity to moderate work.

Semi-closed circuit scuba (the MkVI apparatus) employs a mix of oxygen and nitrogen which permits deeper and longer duration infiltrations. The limit on depth is 180' and the limits on duration are a function of depth and gas mixture. A special bubble-dispersing exhaust valve makes detection of this apparatus difficult.

Overland Infiltration

Overland infiltration – walking – can only be used where the forward operations base and the area of operations are contiguous and the distances involved do not so exhaust the infiltrating unit that it is unable to execute its mission. Overland



infiltration has the advantage of being virtually undetectable if appropriate stealth is employed, but the need to personally carry mission-essential equipment – as well as rations, water, spare clothing, and the like – places definite limits on the distances that can be covered and the speed with which they can be covered. Aerial resupply – by fixed- or rotary-wing delivery – complicates mission security by being more readily detectable by hostile forces, which can offset the advantage of stealth enjoyed by overland infiltration.

Doing the Job: Tactical Execution

There are tactical SOPs for most contingencies, but the actual execution of a mission varies almost on a case-by-case basis. The bibliography provides references for specific examples, as well as many of the military manuals with which the principles of tactical execution for different missions are taught. These can be consulted for further information on planning and executing missions. The scope of tactical execution is so wide that it is not practical to include such detailed, case-by-case instructions here.

Getting Out: Exfiltration

Exfiltration parallels infiltration, but the problem is complicated by the fact that hostile forces will probably be aware of the unit as it attempts to escape after completing its mission!

Aerial Exfiltration

Fixed-wing aerial exfiltration of ground forces requires a landing strip, which generally makes it infeasible in enemy-held territory. Exfiltration over water is accomplished by Fulton STARS (surface-to-air recovery system) techniques. These techniques are extremely dangerous, and involve being picked up by a specially equipped aircraft which catches a line attached to an IBS or individual swimmer pods at speeds exceeding 200 mph.

Rotary-wing aerial exfiltration of ground forces, particularly employing McGuire rig or STABO techniques (both of which involve lifting personnel by hovering helicopter and flying them back to base – usually dangling in the air), are frequently the most efficient means of extracting personnel, but are susceptible to ground fire and surface-to-air missiles. Exfiltration over water is accomplished by similar means.

Waterborne Exfiltration

Waterborne exfiltration is conducted in the same way as waterborne infiltration. A Fulton pick-up technique can also be used, whereby the vessel exfiltrating the swimmers catches a line connecting the individual swimmer pods and tows the swimmers out to sea at a speed of 40 knots.

Overland Exfiltration

Overland exfiltration, from the perspective of the men on the ground, is the least satisfactory means. It is usually employed only when no alternative is available. If hostile forces are large and vehicle-equipped, or if there is little natural concealment available, it is likely that the troops will be located and killed or captured by the enemy. Special ops units simply are not equipped to engage company-sized units or larger in conventional combat. They must depend on stealth and cunning to evade the enemy after completing their mission; otherwise, they will almost certainly die.

SPECTRE AND THE U-BOAT

Two fixed-wing gunships are used exclusively in support of U.S. special operations: the AC-130H Spectre and AC-130U U-Boat. These heavily armed versions of the C-130 (p. 79) use side-firing weapons and advanced sensors to strike at ground targets. Weapons include two 20mm cannon (AC-130H) or one 25mm cannon (AC-130U), one 40mm cannon and one 105mm howitzer, as well as two 7.62mm Miniguns and a variety of optional weapons. Both aircraft have low-light TV, forward-looking infrared, an inertial navigation system, and extensive ECMs. The AC-130U has the same fire-control system as the F-15E Strike Eagle, allowing it to fire on two different targets at once. The crew includes a pilot, co-pilot, navigator, fire-control officer, electronic-warfare officer, flight engineer, loadmaster, two sensor operators and five gunners.

■ **Dimensions:** Length 97 ft. 9 in., height 38 ft. 6 in., wingspan 132 ft. 7 in.

■ **Weight:** 130,000 lbs. (empty), 155,000 lbs. (max. takeoff).

■ **Speed:** 300 mph (sea level).

■ **Service Ceiling:** 25,000 ft.

■ **Range:** 1,500 miles. Unlimited with aerial refueling.

TECHNICAL DATA

The technical data on pp. 79-89 are the "factory specs." The wide variety of equipment that can be installed – especially for special operations, which by definition have special requirements – can affect weights, performance, and dimensions. For instance, painting an MH-6 to resemble a civilian helicopter (as done by 1st SFOD-Delta; see p. 29) will measurably change its weight – and that's just an extra coat of paint!

DROP ZONES

Ideally, a drop zone (DZ) should be accessible from all directions. The length of the DZ is determined by the ground dispersion pattern. As a rule of thumb:

$$\text{Length of Dispersion (meters)} = \frac{\text{Time for Entire Consignment to Exit Aircraft (seconds)} \times \text{Speed of Aircraft (knots)}}{2}$$

Divide by 0.9145 to convert meters to yards, then add 110 yards as a safety factor.

The aircraft must have a level turning radius of 5,500 yards on each side of the DZ. For LALO operations, there should be no obstacles higher than 33 yards within 5 miles of the DZ; for MAMO operations, no obstacles higher than 330 yards within 10 miles of the DZ. If the DZ is oblong in shape, its long axis must be the aircraft's direction of approach. Release point is determined by matching wind drift (drift in yards equals altitude in feet times wind speed in knots times a constant – 4 for personnel, 3 for bundles) to dispersion pattern.


operations, however. The experience of Operation EAGLE CLAW – the mission to rescue hostages in Iran in 1980 – is illustrative: Marine pilots, flying Navy helicopters, refueled by Air Force tankers, carrying 1st SFOD-Delta. Every service was included so that no service could claim credit for success, but inter-service liaison became so complex that performance was catastrophically impeded. An effort has been made to correct these deficiencies – joint commands, the permanent posting of liaison officers from each service in every other service's special ops units, frequent inter-service training and exercises – but the bureaucratic character of inter-service liaison remains a real impediment to special ops success for most countries.

International liaison is even more complex. Contacts between the special ops units of some countries – the NATO countries and Israel in particular – are conducted under agreements between governments and involve cross-training, joint exercises, and the permanent posting of liaison officers. In all cases, though, the political decision-makers must be consulted for approval of operational and support liaison. This can easily create obstacles to effective cooperation, particularly when the political objectives of the countries involved differ.

Unofficial channels are commonly used to solve some of the problems of inter-service and international liaison. An "old-boy network" of special ops soldiers exists, and NATO personnel have developed friendships which permit "back-channel" contacts to smooth the way. If one's government discovers such contacts and disapproves, though, the result can be a disgrace that ends a career.

It's Great to Be Skilled, But Better to Be Lucky

Special ops soldiers are among the most highly trained and skilled in the world, but historical analysis of special operations suggests that although such training is necessary for success, it isn't sufficient. More than skill or training, luck plays a key role in determining the outcome of special operations. Two examples make the point.



DIVING EQUIPMENT

Outside Air

This is usually "hard-hat diving," with full diving dress, including helmet, breastplate, and weighted boots. Another option is a regulator supplied with air from an outside source to allow long-term work in wetsuit, mask and fins. In either case, the diver is tied to his air supply, so this technique is of only limited usefulness in special operations. Success rolls for this kind of diving are made against Hard-Hat Diving skill (p. C1152); several professional skills (e.g., Pearl Diver, Underwater Welder, Salvage Diver) may also be used, at the GM's discretion.

Failures are usually equipment problems (tangled lines, punctured hoses, cracked faceplates, etc.). The worse the failure, the more immediately life-threatening the problem should be.

Rebreather

This piece of equipment is also known as an *underwater breathing apparatus* or UBA. It uses a tank of air at the right pressure for depth and a chemical solution to remove the carbon dioxide from exhalation. It is useful in special operations because the diver leaves no trail of bubbles. As well, a hydrophone will only detect a diver employing an UBA if he is within 1 yard.

Rebreathers were first used in the 1880s; before WWII, they were used exclusively with hard-hat equipment. New models have an air supply sufficient for nearly four hours' underwater operation, depending on the diver's depth and breathing rate.

Treat UBA as a familiarity (p. B43) of Scuba skill. Divers not specifically trained on an UBA must make a Scuba roll to even use the device, and must make a second Scuba roll at -3 midway through the dive or be forced to the surface. Untrained divers also suffer a -3 penalty on any other Scuba roll made while using a UBA.

Scuba

This system of tanks and a regulator, with the exhalation vented into the water, was not in use until after WWII. The diver leaves a trail of bubbles and makes a distinctive noise. Success rolls are against Scuba or an appropriate professional skill (GM's option). Ordinary scuba gear allows a maximum depth of 130' and carries enough air for 180 minutes underwater. Scuba gear automatically triggers hydrophones within 10 yards of the diver. An observer on the surface may spot the bubbles on a Vision roll.

Continued on next page . . .

DIVING EQUIPMENT

(Continued)

Free Diving

Working underwater without equipment is very limited in time and depth (see *Holding Your Breath*, p. B91). As a technique, it may be prehistoric. It is certainly ancient; it was used against Alexander the Great at the siege of Tyre in 332 B.C. It was still the method used by the UDT teams of WWII. Before the war, the sport of fishing with spear, goggles and fins had developed, especially in California. This equipment was adopted by navy teams who cleared mines and obstacles before amphibious landings, and by saboteurs who attacked ships with explosive charges.

A *snorkel* (from a German word for "snout") is a breathing tube extended from below the water to the surface. A snorkel can be improvised from any hollow object with an internal diameter of about 3/4 inch to one inch. It is difficult for most people to breathe through such a tube, as it is hard to form a watertight seal with the mouth. Roll against DX-2 every five seconds if staying still and breathing, or every second if engaged in any activity. On a failure, the diver must come to the surface; on a critical failure, he comes up coughing and gagging (-2 to IQ, DX and ST for three turns; +3 to the Hearing roll of anyone trying to locate him). A properly designed snorkel with a mouthpiece can be used indefinitely; roll vs. Swimming to keep it above water in rough seas (penalties at the GM's discretion).

Small Submersibles

There are a number of small submersibles available today, capable of carrying between two and 18 divers. These come in two types. Pressurized vessels are actual small submarines; handling them is a familiarity (p. B43) of Powerboat skill. Failed rolls may mean a leak in the hull. Free-flooding vessels can carry more equipment than a swimmer, and can move a team with much less chance of exhaustion. They require two skills to operate: Powerboat skill to move and Scuba skill to keep breathing. Both types have been used extensively in special operations; Naval *Spetsnaz* units (p. 38) have a particular fondness for them.

Diver Propulsion Device (DPD)

The DPD is a small propulsion unit capable of propelling a diver at a speed of about 1 knot. Its batteries will last about as long as the diver's oxygen supply. In the water, the DPD is neutrally buoyant; on land, it is a 165-lb. load.

Operation KINGPIN – the raid on the Son Tay POW camp – was probably the most meticulously planned and executed special operation ever conducted. Only two unanticipated problems arose. First, part of the assault team, in darkness, mistook a compound south of the camp for the camp itself. This error was fortuitous in that it permitted them to eliminate a large, hitherto undetected enemy force (almost certainly Russian or Chinese) which might have threatened the mission's success. The problem was quickly dealt with. The second problem was less tractable: unknown to U.S. intelligence, the POWs had been moved – they were not in the camp. Thus, a brilliantly planned and executed mission failed, not because of lack of skill or training, but because of bad luck.

Operation THUNDERBOLT – the Israeli raid on Entebbe – was a poorly planned, ineptly executed operation which succeeded only by extraordinary luck. If the assault force had faced trained troops equipped with surface-to-air missiles, or even rocket-propelled grenade launchers, it is likely that none of the four Hercules transport planes which delivered them to Entebbe would have survived contact with the enemy, leaving the assault force and the hostages with the unenviable option of walking home across Africa. Indeed, if the Ugandan troops had not largely dropped their weapons and fled at first contact, or if the hostages' captors had effectively wired the terminal for demolition, the ensuing casualties would have been enormous. The assault force commander, Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu, was killed while walking through an unsecured area – tactical behavior one might expect of basic trainees, but not experienced commandos. Despite this, the Entebbe raid's success etched the special ops skill and expertise of the Israeli armed forces in the popular mind, and bred an overconfidence for which Israeli special ops units paid bitterly in Lebanon. Sometimes the most exceptional luck simply runs out.

When Operations Go Awry

Fiction dealing with special operations often involves a unit being abandoned deep behind enemy lines after the failure of a mission. Intelligence operatives are portrayed as falsely promising assistance, then reneging when the political stakes become too high. The abandoned unit proceeds to escape over arduous terrain to friendly territory, despite having been written off by higher headquarters. Such scenarios make interesting fiction, but bear little resemblance to reality.

The infiltration and exfiltration of special ops units are, by and large, well planned. Political, as well as military, costs are factored into the decision to launch the mission in the first place. Failure to provide emergency exfiltration usually occurs only when other military needs for air or sea assets are more immediately pressing, or when a conventional unit commander overestimates the level of threat that the special operations unit can cope with. Countries do not routinely dispatch highly trained troops on missions without provision for their extraction. On those rare occasions when such missions *are* ordered, the task is so essential that the cost in manpower is acceptable.

When an operation goes awry, the key elements in unit survival are stealth, speed, and communications. In such circumstances, the chief objective is escape and evasion to a safe rally point where communications with base can be reestablished and alternative emergency exfiltration can be arranged. In practice, when such operations go awry, they usually do so in virtually irretrievable ways. Contact with a vastly superior enemy force, destruction of communications equipment by hostile fire, etc., are rarely survived for long.

EQUIPMENT



Special operations have always needed special equipment. Rogers' Rangers, in the French and Indian War, changed from the bright colors of line units to a subdued green, and supplemented their muskets with hatchets – useful as both weapons and tools. In WWII, both the

American OSS and the British SOE (see p. 9) had research organizations whose primary purpose was to develop equipment for special ops. Some of the tools of special ops are simply those of the regular army, others are modified for unusual uses, and a few are unique.

THE LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY SYSTEM

By the Book: Requisition and Supply

Every military organization has a well-developed, well-catalogued, thoroughly organized and completely bureaucratized system whereby every unit is supposed to receive exactly what it needs to perform its mission. Such a system is entirely adequate to meet the demands of peacetime soldiering, but often falls short when the constraints of time and scarcity – common denominators of combat and crisis – appear. Fortunately, most special ops units are kept well equipped with a variety of specialized equipment. On rare occasions, however, they find themselves in need of some piece of hardware not normally assigned to them.

Most items used by military units can be requisitioned and delivered within a reasonable amount of time, but nonstandard items of equipment can be hard to obtain through the military requisition system. They can be obtained on the open market, but the paperwork associated with such procurements can be fearfully time consuming, and approval by higher headquarters is never guaranteed.

An additional problem which arises in “by-the-book” military requisitions is the failure of higher commands to appreciate the needs of subordinate units. This problem is compounded with special ops units, which by definition have special needs but which are still bound by the rules that apply to regular units. Every unit has a *table of organization and equipment* (TO&E) which specifies in detail the types and amounts of equipment the unit is authorized to possess. No item not on a unit’s TO&E can be requisitioned without time-consuming justifications to higher authority. Thus, a special ops unit might find it almost impossible to obtain a 16mm movie camera needed to document enemy troop movements, but with a phone call might be able to obtain a pizza oven for which it has no use.

Procuring supplies through the military requisition system is an arcane art, and an NCO who can manipulate the system to his unit’s benefit is often worth a platoon of crack soldiers when it comes to guaranteeing a unit’s combat readiness.

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Specialized Equipment

Armor and Clothing

Assault Vest: Special ops troops deployed in the field seldom wear body armor; it’s just too heavy to carry for any length of time. It is used extensively in close-quarters battle (CQB) situations, however. Examples of modern body armor appear on p. B211 and p. HT104. For CQB missions, operators will at the very least wear armor equivalent to the Second Chance Hardcorps system; ceramic inserts are likely to be issued if facing particularly well-armed opponents. Kevlar helmets are also standard equipment on CQB missions.



Explosives Blanket: Counterterrorist and demolition teams use these Kevlar-and-steel shields to suppress bombs that they cannot defuse. A typical blanket would give everyone in the blast radius an effective DR 25. Unless the explosive device is very small, the blanket is usually rendered useless after damping one explosion. \$300, 40 lbs.

Ghillie Suit: Based on camouflage worn by gamekeepers in Scotland, this ragged suit breaks up the outline of a prone man by blending in with surrounding plant life. Under ideal circumstances, it can make a sniper nearly invisible in vegetation. A ghillie suit can be as simple as a field uniform with some canvas pieces sewn to it, or as complex as a Nomex suit with overlapping burlap strips attached and padded elbows and knees for crawling. It gives a bonus to the wearer’s Camouflage skill: from +3 for an improvised suit to +8 for the best commercial

suit. A ghillie suit is only useful outdoors in areas with a fair amount of vegetation – it won't do a sniper any good in a parking lot! Ghillie suits tend to be heavy and hot; add 10°F to the effective air temperature for the wearer. \$550, 16 lbs.

Nomex Flight Suit: A black, one-piece jumpsuit made from Nomex, a fire-retardant fabric. It is often used in hostage-rescue situations. It has an integral hood, Kevlar reinforcements at the elbows and knees (approaching a hostage scene involves a lot of crawling), and gives DR 2 *against flame damage only* (see pp. B129-130). A black, full-face mask can be added to provide extra protection against collateral burns from smoke grenades, gunfire, or stun munitions. This "black and faceless" image can have a psychological effect on tired and mentally stressed terrorists (perhaps requiring a Fright Check as the rescuers smash in). \$170, 4 lbs.

Protective Mask: Commonly known as a "gas mask," the military refers to this item as a "protective mask" or "pro-mask" because it is intended to provide protection not just against gases, but against other chemical and biological weapons as well. Pro-masks are seldom carried on field missions, but are often used in hostage and other CQB situations. Not only do they protect the soldier from smoke and tear gas, but they're often equipped with tinted visors to protect against flash. See p. HT93 for full rules on gas masks. CQB gas masks are usually designed with a clear faceplate that reduces the Vision penalty to only -1. \$157, 5 lbs.

Load-Bearing Equipment

Field Pack: A modern military field pack has an internal frame and can hold over 100 lbs. of gear. It has quick-release tabs that allow it to be jettisoned in a hurry (one second on a successful DX roll, two seconds on a failure; critical failure means it jams – 1d seconds of tinkering are required before another DX roll can be tried). The top third of the pack can be detached from the frame and attached directly to a LBV (below), which lets it function as a lightweight "patrol pack." In this configuration, the soldier can carry additional food, water, ammunition, or other equipment without being encumbered by the full field pack. \$135, 8 lbs.

Load Bearing Equipment (LBE): Often referred to as "web gear," LBE consists of a pair of padded suspenders and a pistol belt. A soldier can carry a surprising amount of equipment with just his LBE strapped over his shoulders. The usual configuration includes two magazine pouches (each holds three 30-round assault rifle magazines and two grenades), one or two one-quart canteen holders, and a bayonet on the pistol belt. A first-aid dressing is carried in a pouch on one suspender, and quite often a compass on the other. A standard sidearm holster can be attached to the pistol belt as well. Although it's currently being replaced by the LBV (below), the U.S. military has employed LBE since World War II, and most other nations use similar designs. \$30, 5 lbs. (empty, with belt and pouches).

Load Bearing Vest (LBV): A variation on the simple LBE (above), the LBV covers the wearer's entire torso with lightweight nylon camouflage fabric. It has light padding at the shoulders and attaches to a standard military pistol belt. The LBV contains six 30-round assault rifle magazine pockets and two grenade pockets. Standard ammunition pouches, canteen holders and other gear can still be attached to the belt. The camouflage versions of the LBV have attachments at the shoulders that allow the patrol pack from a standard field pack (above) to be attached directly to the vest. Counterterrorist teams use a similar design that differs primarily in color (black), commonly referred to as a tactical vest. \$69, 5 lbs. (empty, with belt and pouches).

THE LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY SYSTEM

(Continued)

Acquiring normally authorized equipment in a normal amount of time should never be a game problem; the GM should just rule that it is there. More exotic equipment, or speedy delivery, is a matter for role-playing. Trying to get an unusual request through channels, or simply getting the bureaucracy to move faster, requires rolls against Administration skill. The GM should assign penalties to the roll based on how much faster the system has to move or how hard it is to justify the item being requested.

The ultimate in administrative finagling is to acquire *unvouchered funds*: government cash that can be spent without having to account for it. The GM can simply supply unvouchered funds if he wishes; otherwise, the attempt requires two critical successes in a row on Administration rolls. The GM should assign penalties to the roll based on the amount requested: -1 for amounts up to \$1,000, -2 for amounts up to \$5,000, -3 for amounts up to \$50,000, and -1 per additional \$100,000. A failure simply means no money; on a critical failure, CID initiates an investigation – including an audit of all unit funds and expenditures. This lasts one day per \$10,000 requested (round up) and requires an Administration or Fast-Talk roll each day. Each failure means that the investigation continues for an extra day; a critical failure means that it continues for an extra week. This may seriously impact any mission with strict time constraints.

Scrounging: Forget the Book, We Need the Stuff

When the irresistible force of mission requirements runs headlong into the immovable object of the requisition system, most commanders will look the other way while their subordinates acquire the needed equipment "unconventionally." The "midnight requisition" – theft – from other units can be common. Too much of this kind of scrounging will degrade the combat readiness of all units involved, however.

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THE LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY SYSTEM

(Continued)

Another, less harmful form of scrounging is out-of-pocket procurement on the open market, often in the hope of reimbursement when higher headquarters approves the procurement after the fact. The resources available to a unit for such activity are limited, however. Inventive adapting of equipment is also highly prized, and is the most common form of scrounging in special ops units. The basic rule of thumb for commanders is simple: try to keep your best scroungers at any cost – they can mean the difference between life and death for you and your men.

The skill for obtaining equipment outside normal channels is Scrounging. The GM should assign penalties based on how difficult it is to get the desired items. A special ops unit on the same post as a tank battalion shouldn't have too much difficulty acquiring some vehicular radio mounts, but it is probably -10 to Scrounging to acquire a whole tank! It is easier to scrounge if the scrounger is leaving the vicinity immediately than if he has to hide the scrounged items on-site. A failure at Scrounging just means that the necessary item is not acquired; a critical failure means that the scrounger gets caught. This can mean anything from a general court-martial to a little informal correction with fist and boot, at the GM's discretion.

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Communications Systems

Communications-Electronics Operations Instructions (CEOI): A small paper book containing the radio frequencies to be used, times for changing frequencies, alternate frequencies in case one is compromised, unit call signs, prearranged call times, passwords and countersigns, cipher sheets for encrypting and decrypting messages, and visual signals for contacting aircraft if radio communication is out. CEOIs are vital to the mission; they are also classified material which must not be mislaid. CEOIs are printed on highly flammable paper so that they can be burned easily to prevent capture; they can also be chewed to illegibility in seconds. CEOIs are often kept in waterproof bags. Negligible weight.

Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Terminal: Tactical satellite communications terminals have been developed by the U.S., U.K., Russia, and many other nations. These man-portable devices provide line-of-sight (LOS) links to orbital relay satellites (the Defense Satellite Communications System, for the U.S.). SATCOM communications are unaffected by atmospheric disturbances, and are highly reliable due to their frequency range and LOS transmission pattern. Some SATCOM systems are capable of burst transmissions. SATCOM can only be used while the relay satellite is in LOS of the transmitter; this means that communication must be at preset times. Newer models can function as computer modems, and provide limited LOS AM/FM radio transmission as well. Standard communications security (COMSEC) encryption devices can be attached to SATCOM terminals. \$3,500, 8 lbs.

Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS): SINCGARS represents the latest defense against enemy signal interception on the battlefield. During a transmission, SINCGARS radio hops between 2,300 frequencies at a rate of 100 hops per second. The sequence for this hopping is programmed into the radio according to the operations order, and may change over the course of a mission. This makes it extremely difficult to monitor SINCGARS radio traffic. These radios can be equipped with normal COMSEC encryption devices for additional security. SINCGARS radios come in a variety of configurations,

from portable to vehicle mounted. The backpack version uses a 4-lb. battery, which powers it for 12 hours. Its effective range can reach 35 miles, depending on power source, terrain and atmospheric conditions, but normal range is about 20 miles. \$6,500, 15 lbs.

Tactical Beacon (TACBE): A TACBE is usually part of an aircrew's survival kit, acting as a homing beacon for rescue teams. It can also be used for short-range (one mile or less) LOS radio transmissions with aircraft, ground radios, or even other TACBE units. Its versatility and light weight make it a favorite for long-term reconnaissance missions in many special ops units. \$350, 2 lbs.

Tactical Headset Radio: These improved walkie-talkies consist of an earplug and a slim mouthpiece. They are used on hostage-rescue and other CQB missions, and are often attached to the operator's helmet. Advanced models feature scrambling, voice activation, and a nearly invisible microphone taped to the user's throat. Observers must make a Vision roll to notice a concealed tactical headset. These devices allow communications at ranges of up to half a mile. A full-featured tactical headset like this is \$400, negligible weight. Civilian versions without scrambling or concealability cost \$50, and have a range of only 150 yards.

UTEL Underwater Radio: A UTEL system allows radio communication underwater. Operators can communicate at ranges of up to 2,000 yards, provided they have a direct LOS. Range drops to 500 yards or less if there are any obstructions between the sets. Since most underwater breathing apparatus prevents speech, Morse code must be used (use Telegraphy skill, p. B55). The device is nearly neutrally buoyant. \$5,000, 20 lbs.

Navigation Equipment

AN/PSN-11 Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR): The PLGR, or "Plugger," is the military's latest man-portable Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. It receives locational data from orbiting GPS satellites, and is accurate to within 20 meters. The PLGR can display data in latitude/longitude, military grid and a variety of other coordinate systems. It also has built in anti-jamming capabilities, along with the ability to receive encrypted data. \$1,200, 3 lbs.

Terrain Maps: Military maps are most often drawn at 1:50,000 scale; that is, one inch on the map represents 50,000 inches (roughly 4,167 feet) of actual terrain. They are marked using the *military grid* system. A grid coordinate refers to a location on the map, and starts with a two-letter designator that indicates the general area of the world. Following this, a string of numbers – 6, 8, or 10 digits long – provides the location on the appropriate map. Terrain features, both natural and man-made, are depicted on the maps. Satellite imaging has recently been used to update many maps, making them more accurate than ever.


Soldiers never make permanent marks on a map; in fact, even lead pencils are seldom used. Such marks could compromise a mission or other sensitive information should the map fall into enemy hands. Many soldiers cover their field maps in clear acetate. This practice not only protects the map from water damage, but also allows the soldier to make non-permanent notations that can be easily erased before capture. \$5, negligible weight.

Optical Equipment

AN/GVS-5 Laser Rangefinder: This lightweight device resembles a pair of binoculars. It is used to determine the range to a man-sized or smaller object – usually to verify the location of targets for artillery or air strikes. It is effective out to 9,990 yards. It takes one second and a roll against Electronics Operation (Sensors) to determine the range to a target. The operator must have a clear LOS to the target; smoke or dust in the atmosphere gives -1 to -10 to the roll (GM's decision). \$5,400, 5 lbs.

AN/PAQ-3 Modular Universal Laser Equipment (MULE): A MULE is a laser target designator used to direct laser-guided munitions onto a target. It can be mounted on a tripod or aimed from the shoulder. Many precision air attacks require targeting by a MULE or similar system. The MULE can pinpoint stationary targets out to 5,000 yards and moving targets out to 3,000 yards. As with a laser rangefinder, the operator must have a clear LOS to the target and must roll vs. Electronics Operation (Sensors). \$218,000, 42 lbs.

AN/PAQ-4C Infrared Aiming Light: This device produces a target-marking beam similar to that of a standard laser sight – except that it is infrared, thus invisible to the naked eye. The targeting dot can only be seen through NVGs (p. 98); as a result, it is an effective tool for night combat, but fairly useless under most other conditions. The AN/PAQ-4C is designed for use with the M16 or M4, but can be adapted to the M60, M249 and M2HB machine guns. See p. CII31 or p. HT103 for details on laser sights. \$400, 9 oz. (with batteries).



THE LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY SYSTEM

(Continued)

Patrons and Logistics

A Patron can be of considerable value in the fight for equipment. When assigning the point cost of a military Patron (see p. B24), the GM should consider how much help he can be in logistics. A senior officer (major general or higher) can take many shortcuts through the supply system. For instance, he can order that equipment and even personnel from his subordinate units be temporarily made available for special operations. A division commander (normally a major general) has everything from artillery battalions to veterinary medicine platoons under his direct command; his resources of equipment are immense. Higher commanders have even more resources at their immediate disposal.

Example: Consider a major general, commander of a U.S. Marine Corps division. He is the head of a powerful organization (more than 17,000 personnel, tanks, aircraft, artillery, construction equipment, medical facilities, scout dogs, criminal investigators, and a host of other resources). His use of these resources is hedged with restrictions, but there are only three or four levels of command between him and the President of the United States. There are relatively few people who can tell him no. He appears fairly often in the life of anyone who could reasonably take him as a Patron. He has great power to get the minor sins of his acolytes forgiven. He is a power in promotion and assignment, and has many favors to trade. A Patron like this would cost 15 points.

Patrons can also be useful in the event of a critical failure on a Scrounging or Administration attempt. A high-ranking voice can do a lot to soften the damage after an enterprising but unlucky soldier stumbles. Sometimes the Patron can simply say, "I authorized that action," and this will be enough. More commonly, he can play the game of favor trading, getting his man off in return for using of his power in the interests of the complainants.

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES AND SECURITY

Efficient, instantaneous communications are essential to the success of special operations. Military forces spend enormous sums of money procuring communications equipment. They also spend months training communications operators and maintenance personnel, ensuring that "comms" do not fail in combat. Basic communications tasks use Electronics Operation (Communications) skill.

For greatest efficiency and security, frequencies and call signs (identification signs of units or important personnel) are centrally allocated. They are set out in the communications-electronics operations instructions (CEOI; see p. 96). CEOIs are changed frequently to keep enemy electronic-warfare operators from using the information.

Electronic warfare (EW) remains an ever-present danger, and communications security (COMSEC) is a constant concern for special ops. Some techniques – brief transmissions, frequency hopping and burst transmission – help prevent interception by reducing the time available to intercept and locate the transmission. Encryption systems – scramblers (like the VINSON system used by the U.S.) and ciphers – prevent intercepted communications from immediately disclosing the information that they contain to the enemy.

Codes and Ciphers

There is a vast difference between codes and ciphers. In a cipher, one set of symbols is substituted for another; thus Morse code, even though it is called a "code," is actually a cipher. Ciphers can be highly sophisticated, but most ciphers of use on a battlefield can be broken in a matter of hours – sometimes less (use Cryptanalysis skill). This is not always bad, however, since a cipher only needs to keep information secure until it is of no use to the enemy.

In a code, the substitution is for whole words or entire phrases. For special ops, the disadvantage of a code is that a unit must carry an entire code book, slowing down operations and making it possible for the code book to fall into enemy hands.

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AN/PVS-4 Individual Weapon Night Sight: The AN/PVS-4 is a portable electric sight used for observation and aimed fire of weapons at night. It uses passive light amplification to provide the user with a clear view of the field of fire. Assuming light equivalent to starlight, the AN/PVS-4 provides clear vision out to 400 yards; Vision rolls are made at -1 for every 20 yards beyond this. The AN/PVS-4 can be mounted on the M4, M16, M249, M60, and SMAW. See pp. HT94-95, 103, or p. CII31 for more details. \$4,800, 4 lbs.

AN/PVS-7B Night-Vision Goggles (NVG): The latest model of military NVG, the AN/PVS-7B has a single viewing tube instead of the standard binocular form of earlier versions. Prisms provide simulated binocular vision, but vision is limited to a 40° arc in front of the user. While using the NVG, treat the wearer's left and right hexes as rear hexes (see p. B102). This model works on the principle of light intensification; it doesn't emit infrared radiation that could reveal the wearer to other night-vision gear. It also incorporates photo-reactive light dampening to protect the wearer against the blinding effects of muzzle flashes. It functions continuously for 12 hours on its battery. See pp. HT94-95, 103, or p. CII31 for more details. \$6,000, 1½ lbs.

Weapons

Modern firearms and explosives are covered extensively in *GURPS High-Tech*. Some of weapons most commonly seen in special operations are listed below.

Automatic Pistols

H&K Mark 23 Offensive Handgun Weapon System .45 ACP (Holdout -1): Designed specifically to meet criteria supplied by USSOCOM, the H&K Mark 23 is a rugged yet highly accurate sidearm. It is referred to as a "weapon system" because each pistol comes with a suppressor and a laser sight (see p. CII31 or p. HT103). Both accessories are removable, allowing the weapon to be tailored to individual mission requirements. The suppressor is referred to as a "silencer," but only reduces the noise to that of a .22-caliber pistol – still quite noticeable. Hearing rolls to detect the shot are only at -2. The suppressor adds 1 lb. to the weapon's weight; the laser sight weighs 0.25 lb. Use of either the suppressor or laser sight adds an additional -2 Holdout penalty; use of both adds -3.

Makarov 9×18mm (Holdout +1): The Makarov was adopted by the Russians in the 1950s. It has been widely exported and has frequently been supplied to revolutionary groups. It is the issue police and military sidearm of most communist countries. Its ammunition is not interchangeable with the 9mm Parabellum used by most non-communist countries. The Makarov can be carried hammer down and fired double-action for the first shot.

A Makarov with an integral two-part silencer – the P6 – is also produced. The firer can lock the slide to reduce mechanical noise as well, but the slide must then be worked manually (RoF 1). The Makarov round is already subsonic, so neither muzzle velocity nor damage is reduced by the silencer. Hearing rolls to detect a P6 firing are at -6, or -5 if the slide lock is not used.

S&W Mark 22 Model 0 "Hush Puppy" 9×19mm (Holdout -1): Developed during the Vietnam War, the Mark 22 Model 0 still sees some use with the U.S. Navy SEALs. It is designed to be used with a silencer, but can be fired without it. This silencer does not last indefinitely; it begins to break down after 30 rounds of subsonic ammunition or a mere six standard cartridges. If the weapon is used with



TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES AND SECURITY

(Continued)

One of the most unusual codes ever used was the Navajo language! During World War II, Navajo – a difficult language that few non-Navajo Americans, let alone Germans, ever learned – was used for battlefield communications. In an emergency, a Special Forces unit with a few soldiers from New York City or the Southwest might be able to use Spanish as a code language, but heaven help them if their enemies have Cuban advisors.

Jamming and Direction Finding

Jamming and direction finding (DF) are two dangers closely related to interception. If the enemy identifies the frequencies that friendly forces are using, jamming signals can be transmitted to prevent the use of those frequencies (which is why alternate frequencies are always provided). Sophisticated jamming can appear to be natural interference. Deceptive/imitative jamming is another possibility: if the enemy is sufficiently familiar with friendly forces' CEOI, he can imitate friendly units, pass disinformation and generally sow confusion.

As well, any transmission longer than 30 to 45 seconds can be intercepted and the location of the transmitter discovered if two or more direction-finding stations intercept it. Russian direction finding operates in direct support of artillery and rocket forces, locating key targets. U.S. direction finding is not as efficient; DF units communicate with division artillery headquarters, not directly with artillery fire controllers.

Tactical communications involve a trade-off between ease-of-use and security. The systems easiest to use are those most easily defeated by the enemy, while relatively secure systems involve technology and attention to detail that can break down in combat. Unfortunately, the best result is an unhappy medium between the two.

Electronic warfare is handled as a Contest of the sender's Electronics Operation (Communications) skill and the interceptor's or jammer's SIGINT Collection/Jamming skill. These rolls should generally be made in secret by the GM. If the sender loses, messages may be intercepted, transmitters located, false messages inserted or plans compromised, depending on the circumstances.

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subsonic ammunition, reduce damage from 2d+2 to 2d-1. As with the Makarov P6, there is a slide lock which reduces the mechanical noise during firing. Using this reduces RoF to 1. Hearing rolls to detect the "Hush Puppy" are at -5, or -6 if the slide lock is employed. Use of the silencer adds a -2 Holdout penalty.

The Mark 22 It has a set of plugs to allow it to be carried underwater – no doubt one reason why it remains popular with the SEALs. These must be removed before firing.

Tokarev 7.62×25mm (Holdout -1): The Tokarev was adopted as the standard Russian pistol in 1933, and remained in production until the 1950s. It was also made in large quantities in Communist China. It has been widely exported, and might be found in use by terrorist groups almost anywhere. It was the standard pistol of the North Vietnamese army in the Indo-China and Vietnam wars. The cartridge is interchangeable with that of the "broom-handle" Mauser pistol.

The Tokarev has no manual safety catch. If it is carried with a round in the chamber, it may fire if it is dropped or struck sharply (roll 3d; it fires on a 3 or 4). If it is carried with the chamber empty, it takes an extra turn to ready.

After 1958, the Hungarians and the Chinese manufactured Tokarevs in 9mm Parabellum. These have range and damage as for the FN HP35 (p. B208), and have a manual safety.

Tznitochmash SPP-1 4.5mm (Holdout -3): The Russian military recently unveiled the SPP-1 4.5mm underwater pistol. It has four breech-loading barrels, each of which holds a cartridge firing a drag-stabilized 115mm-long dart. The ranges listed on the table are for shots fired in air; its underwater ranges depend on the depth. From just beneath the surface to a depth of 50 feet, the dart is ½D 18, Max 100. From 51 feet to its maximum depth of 130 feet, it is ½D 6, Max 40.

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES AND SECURITY

(Continued)

Tactical Radio Communications Systems

In general, high-frequency (HF) transmitters (3-30 MHz) have greater range than very-high-frequency (VHF) and ultra-high-frequency (UHF) transmitters (30 MHz and up). VHF and UHF tend to have higher fidelity, however, because VHF and UHF transmissions are usually frequency modulated (FM), while HF transmissions are usually amplitude modulated (AM); consider the difference in audio quality between AM and FM radio to understand this. Most tactical radio communications systems therefore use VHF/UHF FM transmitters for both encrypted and non-encrypted voice communications, while HF AM transmitters are reserved for long-range communications and Morse code transmissions.

It isn't entirely accurate, but as a rule of thumb, most fixed-wing aircraft use AM transmitters, while ground forces tend to use FM transmitters – which often leads to communications problems between ground forces and their air support. Air-support units are sometimes reduced to borrowing ground-force radios and strapping them into already overcrowded cockpits.

Recent technology has introduced frequency-hopping (FH) SINCGARS (p. 96) and burst transmission as effective means of evading hostile interception and direction finding, although counter-countermeasure technology appears to be closing the gap, particularly against FH systems.



Revolvers

Manurhin MR73 .357 Magnum (Holdout -2): This revolver is the primary sidearm of GIGN – one of the few special ops units to chose a revolver over a high-capacity semi-automatic pistol. The MR73 is a high-quality pistol designed specifically for police and military use. It was the first revolver able to function as a double- or single-action, and can also use .38 Special ammunition (damage 2d-1, ½D 120, Rcl -1). Care was taken to round any protrusions on the MR73 to avoid snags when drawing the weapon; this gives +1 to Fast-Draw skill. Due to its high cost, it saw little commercial success and is no longer produced.

Smith & Wesson Bodyguard .38 Special (Holdout +1): This revolver is a favorite with those who have to work out of uniform; it is also widely used as a second gun. The hammer is completely shrouded by the frame, so there is no hammer spur to catch on clothing in a fast draw. The cylinder only holds five rounds, which makes the profile of the gun thinner. This and the rounded contours aid in concealment of the weapon.

Rifles

AK-74 5.45×39mm (Holdout -6): After seeing the success Western armies had with the 5.56mm cartridge, the Soviet Union developed its own lightweight round. The result was a modification of the reliable AK-47, renamed the AK-74 for its design year. The AK-74 looks similar to the AK-47; the most readily apparent differences are a more prominent muzzle brake, orange or brown plastic magazines, and a groove along the foregrip and stock. The muzzle brake helps reduce the recoil of the weapon tremendously; the AK-74 adds recoil to itself only after every *second* four-shot group in a burst. It also increases the muzzle flash (+2 to any Vision roll to locate an AK-74 firing in the dark).

A shortened version of the weapon – the AKSU – was first seen in the early 1980s. It has a drastically shorter barrel and a folding stock. These features combine to make the weapon a mere 17 inches in length when the stock is folded. The AKSU does not have the same muzzle brake as the AK-74, so recoil penalties are handled normally. This version of the weapon is popular with *Spetsnaz* units. The AKSU has damage 3d+2, ½D 200, Max 1,900 and Holdout -4.

De Lisle Carbine .45 ACP (Holdout -5): The De Lisle Carbine is probably as silent as a gun can get. It is a modified Lee-Enfield rifle firing the same ammunition as the Colt .45 pistol. It was designed by the British Special Operations Executive in WWII for silent assassination and sentry removal, and is still used for that purpose (in the Falklands campaign, for instance). The entire barrel is surrounded by the silencer and the bolt-action mechanism allows no gas loss. Combined with the subsonic bullet, it is quieter than most BB guns. Hearing rolls to detect a firing De Lisle carbine are made at -10.


Dragunov SVD 7.62×54mmR (Holdout -7): The Dragunov was first fielded by the Soviets in the late 1960s. Its development was shrouded in secrecy; it is rumored that small *Spetsnaz* teams were sent to give it live-fire trials in Vietnam, and it was certainly employed in Afghanistan. It uses the old rimmed 7.62mm round, which is not interchangeable with that of the AK-47 assault rifle; despite rumors, it is also not interchangeable with the NATO 7.62mm round. Cost includes a scope (+2 Acc when used).

Giat FA-MAS 5.56×45mm (Holdout -5): When this unusual-looking assault rifle was introduced in the early 1980s, its bullpup design earned it the nickname of *Le Clarion* – “the bugle.” The FA-MAS is nearly 6 inches shorter than the M16, but its barrel length is nearly identical thanks to the weapon's layout. This makes

it well-suited to urban combat or other close-quarter fighting. The FA-MAS has a full-length carrying handle, an ejection port that can be adjusted for left- or right-handed firers, and a built-in bipod (+1 Acc when used by a prone shooter). It can also accept an under-barrel grenade launcher or bayonet.

IPME APS 5.66mm (Holdout -6): Built in Russia, this was a secret weapon of Soviet special forces until recently revealed to the world along with the SPP-1 pistol. Like the SPP-1, the APS is a weapon designed to fire effectively underwater. It is a gas-operated weapon based on the tried-and-true Kalashnikov rifle. In fact, except for its oversized magazine, it resembles the AKM folding-stock assault rifle in many ways. It fires a 5.66mm drag-stabilized 120mm-long dart. The ranges listed are for shots fired in air. At depths from just below the surface to 50 feet, the weapon has ½D 30, Max 150. From 51 feet to its maximum depth of 130 feet, it has ½D 12, Max 60.

L42A1 .308 Winchester (Holdout -6): This may be the oldest weapon still in first-line service. It is a modified version of the Lee-Enfield rifle that the British have used since 1884. Selected actions with heavy, stiffened barrels are converted from .303 and fitted with telescopic sights, cheek rests and shortened fore ends. They are notable for their ability to keep working with unimpaired accuracy in rough conditions. The scope is can be detached in two seconds and attached in three seconds. Without the scope, the L42A1 is SS 14, Acc 11 and ½D 1,000.



M4 5.56×45mm (Holdout -4): The M4 is the latest incarnation of the shortened M16 assault rifle. It has the same collapsible stock as the CAR-15, but is designed to accept a variety of accessories to make it more mission-oriented. The top carry handle is removable to allow a standard AN/PVS-4 night sight (p. 98) or a 4× scope (+2 Acc when used) to be installed. There is also a special CQB sight, the ACOG reflex sight, which reduces SS to 8 when employed. Only one sight can be installed at a time. A visible red laser sight or an infrared pointer for night missions can be attached to the weapon as well. Addition of the any of these accessories adds 0.25 lb. to the weapon's weight (except the AN/PVS-4, which weighs 4 lbs.). The M4 accepts the M203 grenade launcher or the standard U.S. Army bayonet. It is expected to replace the Army's aging M3 .45 SMG and, in some instances, the M9 9mm pistol.

M21 .308 Winchester (Holdout -6): The M21 is a specially selected M14 rifle fitted with a scope. It is as accurate as a bolt-action rifle, and faster with second shots. It is not quite as reliable, and tends to lose accuracy faster in field use. It is the standard sniper rifle of the U.S. Army. Cost is for the weapon with the scope (+4 Acc when used).

Remington 700 .308 Winchester (Holdout -6): The Remington is a commercial sporting rifle; in this version, it is a heavy-barrelled, scope-sighted piece intended for long-range target shooting. It has been adopted as a sniper rifle by many police and military organizations (including the U.S. Marine Corps). The cost listed is for the rifle with scope (+4 Acc when used). The .308 is the usual caliber choice for sniping, as it is the NATO standard, but the rifle is also made in other chamberings.

NIGHT-VISION EQUIPMENT

Long-range observation is crucial to reconnaissance, but since the operational area is frequently obscured by darkness or smoke on strike missions, reliable low-light optics are essential for surveillance and target acquisition. These devices range from simple, unpowered periscopes and binoculars to sophisticated night-vision devices. Most are powered ambient light intensifiers. Any such low-light device effectively grants Night Vision (p. B22) while it is operating. See *Optical Equipment* (p. 97) for some examples.

INTRUDER DETECTION SYSTEMS

Special operations units are by and large more concerned with defeating intruder detection systems than with operating and maintaining them. There are six main types of systems: infrared detectors, microwave detectors, differential force cables, seismic detectors, magnetic detectors and ground surveillance radars. Some systems, like the U.S. Army's Improved Remote Emplaced Battlefield Sensor System (IREMBASS), use a combination of several of these.

Any of the first five systems require a roll against Traps skill to install or defeat. To operate a ground surveillance radar, use Electronics Operation (Sensors) skill; a successful skill roll will detect a man-sized target at up to 5,000 yards. A typical radar system weighs 70 lbs., but breaks down into three equal loads for carrying. Radar will not penetrate the ground and is scattered by heavy vegetation. Treat attempts to penetrate a radar perimeter as Quick Contests between Stealth and Electronics Operation. The GM can assign bonuses or penalties to Stealth for terrain. Stealthy movement is almost always quite slow – usually no more than one or two yards per turn. The GM is the final judge of what is possible.

MEAL, READY TO EAT (MRE)

Many U.S. soldiers might question whether MREs are truly "ready to eat," but veterans of the Vietnam era swear that they're more palatable than the older C-rations. In recent years, the U.S. military has made an effort to widen the variety of meals and improve the overall taste of the food. An MRE contains a main course, a snack/dessert, crackers, a spread (cheese, peanut butter or jelly), a beverage mix and an accessory pack. It provides at least $\frac{1}{3}$ a soldier's daily caloric requirements; in fact, it may provide up to three times that value, depending on the main course!

There are many varieties of MRE. Examples include pasta and vegetables, chili macaroni, chicken with salsa, cheese tortellini, and ham. Each meal also contains "side dishes" ranging from applesauce to Mexican rice. The accessory pack includes matches, a long-handled plastic spoon, a packet of tissues, a moist towelette and various condiments. Most MREs also come with a water-activated chemical heater that not only produces sufficient heat to warm the main dish, but also any suitable side dish. MREs are notoriously messy; the small foil packets are efficient at preserving food, but they fail miserably as dinnerware. The average shelf life of an MRE is three years.

MREs are packaged in heavy, brown plastic pouches and weigh about 2 lbs. apiece. They are very bulky; it's common for soldiers to "field strip" the meals before departing on a mission. This entails opening the outer pouch, removing the cardboard from each individual item and discarding any undesirable items in the meal. The remaining containers are then tightly wrapped in the brown pouch and taped with "100 mph tape" – high-strength, olive drab duct tape.

Members of special ops units on covert special reconnaissance have found another use for the heavy brown pouches: they use them to carry bodily waste from an observation post so that no evidence of their passing remains.



Submachine Guns

H&K SMG II 9×19mm (Holdout -4): Also known as the MP-2000, the SMG II was developed by H&K for the SEALs. It outwardly resembles a modified MP5K (p. 106), but at the request of SEAL operators, it has several special features that make it an exceptionally versatile weapon.

It can fire single shots (RoF 3~), three-round bursts (RoF 3~, resolve each "shot" as a group of 3) or full-auto (RoF 14). It has a bolt lock to eliminate mechanical noise; when engaged, the action must be operated manually (RoF 1), but rolls to hear it fire are made at -1. It also has a gas valve that can reduce muzzle velocity to below the speed of sound; toggling this reduces damage to 2d, but gives -2 to hear the shot. A sound suppressor can be attached for a *further* -5 to Hearing rolls. Other features are a collapsible stock (+2 Holdout, SS 8, Acc 5, Rcl -2, ST 11 when collapsed), an ergonomic magazine release (+1 to Speed-Load) and a fully ambidextrous design. As of 1999, the SMG II is not in mass production, and fewer than 100 have been produced.

K/P M45 9×19mm (Holdout -4): This has been the standard Swedish submachine gun since shortly after WWII; it has also been manufactured under license in Egypt. Smith & Wesson's M76 is so close to the M45 that most parts are interchangeable. The M45 is also known as the "Carl (or Karl) Gustaf (or Gustav)" and the "Swedish K." It was a favorite for clandestine operations for many years because it couldn't be assigned to either the Western or Eastern blocs. The Egyptian version of the weapon is called the "Port Said."

MAT 49 9×19mm (Holdout -4): This gun was adopted by the French shortly after WWII and has been standard ever since. It is an orthodox blow-back operated gun with a good reputation for reliability. It is common in former French territories in Africa and Asia. Its simple design makes it easy to produce in village workshops, making it common among guerrillas as well. It has been replaced by

the FA-MAS in the French military, but it continues to see use in many other nations, particularly in North Africa. It has a telescoping wire stock and the magazine housing folds up under the barrel with a magazine in place. In this condition, it makes a package about $19 \times 5 \times 2$ inches. It can be unfolded and readied for action in two seconds.

Model 61 Skorpion 7.65×17mm (Holdout -2): The Skorpion is a rarity, a true machine pistol. Designed by Czechoslovakia, it is intended for use by tank crews and other soldiers who need more firepower than a pistol can provide. It has also been found in the hands of terrorists and revolutionaries around the world. The stats are for the Skorpion fired full-auto as a pistol. It can also be fired semi-auto and with an attached folding wire shoulder stock. Its high rate of fire combined with its light weight make it hard to shoot accurately. Apply the recoil modifier to *each shot* instead of each four-round group! If the shoulder stock is used, apply the recoil modifier to each two-round group. It is easier to conceal than most SMGs – with the stock retracted, it's only 10 inches long. An extended 20-round magazine is also available.

Sterling L2A3 9×19mm (Holdout -4): Until its replacement by the SA-80, the Sterling was the British Army's standard submachine gun. The reliability of the weapon keeps it a favorite with the Special Boat Squadron. With its side-mounted banana clip and perforated foregrip, it appears at a glance to be similar to the cheaply manufactured Sten gun of WWII. It is a far more solid weapon, however. Magazines are also available in 10-, 15- and 34-round capacities.

A silenced version of the weapon – the L34A1 – is also in use. The silencer is built into the submachine gun's barrel and bleeds off propellant gas each time a round is fired. This reduces the bullet to subsonic speeds while using standard ammunition. Any Hearing roll to detect an L34A1 is at -5. Damage is reduced to 2d-1 and the weapon's weight is increased to 9.5 lbs.

Machine Guns

RPK-74 5.45×39mm: The RPK-74 is a squad-level light machine gun based on the AK-74. It is basically a longer-barrelled version of the AK-74 with a folding bipod (+1 Acc and -2 ST when used by a prone gunner). This allows better ammunition distribution and sharing at the squad level – the same principle that motivated the U.S. to adopt the M249 SAW. The weapon can be fired from the hip, shoulder or bipod. It is normally equipped with a 40-round magazine, but can also accept standard AK-74 magazines.

Light Anti-Tank Weapons

AT-4 84mm: The AT-4 is a disposable LAW based on the 84mm M2 Carl Gustav recoilless rifle, designed to replace the M72A2 66mm LAW. It consists of little more than a fiberglass launch tube, open sights, an 84mm shaped-charge rocket and a carrying sling. Once it has been fired, the launch tube can be discarded. The AT-4 has more punch than the old M72A2, but still can't knock out a modern main battle tank.

Shoulder-Launched Multiple Purpose Assault Weapon (SMAW): Based on an Israeli design, the SMAW is currently employed by the U.S. Marine Corps. Firing an 83mm rocket, the SMAW provides the Marines with a man-portable weapon that's capable of taking out enemy fortifications and light armor with its high-explosive dual purpose (HEDP) rocket. During Desert Storm, the U.S. Army was so impressed with the weapon that it borrowed 150 launchers and 5,000 rockets from the Marines.

A KNIFE TO TAKE TO A GUNFIGHT

The *Spetsnaz* of the former Soviet Union placed a higher emphasis on hand-to-hand combat than most Western special ops troops did. In the 1980s, their trademark weapon became the sharpened entrenching tool (treat as a hatchet, p. B206), which they were reputed to use to deadly effect not only in hand-to-hand combat, but also as a hurled weapon, attacking targets up to 20 feet away.

In 1992, the Russian military began issuing a new bayonet – the NRS-2 – to its special ops units. The NRS-2 is a folding reconnaissance knife with a green Bakelite handle and sheath. It is not in wide circulation, but it has drawn a lot of attention due to a unique feature: it can fire a single 7.62mm round!

The handle and scabbard, when attached to each other, allow the user to aim and fire the round. The projectile isn't terribly accurate – and its usefulness is questionable (it would certainly alert enemy sentries) – but it is a tribute to ingenuity. When used as a firearm, the NRS-2 does 2d+1 damage and has SS 14, Acc 0, $\frac{1}{2}$ D 20, Max 110. The NRS-2 weighs 1.75 lbs. and costs \$200 (with scabbard) – assuming it can be found for sale. A non-firing version, the NRS-1, weighs 1 lb. and costs \$50 (with scabbard).



THE LIBERATOR ".45 CALIBER FLARE PROJECTOR"

Early in WWII, the OSS desired a simple, disposable gun to distribute to resistance fighters in both occupied Europe and the South Pacific rim. The Guide Lamp division of General Motors (which normally made headlights) stamped out one million Liberators in 1942. The whole production run was completed in three months, at a cost of \$2.10 apiece – complete with 10 rounds of ammunition, a waterproof bag, a set of instructions in comic-strip format and a wooden stick to punch out the empties. All this was done under an OSS contract with the cover name ".45 Caliber Flare Projector."

The gun is a stamped sheet-metal single-shot. The hollow butt holds five loose rounds. Reloading takes six turns; a roll against Guns (Pistol)-2 or DX-2 can cut two seconds off this time, but a failure will add 1d seconds to the reload time and a critical failure will break the gun.

Liberators are not intended for speed-loading; they are designed for one careful shot that kills an armed opponent and lets you steal a better gun. One estimate indicates the gun was actually being built faster than it could be reloaded! A small amount were dropped to resistance forces in Europe, but the majority were sent to the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Liberators may continue to turn up for another century.

The Liberator does 2d-1+ damage, and is Malf. 16, SS 11, Acc 1, ½D 90, Max 1,100, Cost \$25, Weight 1.5 lbs.



The weapon consists of a reusable fiberglass launch tube, an electric firing device, open sights, a mount for an AN/PVS-4 night sight and a 9mm spotting rifle. The spotting rifle fires a tracer round that is ballistically matched to the rocket and bore-sighted to the launch tube. When using the spotting rifle, the gunner adds an additional +2 to Acc. The SMAW can also launch a high-explosive anti-armor (HEAA) rocket, capable of damaging heavily armored fighting vehicles. When using HEAA rockets, the weapon's damage is 6d×6(10). Each HEAA rocket weighs 14 lbs.

Surface-to-Air Missiles

FIM-92 Stinger: The Stinger, designed to replace the aging Redeye, is representative of more modern SAM systems. Using an "all-aspect" infrared/ultraviolet guidance system, the Stinger can achieve a lock-on from any direction by distinguishing the temperature difference between the target and the background. On his belt, the gunner wears a small Identification: Friend-or-Foe (IFF) system that prevents firing on friendly aircraft. The Stinger saw use by Afghan guerrillas against Soviet armed forces. It is currently in use by more than 20 nations, including the U.S., Germany, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and South Korea. An estimated 20 of those originally delivered to the Afghan guerrillas were passed to Iran, although few – if any – remain.

SA-7 Grail: An early Soviet SAM design, the SA-7 Grail is comparable to the obsolete U.S. Army Redeye missile. Its infrared guidance system can only achieve a lock-on when fired at an aircraft's rear aspect. The missile must then overtake the target – which means that it cannot be used until the aircraft has already overflown the SAM gunner. The weapon is easily foiled by IR countermeasures and can even be fooled by the sun. As well, some planes can sustain a hit from the Grail's small warhead and remain operational. In spite of its age and drawbacks, the SA-7 has been extensively produced over the years, and can be found in use in over 50 countries.



Grenades

American nomenclature is used for the grenades below, but other nations have weapons with similar function and effect. All of these grenades are armed by pulling out the pin with the attached ring and then releasing the arming handle.

ABC-M7A3 Riot Control Grenade: A typical tear gas grenade. It is shaped like a soup can and gray in color. The fuse has a two-second delay. The grenade does not explode on ignition; instead, it emits a noxious cloud of tear gas (CS) for about 25 seconds, filling an area three yards around the hex where the grenade rests. See p. B132 for the effects of tear gas. The grenade becomes very hot, and may ignite easily flammable materials nearby.

AN-M14 TH3 Incendiary: Frequently called "thermite grenades," incendiary grenades are used to destroy or disable equipment. Unlike most other grenades, they are seldom thrown by the wielder. Instead, the user places the grenade on a vulnerable spot on a vehicle or other target and pulls the pin. Once the grenade ignites (it has a two-second fuse), it heats up to 4,000°F for 40 seconds – more than enough to burn through ½ inch of steel and fuse any moving metal parts together. It will also ignite flammables within a two-yard radius. Incendiary grenades produce their own oxygen and thus will burn underwater.

The grenade does its listed damage at the beginning of each turn to anything in contact with it. This includes armor: for every 10 points of damage the grenade does, *permanently* reduce DR in that location by 1 point.

M34 White Phosphorus (WP): Also known as "Willy Pete," this grenade scatters burning white phosphorus fragments when it explodes, creating an instant (and dangerous!) smoke screen. This "hot smoke" blocks infrared and thermograph detection as well as normal sight, but only lasts 50 to 80 seconds, depending on weather conditions.

The white phosphorus fragments are *deadly*. Anyone hit by shrapnel from an M34 takes 1d for the next 20 turns as the fragment continues to burn; clothes will be set on fire, but armor protects normally unless DR is exceeded. The victim, or an ally, may attempt to brush away the fragments by making a successful DX roll. White phosphorus cannot be extinguished by water, but if a WP grenade bursts underwater, the fragments will not disperse properly and it will not create smoke.

Stun Munitions: Stun munitions are the primary diversionary devices for counterterrorist strike missions. Most produce a 2 million-plus candela flash and a 200-decibel-plus "bang" (jet engines and rock bands only produce 110-130 decibels) – they're often referred to as "flash-bangs" for this reason. Anyone within 10 yards who is not wearing ear protection and heavily darkened lenses may be incapacitated for several seconds.

The victim must make a HT-5 roll to avoid being physically stunned; this is changed to an unmodified HT roll if he is wearing ear and eye protection. If stunned, the victim must roll at HT-5 (or HT, with eye and ear protection) each turn to recover. On a critical failure, he remains stunned for 5 turns before he can roll again. Eye and ear protection enough to protect from a flash-bang give -3 to all Vision and Hearing rolls.

Most stun munitions produce smoke as a by-product of the explosion. This can impair vision in the operational area (-2 to all Vision rolls and aimed fire within five yards of the point of impact for 10 seconds). They can also set incidental fires – one such grenade set the Iranian embassy afire during the SAS raid of 1980 (see p. 11). Unlike most other grenades, stun munitions are usually cylindrical in shape, to allow them to be rolled into a room or down a hallway. Some counterterrorist units have modified conventional grenades to work in this fashion as well by placing them in empty soda cans.

WEAPONS OF CHOICE

Every special ops unit has its preferred weapons. Some are allowed to choose their weapons; others have their weapons chosen for them. Units that select their own (like the SAS) usually choose proven and effective firearms. Those that don't often have to live with weapons selected on the basis of the lowest bidder or the nationality of the vendor. Examples of units and their weapons of choice appear below; mission requirements occasionally necessitate other weapons.

France, 2e REP: FA-MAS assault rifle, MAB PA15 pistol (similar to Beretta 92).

France, GIGN: Barret Model 82 sniper rifle, FA-MAS assault rifle, H&K G3 assault rifle, H&K MP5 submachine gun, Manurhin MR73 pistol, Remington 870 shotgun.

Germany, GSG-9: H&K G3 assault rifle, H&K MP5 submachine gun, H&K P7M8 pistol.

Israel, Sayeret Tzanchanim: Beretta 92 pistol, FN MAG machine gun, Galil ARM assault rifle, IMI Uzi submachine gun.


Russia, Spetsnaz: AKSU assault rifle, Makarov P6 pistol.

United Kingdom, SAS: Browning High-Power pistol, H&K MP5 submachine gun, L85A1 assault rifle (also called SA-80).

U.S. Marine Force Recon: Beretta 92 pistol, M16A2 assault rifle, M60 machine gun, Remington 700 sniper rifle, Remington 870 shotgun.

U.S. Navy SEALs: Beretta 92 pistol, H&K MP5 submachine gun, M4 assault carbine, M16A2 assault rifle, M60 machine gun, S&W Mark 22 Model 0 pistol.

U.S. 1st SFOD-Delta: H&K MP5 submachine gun, M4 assault carbine, M16A2 assault rifle, a variety of pistols.



THE H&K MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN

The MP5 first gained notice as the weapon employed by the SAS during the storming of the Iranian embassy in 1980 (see p. 11). Since then, it has become *the* weapon of choice among special ops units everywhere. This may seem strange, since the MP5 is more complex and expensive than many other submachine guns – e.g., the Uzi or Sterling. Nonetheless, virtually every major Western special ops or counterterrorist unit uses the weapon.

Continued on next page . . .

THE H&K MP5 SUBMACHINE GUN

(Continued)

Two factors combine to make the MP5 the preferred special ops SMG. The first is the MP5's closed-bolt firing mechanism. This makes it probably the most accurate weapon of its type available today – and accuracy is a must in CQB situations! This mechanism does cause the weapon to heat up faster than other SMGs when used on full-auto, but since CQB firefights tend to resolve themselves quickly, this is not a major hindrance. The second factor is the MP5's sheer versatility. More than 15 versions exist, including:

MP5A4: Fixed plastic stock, three-round burst option; the standard model described on pp. HT116, 125.

MP5A5: Collapsible wire stock, three round burst option; otherwise as above.

MP5SD3: Suppressed version (-7 to Hearing rolls), collapsible wire stock.

MP5K: Shortened version, designed to fit in a briefcase (Holdout is -2, not -4); see p. HT116 for details.

MP5KA1: Lacks sights to increase concealability; treat as MP5K, but Acc drops to 2 and Holdout is -1 (not -2).

MP53: Chambered for the 5.56mm round; does 3d+1 damage, has ½D 190, Max 1,800.

MP5/40A1: Chambered for the S&W .40-caliber round. This version does 2d+1+ damage, but is otherwise similar to the MP5A4.

FIRING A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM)

In order to engage a target with a SAM, the gunner needs an unobstructed line of sight to his target. The SAM must achieve sensor lock-on before launch. This requires an Aim maneuver and a roll against the missile's Skill. Apply a -2 to this roll for every doubling of range past 500 yards (-2 at 1,000 yds., etc.), or +2 for every halving of range (+2 at 250 yds., etc.). Countermeasures give a penalty, from -3 for basic systems (typical of those on the helicopters used to insert special ops troops) to -10 or more for the systems used by front-line jet fighters. Failure allows another attempt next turn.

Once lock-on is achieved, the gunner must take an Attack maneuver and roll vs. Gunner (Guided Missile)+4 to launch the missile; failure means the missile crashes. The missile will travel Speed yards/second for Endurance seconds. It will hit the target unless the aircraft can outrun the missile (which is possible for a fast jet) or dodge it at the last instant (one attempt only, at pilot's Piloting/3).

Antipersonnel Mines

Special ops soldiers often make use of antipersonnel mines. This is one of the main reasons why many advanced nations (the U.S. included) maintain an arsenal of these devices, despite growing popular opinion against them. Special ops forces most often use mines defensively, to protect a reconnaissance post ("hide") or cover a retreat, but they can also be used to cover likely routes of enemy retreat from an ambush or raid, increasing the casualties inflicted.

An antipersonnel mine may be triggered by pressure, tripwire, contact or a remote detonator, depending on the design. Mines vary a great deal from nation to nation, but a "generic" antipersonnel mine inflicts 2d damage – usually to hit locations 12-16 (see p. B211). To correctly employ antipersonnel mines, use Demolition skill; to remove them, use Explosive Ordnance Disposal skill.



Some specific U.S. designs:

M25 Blast Antipersonnel Mine: A small mine that uses a ⅓-oz. shaped charge to pierce the victim's boot and foot. It inflicts 1d+1(10) damage to the foot (this damage is *already* doubled for a "contact explosion"). There is no area effect to speak of. Weighs 3 oz.

M26 Bounding Antipersonnel Mine: A mine that springs 3 yards above the ground and explodes, scattering deadly pellets. The roll to hit is 14 minus the range penalty (measured from the mine to the victim). Multiple hits may occur on a good roll; see p. HT21 or p. VE190. Each pellet inflicts 4d damage (treat as a bullet) out to 17 yards; halve damage after that. Weighs 2.2 lbs.

M18A1 "Claymore" Mine: An above-ground weapon based on a WWII German design. It consists of a convex, 1.5-lb. block of C-4 explosive with 700 steel pellets embedded in it. It is pointed toward the desired area of effect, and may be detonated remotely or by a tripwire. When triggered, it acts like a huge shotgun round, attacking everything in a 60° cone in front of it. Roll vs. 14 minus the range penalty to hit. Multiple hits may occur; see p. HT21 or p. VE190. Each hit inflicts 6d+2 damage (treat as a bullet) out to 50 yards; halve damage after that. Anyone near the Claymore when it goes off also has a 6d×4 explosion to worry about, so it is usually deployed over 20 yards from friendly positions. Incidental fragmentation may cover a larger area to the side and rear; most troops take cover before detonating a Claymore. Weighs 5 lbs., including blasting cap, wire and detonator.

WEAPON TABLE

Entries in this table use the format on pp. 123-127 of *GURPS High-Tech, Third Edition*.

AUTOMATIC PISTOLS *Guns (Pistol)*

Weapon	Malf	Damage	SS	Acc	1/2D	Max	Wt.	AWt.	RoF	Shots	ST	Rcl	Cost	TL
H&K Mark 23 OHWS, .45 ACP	ver.	2d+1+	10	3	175	1,700	2.3	1	3~	12+1	10	-1	\$1,600	7
Makarov, 9x18mm	crit.	2d-1	10	2	125	1,500	1.6	0.36	3~	8+1	8	-1	\$350	7
S&W Mark 22 Model 0, 9x19mm	crit.	2d-1	10	3	150	1,900	2.6	0.36	3~	8+1	9	-1	\$550	7
Tokarev, 7.62x25mm	crit.	2d+1	10	1	140	1,800	2.25	0.29	3~	8+1	8	-1	\$250	6
Tznitochmash SPP-1, 4.5mm	crit.	1d+1	10	1	50	600	2.25	0.2	2~	4	10	-1	\$500	7

REVOLVERS *Guns (Pistol)*

Weapon	Malf	Damage	SS	Acc	1/2D	Max	Wt.	AWt.	RoF	Shots	ST	Rcl	Cost	TL
Manurhin MR73, .357 Magnum	ver.	3d-1	10	3	185	2,000	3.5	0.21	3~	6	10	-2	\$1,100	7
S&W Bodyguard, .38 Sp	crit.	2d-1	11	1	120	1,900	1.5	0.17	3~	5	10	-1	\$250	7

RIFLES *Guns (Rifle), or Guns (Light Auto) on full-auto*

Weapon	Malf	Damage	SS	Acc	1/2D	Max	Wt.	AWt.	RoF	Shots	ST	Rcl	Cost	TL
AK-74, 5.45x39mm	crit.	5d	12	7	500	3,800	8.9	1	12*	30+1	9	-1/2	\$425	7
De Lisle Carbine, .45 ACP	ver.	2d+	14	12	200	1,900	10	0.5	1	7+1	9	-1	\$500	6
Dragunov SVD, 7.62x54mmR	crit.	7d	15	12+2	900	3,900	12	0.7	3~	10+1	10	-1	\$1,200	7
FA-MAS, 5.56x45mm NATO	crit.	5d	11	10	500	3,800	8.8	0.9	15*	25+1	9	-1	\$900	7
IPME APS, 5.66mm	crit.	2d+2	12	9	150	1,400	7.5	1.5	9*	26	9	-1	\$950	7
L42A1, .308 Win	ver.	7d	15	11+4	1,200	4,700	12	0.89	1	10+1	12	-2	\$750	6
M4, 5.56x45mm	crit.	5d-3	11	9	400	3,000	7.25	1	12*	30+1	9	-1	\$700	7
M21, .308 Win	crit.	7d	14	11+4	1,200	4,700	12	1.7	3~	20+1	11	-2	\$950	6
Remington 700, .308 Win	ver.	7d	15	11+4	1,200	4,700	12	0.29	1/2	4+1	12	-2	\$700	6

SUBMACHINE GUNS *Guns (Light Auto)*

Weapon	Malf	Damage	SS	Acc	1/2D	Max	Wt.	AWt.	RoF	Shots	ST	Rcl	Cost	TL
H&K SMG II, 9x19mm	crit.	2d+2	10	8	160	1,900	7	1.1	14*	30	10	-1	\$1,000+	7
K/P M45, 9x19mm	crit.	3d-1	10	6	160	1,900	9.25	1.7	10*	36	10	-1	\$300	6
MAT 49, 9x19mm	crit.	3d-1	10	2	100	1,500	3.8	0.3	13*	10	10	-1	\$275	6
Model 61 Skorpion, 7.65x17mm†	crit.	2d-1	10	2	125	1,500	1.6	0.36	14*	10	9	-1	\$350	7
Sterling L2A3, 9x19mm	ver.	3d-1	10	7	160	1,900	6	1.5	9*	32	10	-1	\$350	6

† Uses Guns (Machine Pistol) skill.

MACHINE GUNS *Guns (Light Auto)*

Weapon	Malf	Damage	SS	Acc	1/2D	Max	Wt.	AWt.	RoF	Shots	ST	Rcl	Cost	TL
RPK-74, 5.45x39mm	crit.	5d+1	17	6	800	3,900	11	1.3	12*	40+1	12B	-1	\$650	7

LIGHT ANTI-TANK WEAPONS *Guns (LAW)*


Weapon	Malf	Damage	SS	Acc	1/2D	Max	Wt.	AWt.	RoF	Shots	Cost	TL
AT-4, 84mm	crit.	6d×6(10)	14	8	400	1,000	15	—	1	1	\$1,500	7
SMAW, 83mm HEDP	crit.	6d×6(5)[6d]	17	9	500	1,000	29.5	13	1/4	1	\$13,000	7

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES *Gunner (SAM)*

Weapon	Malf	Damage	Min	Max	Spd	End	Skill	Wt.	AWt.	RoF	Shots	Cost	TL
FIM-92A Stinger	crit	6d×11	220	8,500	775	11	12	34.5	22.0	1/5	1	\$38,000	7
SA-7 Grail	16	6d×6	500	5,600	620	9	11	29.5	20.25	1/8	1	\$14,500	7

GRENADES

Weapon	Malf	Damage	Wt.	Fuse Time	Cost	TL
ABC-M7A3	crit.	Spec.	1	2 sec.	\$25	7
AN-M14 TH3 Incendiary	crit.	2d	2	2 sec.	\$45	7
M34 White Phosphorus	crit.	3d[1d]	2	5 sec.	\$45	7
Stun Munition	crit.	Spec.	1	2 sec.	\$40	7



CHAPTER 6

OPPOSING FORCES



The term “opposing forces” was carefully selected to denote the enemies which special operations units engage. It includes the conventional and special ops troops of opposing nations, as well as

unconventional forces ranging from quasi-regular guerrilla armies to small “terrorist” groups distinguishable from common criminals only by their avowal of political objectives.

In most scenarios, opposing forces will be NPCs (although opposing-force PCs are possible in more elaborate scenarios). They usually have neither the training nor the experience of special ops troops, nor have they been subjected to the same rigorous selection process – except, of course, for opposing-force special ops units, which use the character generation rules in Chapter 3. For this reason, most opposing-force characters should be generated on no more than 50 to 100 points, with anything more being reserved for important NPCs and opposing special ops troops.

These guidelines can also be used for friendly-force NPCs; e.g., local guerrillas being trained by U.S. Army Special Forces.



Unconventional Warfare

Social scientists attempt to differentiate unconventional forces in terms of level of support both within the target population and from external sources. At one end of the spectrum are the Weather Underground or Symbionese Liberation Army in the U.S., or the Red Army Faction in Germany – groups with little support within their target populations and little, if any, external support from friendly governments. At the other end are the Viet Cong and the Palestine Liberation Organization – groups with considerable support within their populations and extensive support from friendly governments. In the middle are groups like the Provisional Irish Republican Army, with considerable popular support in Catholic neighborhoods in Northern Ireland and intermittent, low-level assistance from friendly foreign governments and individuals.

It makes sense politically and militarily to call groups like the Weather Underground and the Red Army Faction “terrorist,” since they rely on the propaganda value of political violence to generate popular and external support for their struggle. They seek to “terrorize” as a tool of war. Furthermore, their level of training, organization and logistical support limits them to relatively easy but politically sensational operations – usually kidnappings and bombings. Only when they are able to link up with other, better-trained and -supported organizations (as was the case when the Red Army Faction linked up with elements of the PLO in the Mogadishu and Entebbe hijackings) are they able to carry out major operations.

Groups like the Viet Cong and the PLO operate much more like regular armies, sometimes fielding battalion- and regiment-sized units in combat. They have extensive training facilities, access to military-grade weapons and explosives, sophisticated logistical support systems, etc. They are capable of undertaking major operations and present a much greater threat to the governments against which they operate.

A Typology of Unconventional Warfare

This is a general guide to the training, equipment, organization and logistical support of unconventional opposing forces. The GM is free to invent his own backgrounds and causes.

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

There are almost as many terrorist organizations in the world as there are special ops units. The following list is far from complete, and is meant as to serve as a starting point for further research. Note that *not* all members of these groups are terrorists; in fact, the majority of most organizations' membership consists of political sympathizers, with only a small fraction on the violent, radical fringe.

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

The ANO split from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1974. It is currently led by Sabri al-Banna. Its targets include Israel, nations supporting Israel, moderate Palestinians (including the PLO) and other Arab nations. The ANO carried out major attacks on airports in Rome and Vienna in 1985, hijacked Pan Am Flight 73 in 1986, and attacked a day-excursion ship in Greece in 1988. Its members are suspects in the 1991 assassinations of the deputy chief and security chief of the PLO. The ANO has claimed responsibility for the 1994 assassination of a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon as well.

The ANO is presently headquartered in Libya and maintains a presence in Lebanon. Members can also be found in Algeria, Iraq, Sudan and Syria. It has demonstrated the capability to conduct operations throughout Asia and Europe. The ANO currently claims a membership of several hundred, with additional forces in the form of Lebanese militia groups. It is believed to receive support in the form of training, financial and logistical assistance, and shelter from Iraq, Libya and Syria.

The ANO is also known as the “Fatah Revolutionary Council,” the “Arab Revolutionary Council,” and “Black September.”

Continued on next page . . .

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

(Continued)

Japanese Red Army (JRA)

This radical terrorist group broke away from the Japanese Red Army Faction (*Sekigun-ha*) in 1971. An anarchist group with the professed goal of overthrowing the Japanese government, the JRA also targets pro-Western and Israeli government facilities and officials. It is led by Fusako Shigenobu, who is thought to be hiding outside of Japan (possibly in Lebanon).

The JRA's activities during the 1970s included a massacre at the Lod airport in Israel (1972), the hijacking of two airliners (1973 and 1977), and the attempted seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur (1975). More recently, it bombed a Naples USO club in 1988. A concurrent bombing was foiled when a JRA member was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike.

The JRA's current base of operations is unknown, but it was formerly based in Lebanon. Membership has fallen greatly in the past decade, from a high of 30 active members to less than 10, and it is unknown how much popular or foreign support the JRA still enjoys. In the past, the JRA maintained good relations with both the European New Left and radical Palestinian terrorist groups.

The JRA is also known by its Japanese name, *Nippon Sekigun*, and may have ties with the Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB). Some experts theorize that the two may actually be the same organization.

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Low Popular Support, Low External Support

Groups which fall into this category are the Weather Underground and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the U.S., the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades and *Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari* in Italy, the Fighting Communist Cells in Belgium, GRAPO and FRAP in Spain, *Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo* in Yugoslavia, the AKO in Switzerland, *Action Direct* in France, the *Montoneros* in Argentina, the *Tupamaros* in Uruguay, the Japanese Red Army (see sidebar), the Turkish People's Liberation Army, and the Armenian Secret Army of Liberation and the Grey Wolves in Turkey.

Training: The level of training is generally quite low, limited to small-arms proficiency and some knowledge of demolition – much of this acquired while members underwent compulsory military service prior to joining. In some cases, members may have received advanced training from external organizations; e.g., Palestinian groups, or the intelligence services of foreign governments. A few members may even develop high levels of proficiency (12-14 range) in a limited number of skills as the result of intensive study or a hobby. The skill levels of average personnel should be in the 5-9 range, though; these are essentially civilians operating at default skill levels. Many of those who have studied military skills will have learned what they know from other civilians who are unqualified to give proper training. This is why such groups often fail spectacularly in their missions, doing more damage to themselves than to their targets.

Equipment: Civilian small arms and some military small arms (usually stolen, although some may be purchased on the black market or obtained from better-equipped organizations). Limited access to military explosives is possible (through theft or purchase on the black market, or contacts in other groups), but civilian explosives are more usual. One reason why kidnapping for ransom and bank robbery are frequent tactics of these groups is to obtain funds for purchasing arms and explosives on the black market.

Organization and Logistical Support: These groups are usually small – ten to 200 members – and organized into cells with cut-outs (see *Cell Structure*, p. 21) to prevent the elimination of the entire organization by the arrest of a single cell. They are extremely difficult to penetrate, owing to their small size and the usual requirement that recruits commit murder to prove their loyalty (an initiation that few police or military organizations would permit their personnel to pass). They depend on a limited network of sympathizers to provide them with safe houses, food, transportation and false identification.

Low Popular Support, Medium External Support

The Abu Nidal Organization (p. 109) is an excellent example of a group with little popular support, but occasional training, logistical and intelligence support from friendly foreign governments – notably Iraq, Syria and Libya.

Training: Groups of this category are generally well trained, frequently receiving some training from friendly foreign governments. Skill levels in small arms and demolition should be in the 9-10 range, but exceptional individuals may achieve significantly higher levels.

Equipment: Civilian small arms obtained on the open market and military small arms obtained on the black market are common, but support from friendly foreign governments permits procurement of additional military small arms and explosives. Such governments usually attempt to conceal their role by providing "sanitized" weapons and ammunition (i.e., those with all identification marks removed), frequently of Russian or former Soviet provenance (e.g., the ubiquitous AK-47).



TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

(Continued)

Khmer Rouge (The Party of Democratic Kampuchea)

The Khmer Rouge is technically an insurgency rather than a terrorist organization, but its activities include the occasional kidnapping or murder of foreign nationals in Cambodia, so the line is somewhat blurred. Its stated goal is the destabilization and overthrow of the Cambodian government.

During the late 1970s, the Khmer Rouge was responsible for the deaths of an estimated 1 million people in Cambodia. Vietnam ousted the Khmer Rouge from power in 1979, but the group merely retreated into the outlying regions of the country, where it has maintained a constant conflict with the Cambodian government, targeting rural villages. In 1997, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, ordered the death of the group's co-founder, Son Sen. This action split the group and resulted in Pol Pot's arrest and trial by its members. He died of natural causes in 1998 while under house arrest imposed by his former followers.

Pol Pot's actions have weakened the organization, but it is believed that the Khmer Rouge still has between 1,000 and 2,000 active members. Its activities are presently limited to Cambodia's borders, and it receives no support from foreign agencies.

National Liberation Army (ELN)


The ELN is a leftist, anti-U.S. guerrilla group active in Colombia and border areas of Venezuela. It traces its roots back to 1964, and has remained active for over three decades. Negotiations with the Colombian government failed in the early 1990s and the ELN has resumed hostile activity.

The ELN targets ranchers, oil companies and similar large corporations. It has conducted assassinations, ransom kidnappings, bombings of buildings and oil pipelines, and other armed attacks. The group also extorts protection money from opium and coca growers, and hinders the Colombian government's attempts to destroy those crops. Its activities in the criminal sector have made it difficult for Colombian and Venezuelan authorities to distinguish between terrorist and drug-trafficking operations.

The ELN has grown in strength over the last decade, increasing its armed membership from 1,700 to over 3,000. The lucrative nature of many of its operations no doubt helps to attract recruits. The ELN currently receives no foreign support, but is able to finance most of its actions through its criminal activities.

"ELN" is an abbreviation for the group's native Spanish name, *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*.

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Organization and Logistical Support: These groups also tend to use a cell organization (see p. 21), but the existence of some level of logistical – particularly financial – support allows them to operate with less dependence on sympathizers in the general population. Furthermore, sanctuaries on the soil of friendly foreign governments are often provided for rest and recuperation after operations, as well as for training and staging prior to operations. Forged identification is often easily obtained from friendly intelligence services.

Low Popular Support, High External Support

The Nicaraguan *Contras* are perhaps the best example of this type of group. These groups generally emerge when a foreign government is engaged in paramilitary operations aimed at destabilizing a hostile regime.

TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

(Continued)

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, Provos)

The Provos were formed in 1969 as the military arm of Sinn Fein, a political movement aimed at reuniting Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic. Sinn Fein is a legal organization, but the Provos engage in a number of terrorist activities in pursuit of the same goals.

The Provos' operations are usually violent: assassinations, bombings, kidnappings and robberies. Their targets were originally limited to British government officials, military personnel and police in Northern Ireland, as well as Northern Irish Loyalist paramilitary organizations. Since breaking their 1996 cease-fire agreement, however, the Provos have expanded their activities to include civilian targets in Britain.


The Provos have a large manpower base, with more than 200 hard core terrorists, over 500 regular combatants and several thousand sympathizers. They are based primarily in Ireland and Northern Ireland, although they have operated throughout Britain and the rest of Western Europe. They have received aid in the form of arms and training from Libya, and at one time maintained ties with the PLO. It is suspected that financial assistance and arms are also smuggled from sympathizers in the U.S.

Sendero Luminoso (SL, Shining Path)

Founded in 1969 by Manuel Abimael Guzman, SL started as an intellectual movement and has since gained the reputation for being one of the world's most ruthless terrorist organizations. Its goals are a unique mix of Marxism and nationalism: SL seeks to replace Peru's existing government with a revolutionary regime and to expel all foreign influences from the country.

SL is known for its almost careless use of explosive devices; virtually every government building in Peru has been bombed at one time or another, as have many foreign embassies. Other common SL activities include kidnapping, murder and sabotage. Like the ELN (p. 111), SL has close ties to the drug trade – a relationship often described as "narco-terrorism."

SL is highly organized and uses a classic cell structure (see p. 21). The 1992 arrest of its founder and the 1995 arrests of other leaders have dealt SL a telling blow, but it still maintains a fairly large following. At present, SL claims over 1,500 armed members and a large number of supporters in the outlying regions of Peru. It receives no foreign aid, but its ties to the drug market help to fund its operations.



Training: The level of training is frequently as high as that of regular military forces – and in a wider range of military skills than is the case for less well-supported groups. This training is often provided by military advisors from friendly foreign governments (the U.S. and Argentina, in the case of the *Contras*). In many cases, a significant percentage of the membership consists of professional soldiers. In general, such troops should have the skills provided by infantry AIT (see p. 26). Members with combat experience and leaders should have skills 1-3 levels higher than these minimums, as well as Leadership (and possibly Tactics) at 12 or better.

Equipment: Usually military-grade, including small arms, explosives and limited numbers of support weapons (machine guns, mortars, etc.). This equipment is often "sanitized" and of the same provenance as equipment used by the government against which the group is fighting – making resupply by capture a realistic possibility.

Organization and Logistical Support: These groups often have extensive base camp facilities from which they can operate – frequently under the auspices of friendly countries. The existence of a supporting foreign government obviates many of the supply problems faced by less well-supported insurgencies. Aerial resupply is a political question for the supporting government, but it is not infrequently a real possibility, particularly when it could mean the margin between victory and defeat.

Medium Popular Support, Low External Support

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, p. 112) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) are examples of groups of this type. The PIRA is clearly the more popularly supported of the two; in the mid- to late-1970s, it was probably in the *Medium Popular Support, Medium External Support* category (below), with aid from Palestinian organizations and Libya, and contributions from Irish supporters abroad. This assistance diminished considerably in the early 1980s, however. *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA), the Basque separatist organization in Spain, is another example of a group of this type.

Training: The overall level of training is similar to that of groups in the *Low Popular Support, Low External Support* category (p. 110) – military skills in the 7-10 range, limited to proficiency with small arms and demolition, usually obtained in the military service of the country the group is in revolt against. Members with advanced training from external organizations may have higher levels (12-14 range) in a limited number of military skills. The degree of popular support implies a considerable period of struggle, during which proliferation of needed skills has taken place within the organization (which is why they are above default levels). Members are often professional guerrillas who have studied military skills to advance their political agenda.

Equipment: More civilian sporting guns than military small arms. Explosives are likely to be commercial, not military, and they may also manufacture their own in small quantities – especially if they have recruited chemistry students.

Organization and Logistical Support: These groups are usually in the 50- to 400-member range, organized into cells (see p. 21). They are likely to have a murder-as-initiation requirement (see p. 110), but their networks of sympathizers are a good target for penetration. Since these groups often have operations that require extensive preparation, and need hide-outs and escape routes, an agent in the support network can get very useful information.

Medium Popular Support, Medium External Support

The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines is a good example of this kind of group, with moderate to high levels of support in the ethnic Muslim population and some support from Iran and other Muslim governments.

Training: Groups in this category are quite likely to have some training from friendly foreign governments. Skill levels in small arms and demolition should be in the 9-10 range, but a few individuals will be significantly more skilled.

Equipment: Military small arms and explosives, including some light anti-tank weapons, plus the usual gamut of sporting guns and small handguns. Weapons from foreign sources will usually be “sanitized.” These groups prefer to have weapons of the same type as the army or police they fight, as this simplifies the search for ammunition and parts.

Organization and Logistical Support: These groups tend to use a cell organization (see p. 21), but the existence of medium levels of popular support means a large network of sympathizers. This can be effectively used to provide logistical support and (in some cases) denied areas: territory under insurgent control where the government operates only at considerable risk and usually with some reluctance (see sidebar). Forged identification is often easily obtained from friendly intelligence services.

DENIED AREAS


A “denied area” is any area where a criminal or revolutionary group holds control and authority while the “legitimate” government does not. It is called a denied area because the legitimate government is denied the use of the area. If government troops cannot enter the area except in full combat readiness, while insurgent troops can stroll through in small groups, then the area is denied.

During the last phases of the Vietnam War, most of South Vietnam was a denied area. A denied area may be much smaller, though: a single city – or even a hamlet and its surrounding fields – will be a denied area if a significant part of its population is actively anti-government.

A denied area does not have to be created by an insurgency. A big-city slum is a denied area as far as the local police are concerned.

Denied areas are natural fields for special ops missions: Recon teams will penetrate these areas to locate targets and chart enemy movements. Snipers will stealthily infiltrate to kill individual enemies. Strike missions will go after material targets. Counter-insurgency forces will move in trying “to win the hearts and minds of the people” and try to stay alive while they do it.

Some of the most incongruous sights in special ops are found in denied areas: Where else is a medic responding to an obstetrical emergency likely to be found in body armor and a helmet, escorted by SMG-toting guards?



OPPOSING FORCES

These templates list bare minimum attributes, advantages, disadvantages and military skills for several "generic foes." Individuals can be customized using low-value advantages and disadvantages, skills that represent MOS or other training (e.g., Forward Observer and Gunner for artillery troops), plus common non-military skills like Cooking, Driving, hobby skills, etc.



Guerrilla

ST: 10 DX: 10 IQ: 10 HT: 10

Skills: Camouflage-10, First Aid-9, Guns (Rifle)-10, Knife-10, Orienteering-11, Stealth-10, Survival (native terrain)-12, Throwing-10.

Languages: Native Language-10.

This template represents the typical member of a guerrilla force with some amount of popular support. More experienced members will have higher skill levels (see p. 117), and central characters should be fully detailed.

The equipment available to a guerrilla force is greatly dependent on the level of support – both popular and external (see p. 109) – it receives. Poorly supported guerrillas may be limited to hunting weapons (use the Remington 870 shotgun and the SMLE rifle to represent these) and crude explosives. On the other hand, fighters in a well-supported guerrilla force may be equipped to nearly the same level as a soldier in a conventional army.

Continued on next page . . .

Medium Popular Support, High External Support

UNITA, in post-independence Angola, exemplifies groups in this category. Its support within some tribal groups is high, but it amounts to a distinct minority countrywide. Extensive South African and U.S. assistance has nonetheless enabled Jonas Savimbi to field well-equipped and effective guerrilla forces. Many of the resistance groups in occupied Europe in World War II fall into this category.

Training: The level of training is frequently as high as that of regular military forces. This training is often provided by military advisors from friendly foreign governments (South Africa and the U.S., in the case of UNITA). Many of the group's members are likely to be veteran soldiers (in UNITA's case, veteran insurgents from the struggle against Portugal for independence). In general, such troops should have the skills provided by infantry AIT (see p. 26). Some members of each combat team will have better skills than this, and leaders may have high Leadership, Tactics and possibly Strategy.

Equipment: Similar to that of a slightly under-strength infantry unit. Will have automatic weapons, military explosives, light support weapons and at least some medical facilities, but with more handguns and fewer support weapons and radios than a conventional force, and a shortage of repair parts and ammunition.

Organization and Logistical Support: These groups often have extensive denied areas (see p. 113). They may also have base camp facilities under the auspices of friendly countries. They have extensive contacts with their external supporters, and little difficulty in acquiring supplies. Aerial resupply is possible, and depends more on the air defenses of the hostile government than on any other factor. Friendly governments may use "civilian" air resources for such missions. Such groups are often able to operate in battalion- and regiment-sized units, accompanied by foreign advisors. Occasionally, when the political situation warrants, friendly foreign troops may actively intervene in support of the insurgency.

High Popular Support, Low External Support

It is difficult to identify groups in this category because those with high levels of popular support generally garner at least a medium level of external support as friendly governments seek to gain favor with what they perceive as the likely successor regime. At the outset of their struggle, the Afghan *mujaheddin* certainly fell within this category, but they quickly received significant external support as the popularity of their cause became apparent.

Training: The level of training is better than that of groups with lower levels of popular support, but still generally low. Much of the training will have been at the hands of the army they are now fighting. A high level of popular support usually means that the unrest is of long standing. Some members will have prepared for the insurgency by training with other guerrilla forces or with foreign intelligence services; they may also have recruited, or been supplied with, outside advisers and technicians (but not many, if their level of outside support is low). Most will have military skills in the 8-11 range; a few will be considerably more skilled.

Equipment: Military small arms from their own army, captured or provided by sympathizers. A high level of popular support implies that some army units may have come over *in toto*, with all their equipment. The level of popular support frequently makes clandestine procurement of weapons and explosives from government arsenals possible through secret sympathizers operating inside the government.

Organization and Logistical Support: These groups are massive, often numbering in the 1,000- to 250,000-member range, and organized into relatively large units – frequently on the basis of ethnicity or tribal attachment. They are often dif-

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difficult to penetrate because an outsider is immediately noticed. They depend on an extensive network of sympathizers, and this network is more vulnerable to police and intelligence agents. The insurgents may control large-scale denied areas (see p. 113), but in the absence of access to regular resupply, particularly of support weapons, they are highly vulnerable to better-equipped and -supplied government forces.

High Popular Support, Medium External Support

The Shiite Lebanese groups *Amal* (with Syrian support) and *Hezbollah* (with Iranian support), the Afghan *mujaheddin*, and the FSLN in pre-revolutionary Nicaragua, are all examples of groups in this category.

Training: Groups in this category are generally well trained – sometimes receiving training from friendly foreign governments. Skill levels in small arms and demolition should be in the 9-10 range, with some members of every combat team having skills in the 12-14 range.

Equipment: Military and relatively modern, along with reasonable stockpiles of ammunition and spares. Provided largely by outside supporters; friendly governments will be less worried about “sanitizing” equipment. Government weapons may be captured from troops or arsenals (much of the Lebanese Army’s weapons stockpiles disappeared into the hands of such groups during the civil war), or in some cases sold to the insurgents by avaricious local commanders (common in Somoza’s Nicaragua).



Organization and Logistical Support: These groups tend to use a cell organization (see p. 21), but the existence of high levels of popular support means an extensive network of sympathizers which can be effectively used to provide logistical support and (often) denied areas (see p. 113). In many cases, these groups are actual alternative governments, controlling much of the countryside. They may have extensive medical, manufacturing and agricultural facilities.

OPPOSING FORCES

(Continued)

Typical Soldier

ST: 10 DX: 10 IQ: 10 HT: 10

Skills: First Aid-10, Guns (Light Auto)-10, Guns (Pistol)-10, Savoir-Faire (Military)-10, Spear-10, Throwing-10.

Languages: Native Language-10.

This represents an average soldier in a non-elite unit. Examples are first-term soldiers in a U.S. Army infantry division, soldiers in the IDF, and Iraqi troopers. Be sure to adjust the skill levels as appropriate for training and combat experience (see p. 117). Officers and NCOs will have higher skills across the board, and should add the Military Rank advantage and the Administration, Leadership, and Tactics skills.

Standard combat load for a U.S. infantry soldier includes an M16 assault rifle, seven 30-round magazines, 4 M26 defensive grenades, a bayonet and a Kevlar helmet (PD 4, DR 5). Additional weapons – like an M60 or M240G machine gun, M203 grenade launcher, or AT-4 anti-tank weapon – may also be carried, depending on the mission. Non-combat equipment includes an NBC protective mask, 2 canteens, 2 ammunition pouches, a field dressing (bandage) and a rucksack (which usually contains an additional canteen, an entrenching tool, sleeping gear, a change of uniform and food).

Elite Soldier

ST: 11 DX: 10 IQ: 10 HT: 11

Advantages: Fit.

Skills: Brawling-10, First Aid-11, Guns (Light Auto)-12, Guns (Pistol)-12, Knife-10, Savoir-Faire (Military)-11, Spear-11, Stealth-10, Tactics-8, Throwing-12.

Languages: Native Language-10.

This template should be used for experienced or elite (but not special ops) troops. Examples include troops in a Russian Guards Division, the British Army Paras, or a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit. Per *Typical Soldier* (above), adjust skills to reflect experience or rank.

Elite troops are equipped in much the same way as standard forces, but tend to receive newer or better equipment, and may be armed with larger numbers of support weapons (like light machine guns or grenade launchers).

Continued on next page . . .

OPPOSING FORCES

(Continued)

Terrorist

ST: 10 DX: 10 IQ: 11 HT: 10

Advantages: Alertness +2.

Disadvantages: Enemy (Government Agency, 6 or less), Fanaticism (Political cause).

Skills: Demolition-10, Guns (Light Auto)-13, Guns (Pistol)-13, Holdout-13, Shadowing-12, Throwing-10.

Languages: English-9, Native Language-11.

This template represents the average "grunt" terrorist – basically cannon-fodder. Pivotal or specially trained characters should be more fully detailed. Most terrorists also have other skills used in everyday jobs.

Equipment carried by terrorists varies a great deal, according to the circumstances. Most favor small, easily concealed weapons like pistols or hand grenades. Submachine guns, such as Uzis and MAC 10s, are also sought for their high rate of fire and relatively small size. Well-financed organizations may have access to military assault rifles (AK-47s and AK-74s are the most popular) and even SAMs (Stingers or SA-7s).

A GENERIC INFANTRY PLATOON

Despite differences in military doctrine between East and West, basic combat units are constructed in a similar manner.

The infantry platoon is one of the primary building blocks of any army. Three infantry platoons are found in each infantry company, three infantry companies in each infantry battalion, and three infantry battalions in each infantry brigade or regiment. There are minor differences from nation to nation, but most infantry platoons are organized along the following lines:

First, a platoon has a *headquarters element* consisting of a platoon leader (Rank 3, 2nd lieutenant or equivalent), an assistant platoon leader or platoon sergeant (Rank 2, sergeant first class or equivalent), and a radio operator. In a dedicated artillery unit, the radio operator will often serve as a forward observer.

Next in the platoon's organizational

Continued on next page ...

High Popular Support, High External Support

Many of the resistance movements of WWII were of this type – especially in France after the Normandy invasion. The Viet Cong also fit into this category.

Training: Equivalent to that of a regular army. Some units may even have the equivalent of special ops training. They are liable to be accompanied by – and perhaps actually commanded by – professional soldiers from their supporting governments.



Equipment: Modern military equipment in the same quantities as any modern army, but with more light infantry and less artillery than government forces. Aircraft and armor are unlikely, however.

Organization and Logistical Support: These groups are generally actively contesting for state power; they amount to an alternative government over wide areas of the country. They are supplied by their supporting government. Resupply usually depends on air or sea routes, or an extensive, low-tech overland supply effort, but truck and even rail supply is possible. Such groups are often able to operate in battalion- and regiment-sized units – perhaps even division-sized units – accompanied by foreign advisors. They may be supported by foreign combat troops.

Conventional Forces: Up Against the Regulars

“Conventional forces” are the active-duty and reserve military forces of governments. The training, skills and skill levels of conventional opposing forces will differ from country to country, and it is difficult to give any consistent rule of thumb. Standard reference works (such as *The Military Balance*) and historical studies can provide guidance when deciding on skills and skill levels.

As a general rule, one should start with the skill levels appropriate to infantry AIT (see p. 26), then modify those skills to reflect the opposing force’s training and combat experience, as follows:

TRAINING	MODIFIER	EXPERIENCE	MODIFIER
Militia	-2	Green	-2
Reserve	-1	Average	-1
Regular	0	Seasoned	0
Elite	+1	Veteran	+1

All modifiers are cumulative; e.g., a veteran, elite unit will have +2 to its skill levels, while a green, reserve unit will have -3.

Tailoring skills for specific units can add considerable realism; e.g., a transportation platoon might have high Driving and Mechanic skill levels and relatively low Combat/Weapon skills; an artillery battery might have high Gunner and Forward Observer skill levels and low Guns skills. Similarly, NCOs and officers will have higher skill levels, on average, than the troops they lead, and will probably have skill at Administration, Leadership and Tactics.

As much as possible, the GM should make an effort to learn and take into account the real-world performance of military units from a given force and nation. An “average, regular” unit of British infantry is likely to be considerably better than an “elite” formation in the Ugandan army. Thus, the guidelines above must be used with good sense to provide maximum realism.

Finally, the detail with which opposing-force characters are generated is up to the Game Master. When the opposing forces consist of a company of Viet Cong, only the most meticulous GM would generate 150 to 180 individual opposing force NPCs! It is far simpler – and reasonably realistic – to individualize officer NPCs, but to use only a few different “generic NCO” and “generic private” NPCs for everyone else.



A GENERIC INFANTRY PLATOON

(Continued)

structure are three nine-man infantry *squads*. Each of these squads has a squad leader (Rank 1, staff sergeant or equivalent) and two fire-team leaders (Rank 0, corporal or equivalent) armed with assault rifles (M16s, AK-74s, etc.), three riflemen armed with assault rifles, a grenadier armed with an assault rifle and either an under-barrel 40mm grenade launcher (M203, BG-15, etc.) or a light anti-tank weapon (RPG-7, AT-4, etc.), and two machine-gunners armed with light machine guns (RPK-74s, M249 SAWs, etc.).


Finally, each infantry platoon has a nine-man *weapons squad* assigned to it. This consists of a squad leader with an assault rifle, two machine-gunners with medium machine guns (M60s, PKs, etc.), two assistant machine-gunners with assault rifles, two anti-armor gunners with light or medium anti-tank weapons (Carl Gustavs, etc.), and two assistant anti-armor gunners with assault rifles. Alternatively, the squad may contain a squad leader, three machine-gunners, three assistant machine-gunners, and a grenadier (armed as above).

A platoon manned and equipped like this is likely to give even the best-trained special ops team a tough fight.

CHAPTER 7

CAMPAIGNS

More than most roleplaying games, **GURPS Special Ops** places a considerable responsibility on the shoulders of the **GM**. Not only does the **GM** need to weave a convincing and compelling story, involving and exciting the players in a separate reality of his own making – he needs to be familiar with the technical arcana of military technology and equipment, tactics, planning and nomenclature which underpin that reality. In addition, he must be able to explain this world to players who have never been closer to real special operations than the **Late Late Show**.



Special Ops scenarios can range from simple impromptu adventures to complex, detailed simulations like the "command post exercises" with which military units train. Each group will have its own favorite style of adventure. One might prefer to play a modern counterterrorist force, another might enjoy adventures set in occupied France during World War II, and a third might enjoy going behind the lines in the American Civil War!

Small Unit Operations

Small unit scenarios most closely resemble what the majority of players expect from a roleplaying game. Each player generates a character and the activities of these characters form the focus of the scenario. Missions best-suited to small units are foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, intelligence operations, counterdrug activities and special activities in support of foreign policy. Examples include a mobile training team mission to organize Meo tribesmen in Laos against the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao, supplying Afghan *mujaheddin* with arms (or alternatively, running a Soviet counterinsurgency unit), and cutting railroad lines in 1862 Virginia.

The key is to keep the mission small enough in scope that a unit of the appropriate size can accomplish it and return for its next mission. A six-man long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) asked to stage a raid on a Viet Cong regimental headquarters is likely to be justifiably upset; suicide from the get-go makes for a short and unpleasant game. On the other hand, the same LRRP happening upon this headquarters while scouting – and discovering the difficulty of extracting itself from its predicament – could make for an interesting and exciting encounter. If the choppers are late, though, the patrol is likely to end up just as dead.

The chief problem in small-unit scenarios is providing each player with enough to do. The commander, senior NCO and point man in a patrol will certainly have their hands full, but the rest of the patrol will often have little to do unless some misfortune occurs – like being ambushed. One way around this is to specify with some precision the responsibilities of the patrol members: the communications specialist should handle communications between the commander and base, the demolition specialist should be called to the point whenever there is a risk of booby traps, a soldier with the appropriate language skills should be detailed to interrogate prisoners and examine captured documents, etc. As well, the point position should be rotated through the patrol, as in real life, to ensure that the man most likely to contact the enemy first is fresh and alert. Each player should also be encouraged to participate as fully as possible in the planning of the mission, as in the "brief-back" portion of mission planning in real operations (see p. 82).


Small-scale direct action and counterterrorist missions are possible, but these missions usually involve forces of at least company size. There is no reason why such missions cannot be accomplished by small units if the objective is kept manageable, but the GM must take care not to ask too much of too few men.

DRESSED TO KILL

Special operations forces take their equipment seriously. The knowledge that their lives may depend on having the right tool at the right time is balanced by the danger of being too heavily laden to react to an unexpected turn of events. As a result, a good deal of planning goes into exactly what gear gets taken on any special ops mission.

Counterterrorist and other CQB-type missions tend to be fairly quick. Support units and transportation are likely nearby, ready to move in as soon as the operation is complete. Consequently, little beyond weapons, protective gear and entry equipment is carried. A typical load for such an operation includes a helmet (often with a headset radio), body armor, a Nomex flight suit and gloves, a climbing/rappelling harness and seat, a protective mask, a Maglite flashlight, the soldier's primary weapon (usually a submachine gun, like the MP5), several spare magazines, two to four flashbang grenades, plasticuffs, and a simple first aid kit (including an IV). The team may also have a crowbar or sledgehammer to breach doors.

Continued on next page . . .



DRESSED TO KILL

(Continued)

On the other hand, teams deployed for long-term missions like special reconnaissance often carry tremendous amounts of gear. This is because they may have to support themselves for weeks in hostile territory. For example, each member of an SAS team deployed behind Iraqi lines during Desert Storm carried an M16/M203 or a Minimi light machine gun, 10 extra magazines, 12 40mm grenades, a 72mm LAW, 2-4 white phosphorus grenades, a first aid kit (including morphine and IVs), a personal survival kit, NBC gear (mask, detector, decon kit), 14 days' rations, and two canteens of water. Additional gear was divided among the team members, including four tactical beacons (TACBEs), a long-range radio, spare batteries for the radio, spare medical supplies, Claymore mines, and demolition equipment. On top of that, each member also carried a 5-gallon jerrycan of water. The soldiers ultimately set up a cache to hold much of this gear, but the total weight that each man had to lug 5 miles from the LZ to the mission area totaled nearly 210 lbs.!

It adds a great deal of realism to any scenario to determine an equipment list like this for the mission.

Large Unit Operations

Direct action, counterterrorist, and combat search and rescue missions are usually conducted by units of company size or larger. It would be irrational to require players to generate and run 100 or more characters, though; even if they were willing to try, playing out the operation would take forever and would likely tax a computer simulation, never mind a GM! These scenarios are among the most interesting for any *Special Ops* campaign, but they cannot be handled like small unit operations.

What works best is for the players to take the roles of those in charge of operational planning: the commanding, executive and staff officers. For instance, a scenario involving a hostage rescue on board an ocean liner might involve PC-led teams from a host of different units – 1st SFOD-Delta, GIGN, *Kommando Yami*, KSK, Naval Special Warfare Development Group, SAS, etc. Most of the “action” would consist of planning the mission and overcoming the considerable political and logistical difficulties involved in any multilateral military operation, even among the closest of allies. The PCs would have to obtain intelligence, organize and stockpile supplies and equipment, lay on transportation and plan each step of the operation's execution in detail. The players will still get a healthy dose of sneaking and shooting when they finally lead their teams into action!

Gamers who have experienced only small unit roleplaying may initially balk at spending hours discussing how to conduct an operation. In the hands of a skilled GM, however, the politics and intrigue of intraservice, interservice and international rivalries, as well as the technical arcana of military operations, can be an excellent basis for high-powered gaming.

Creating a Special Ops Scenario

The first step in creating *any* realistic scenario is research. The GM may wish to draw on historical missions for inspiration; the bibliography (p. 123) provides a starting point, but a wealth of historical material on special ops can be found in any major library. The more the GM knows about the historical context, the better he will be able to provide his players with a vivid sense of “being there.”

Props – maps, communications schedules, intelligence briefings, etc. – are at the heart of any successful *Special Ops* scenario. The more effort the GM puts into these materials, the more enjoyable the scenario will be. Again, much of this can be obtained at the library. For detail enthusiasts, military maps (see p. 97) can be obtained from the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency through the Government Printing Office; acetate overlays and grease pencils for maps can be found at any art supply store. Information provided to the players in the form of written, military-style intelligence reports and briefings adds immeasurably to the atmosphere of realism, and is also useful for refreshing the players' memories in more complicated scenarios. The use of military communications formats, callsigns, brevity codes, etc., can add a compelling touch of realism as well.

Non-historical scenarios are limited only by the GM's imagination. Several *GURPS* supplements treat special ops in fictional settings. *Black Ops* deals with missions carried out by the Company – a special ops force tailored to the needs of an illuminated world – against aliens, monsters and evil psychics. In *Reign of Steel*, AIs rule the Earth and the Washington Chromes, a crack unit of cyborgs, conduct special ops against both robotic and human foes. *Technomancer* – an alternate Earth – mentions the Black Berets, a magic-using special ops unit, and describes their role in Vietnam. In *GURPS Traveller*, the Imperial Marine



Commandos carry out all of the missions outlined in Chapter 1 . . . at tech level 10. See the sidebars on pp. 121-122 for other crossovers.

From Scenario to Campaign

Scenarios can make for exciting and enjoyable gaming on their own, but many players prefer to develop characters and their relationships in the context of a campaign. Character development is discussed in Chapter 3; see the rules for on-the-job training (p. 52), decorations (p. 46) and promotion (p. 47). Character interaction is most effectively encouraged by organizing the campaign around the activities of a specific unit and presenting situations where the characters must interact to do their jobs. A mixture of judicious character improvement and regular character interaction is the surest way to link a series of scenarios into a *Special Ops* campaign.

Many historical scenarios lend themselves well to elaboration into a full campaign. A series of related operations – be they in WWII, Vietnam or the Gulf War – make excellent scenarios, and come with a ready-made context for an overarching campaign. Building a campaign from non-historical scenarios is simultaneously more and less difficult: It requires more vision and imagination on the part of the GM, but he also has more latitude, since he is free of the constraints of historical accuracy and realism.

The most important goal for a GM running any kind of campaign is to ensure that the scenarios are sufficiently varied and the players sufficiently involved that interest and enthusiasm do not lag. This can be accomplished by presenting a variety of scenarios – and situations within scenarios – that require the principal skills of *all* the PCs.

By the Numbers: Hierarchy vs. Anarchy

Military organizations are hierarchical for a reason. A clear-cut chain of command is essential to effective decision-making in an environment of intense stress, limited time and great danger. Hierarchy and discipline are absolute requirements for success in military operations. Gaming, however, tends to be highly individualistic. Most fantasy gaming “parties” seem more like *ad hoc* raiding and looting coalitions than military organizations, with the option to challenge minimal party leadership or to go it alone always available.

The disciplined, hierarchical structure of military special operations may seem restrictive to some players. Given a game system as realistically lethal as *GURPS* and a scenario with automatic weapons and high explosives, however, the most immediate consequence of a lack of hierarchy and discipline among the characters will be their rapid demise. In this, gaming mimics life.

As the players become familiar with the system, this will become obvious to most of them. It need not unduly restrict their individual initiative, however. There must be a commanding officer, subordinate commanders and NCOs in any military unit, or fatal anarchy will result, but the GM can alleviate some of the problems associated with this reality by encouraging the players to utilize their characters’ technical specializations as fully as possible (giving everyone something important to do), to participate in operational planning (the “briefback”) and to hand operational command from one PC to the next from scenario to scenario.

SPECIAL OPS IN OTHER GURPS BACKGROUNDS

GURPS Cyberworld and GURPS Cyberpunk

Cyberworld is 50 years in the future. It’s a lot like today, but with cyberwear and *far* messier politics. Most firstworld military units are special ops units by 20th-century standards. Members of actual special ops units are equipped with rare, very rare and even experimental cyberwear – all of it state of the art. The nightmarish political situation means that foreign internal defense and counterterrorist missions (which is what the NERCC Elite Enforcers are ostensibly used for) are more important than ever – as are counter-proliferation and counterdrug missions, although they are probably a lost cause. Korps (especially the Bolshy Ten) most likely have private special ops units for carrying out direct action and intelligence missions against their rivals.

A similar situation would exist in a generic *Cyberpunk* world, although the emphasis on cyberwear would be even greater at higher TLs. If cyberspace exists, then “netrunner” will probably replace the traditional communications MOS for special ops units, and some missions (like raids on data havens) may even take place entirely in cyberspace.

GURPS Fantasy

The constant warring between Megalos and its neighbors combined with the military threat posed by magic could lead to special ops units being developed on Yrth despite its low TL. Several elite military units are prime candidates, including al-Wazif’s Order of the Pegasus and Megalos’ True Dragon legion. More unusual possibilities would be operatives of Megalos’ Ministry of Serendipity (who carry out intelligence operations and combat search and rescue missions to locate and kidnap off-world visitors) and the Michaelites (who operate all over Yrth in five-man teams that include experts in combat, investigative and magical skills).

The GM may also decide to create entirely new special ops units modeled on modern forces, with magic replacing technology. Such units would include a lot of mages – especially in the communications, intelligence and medical roles. Dwarves would make excellent demolition experts, while elven archers would be ideal weapons men, since “weapons” basically means “bows and arrows” at TL3. Scenarios include counterterrorist missions against the Assassins and special reconnaissance in the Orclands, and possibly “counter-proliferation” operations to keep deadly magic out of enemy hands and “counterdrug” missions against traffickers in baneful elixirs.

Continued on next page . . .

SPECIAL OPS IN OTHER GURPS BACKGROUNDS

(Continued)

GURPS International Super Teams

In many ways, IST is a special ops force. Its UN parent agency, COPFF, has an international political presence, maintains a covert operations wing and provides limited military assistance to UN member nations on request – mainly for peace operations and the occasional counterterrorist or counter-proliferation mission. IST Command uses military grades (ranks), subjects its members to military discipline and maintains a military-style “boot camp” where supers receive intensive training at the hands of USMC drill sergeants. In the field, IST operatives work in 8- to 20-man teams with a CO and staff officers for operational planning. Even without all that, though, most people would consider these units “elite” simply because of the nature of their members.

Outside IST, national super special ops forces, like America’s WWII-era “Strike Force A,” existed until they were banned by the Edicts of 1982. Given the secrecy surrounding special ops forces, it is probable that “super ops” forces exist despite the Edicts. In any case, terrorist and guerrilla groups certainly don’t feel bound by that treaty!

GURPS Time Travel

Time travel provides endless opportunities for special operations. Time machines and parachronic conveyors are the ultimate stealthy infiltration and exfiltration techniques, while a unit operating in *another time* is probably as isolated from friendly forces as a unit can be. A time-travel or crosstime game offers opportunities for many kinds of missions, especially unconventional warfare (train TL0 cavemen to use TL7 rifles against TL6 alternate-Earth Nazis) and coalition support (help troops from across time iron out logistical and organizational problems and oppose a time-traveling menace).

The *Infinite Worlds* setting in *Time Travel* offers additional possibilities. Infinity Unlimited’s Penetration Service conducts special reconnaissance of other timelines, while other I-Cops conduct counter-proliferation missions aimed at keeping parachronic travel a secret. Direct action missions against Centrum may be the ultimate in special operations. The *Eternity’s Rangers* campaign is a special ops campaign, exactly as described in this book – but through time!

Inevitably, some players will be intractable and refuse to submit their characters to reasonable discipline. In non-dangerous situations, such characters can be reassigned, docked pay, demoted or imprisoned. The penalty for such behavior in the face of the enemy is usually death – either ordained by a court-martial, or carried out in the field by the enemy.

Variations on a Theme

Mercs

Most nations discourage former special ops troops from entering mercenary service except under the auspices of their intelligence service (e.g., British “civilian advisors” in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf), but there have always been those who are willing to weather the consequences of official disapproval and sell their skills to the highest bidder. *Special Ops* can be used for mercenary scenarios. “Mercs” do not always have the chance to exercise their skills on a daily basis and may not have access to the latest in tools and materials, but the pay is much better – and a good merc needs to work only when he wants!

Grunts

Another possibility is to adapt *Special Ops* for regular troops in regular units; e.g., infantry “grunts.” The skill levels of such troops will be considerably lower – although officers and NCOs will have higher levels than their troops. The GM should reduce the difficulty level of scenarios to compensate for the lower skill levels of the characters.

The Cinematic Campaign

Special Ops concentrates on realistic campaigns, in part because *GURPS* strives to be realistic. Special ops as described by Hollywood and disposable novels are very unrealistic, however. This is because a lot of special ops work, like any work, is tedious, unpleasant and occasionally downright boring stuff done by ordinary Joes, while Hollywood thrives on excitement and larger-than-life characters.

The players may be happy to sacrifice some of the realism of special ops in favor of having fun. Let them! The point of the game is to have a good time, after all – not to slavishly imitate the exploits of a real-life band of counterinsurgents. In a cinematic campaign . . .

- Officers and orders can be ignored, equipment lost, and discipline forgotten. If the unit succeeds at its mission, all will be forgiven.
- Player characters will have 300+ points to spend (see *Action Heroes*, p. 45) and really will be “supermen.”
- Skill degradation (p. 72) is ignored. Despite being a farmer for 20 years, an ex-commando will recall all his training if he gets mad enough to pick up a gun.
- The *Silly Combat Rules* sidebar on pp. CII76-78 is in effect, allowing Hollywood-style combat to prevail.
- Women can serve in any special ops unit, regardless of real-life regulations.

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GLOSSARY

A-Team: The basic unit of U.S. Special Forces. The 12-man team includes specialists in weapons, demolition, communications, medicine, intelligence and operations. They are expected to organize and train an indigenous force of up to 1,000.

ACP: Automatic Colt Pistol. The designation of a family of cartridges designed by John Browning and first used in the U.S. in Colt automatic pistols. They include the .45 ACP, .380 ACP (9mm Short), .32 ACP (7.65mm Browning) and .25 ACP (6.35mm Browning).

AFSOC: Air Force Special Operations Command. The command authority that controls all USAF units tasked for support of U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps special ops units.

AIT: Advanced Individual Training. The training that gives a soldier the skills he will need for his mission. Length varies with the skills taught.

AM: Amplitude Modulation. Radio with greater range but less clarity than FM. Aircraft usually use AM; so do special ops units who must communicate with a distant station.

APC: Armored Personnel Carrier. A lightly armored, wheeled or tracked vehicle use to transport people, rather than principally as a fighting vehicle.

ARVN: Army of the Republic of Viet Nam. The army of former South Vietnam.

asset: Anything useful to the mission. The term is often used of people with special skills and knowledge.

AUG: Arme Universal Gewehr. A compact assault rifle manufactured by Steyr, first available in the early 1970s. It has been adopted by several armies, including Austria and Australia, and by some U.S. SWAT teams. It is only about 2/3 as long as an M16.

BDU: Battle Dress Uniform. A baggy, camouflage-patterned uniform adopted by the U.S. military in the 1980s.

BMT: Basic Military Training. The introductory training normally given to all new soldiers. It is usually four to ten weeks long.

briefback: Part of the planning and preparation for an operation. Each member of the unit tells his immediate superior (at least) what he thinks his part of the mission is and how he is going to accomplish it. This ensures that everyone understands what everyone else is planning to do under all the circumstances that the team can imagine. This can require a lot of discussion.

Bundesgrenzschutzgruppe-9 (GSG-9): *Bundesgrenzschutz* translates roughly as "Federal Border Police." They have responsibilities

similar to those of the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, plus paramilitary duties. When the West German government organized a hostage-rescue and counterterrorist force, they put it under the authority of the *Bundesgrenzschutz*. They have a reputation for competence, and have been invited to train the units of several other countries.

burst transmission: An electronically compressed radio message sent so fast that opposing forces find it difficult to intercept and thus to locate the transmitter.

CIB: Combat Infantry Badge. This decoration is a representation of a Revolutionary War flintlock, surmounted by a wreath, in silver on a blue field. It is awarded only for service in an infantry unit in combat, and is one of the most respected U.S. insignia. It was first authorized during WWII; additional awards are recognized by stars between the points of the wreath. Awards are limited to one per soldier per war. (See **EIB**.)

CID: Criminal Investigation Division. The U.S. Army's equivalent of detectives on a civilian police force. They work in civilian clothes and are called "Special Agent" rather than by their rank. The name is actually Criminal Investigation Command now, but old soldiers still call it CID.

CIDG: Civilian Irregular Defense Group (pronounced "sij"). Local militia organized to defend villages against the communists in Vietnam. They were trained and sometimes commanded by U.S. Special Forces.

CINCPAC: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. The commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific Theater of Operations. It is one of the most important posts in the U.S. military and is normally held by an admiral.

citation: The formal statement of the action for which an award or decoration is granted.

CJCS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a committee of the professional heads of the U.S. military services: the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations, and (when U.S. Marine Corps operations are involved) the Commandant of the Marine Corps. All are four-star officers. The Chairman is appointed by the President; he can appoint any four-star, but the job usually rotates among the services. The CJCS usually has direct access to the President.


clandestine operations: Activities conducted so secretly that no one except the sponsors, planners and implementers know that they have taken place.

combat rescue: Armed operation to free prisoners of war or hostages.

COMINT: Communications Intelligence. Gained from the intercept of opposing forces or friendly communications signals.

commissioned officer: An officer with a commission issued by the central governing authority of a nation. Includes all officer grades from platoon leader to professional commander of the armed forces. Commissioned officers traditionally held rank directly from the monarch (and still do in the U.K.). They are distinct from warrant officers (see **WO**) and non-commissioned officers (see **NCO**). The U.S. Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have the same officer grades and names. From lowest to highest: 2nd lieutenant, 1st lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel and colonel. Equivalent U.S. Navy grades are ensign, lieutenant (junior grade), lieutenant, lieutenant commander, commander and captain. Other nations have similar systems, though names and grades differ.

counterinsurgency: 1. Political, economic, social, military and paramilitary measures taken by indigenous governments and their allies to forestall or defeat revolutionary war. 2. Similar measures taken by an occupying power to forestall or defeat resistance movements.



covert operations: Activities which conceal the identity of sponsors, planners and implementers, or which facilitate the plausible denial of their involvement.

CQB: Close-Quarters Battle. Refers to both combat at extremely short range and the tactics and techniques used in such situations.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. The professional head of the U.S. Army, a four-star general.

CT: Communist Terrorist. The name used by the British for the enemy in the insurgency in Malaya from 1946 to 1960. It is sometimes loosely applied to any Communist revolutionary group that uses violence.

DCSOPS: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (pronounced "dee cee ess ops" by the polite and "dixops" by others). A chief subordinate of the **CSA**. He is a three- or four-star general, and is in charge of all the plans and training for the Army. His office has a major say in any commitment of special operations forces; in peacetime, his office is the final authority in special ops training.

debriefing: After a mission, while memories are fresh, all participants give an oral statement and are questioned about what happened. This gives the most accurate report. The information is used to evaluate the success or failure of the operation and to plan for subsequent operations.

Delta Force: 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta. The U.S. Army's specialized counterterrorist and hostage-rescue force.

desant: Translates roughly from Russian as "airborne." There are seven *desant* divisions in the Russian army, which have air-transportable APCs and self-propelled anti-tank guns. All *spetsnaz* formations are *desant* qualified.

DEVGROUP: Naval Special Warfare Development Group. The U.S. Navy's specialized counterterrorist force, formerly known as SEAL Team 6. Under the direct control of both **JSOC** and **NAVSPECWAR-COM**.

DF: Direction Finding. Locating the direction a radio signal is coming from. Two DF stations can locate a transmitter by triangulation.

DLI: Defense Language Institute. Teaches foreign languages to military students. It is one of the best language schools in the world.

DOD: Department of Defense. Since 1947, the cabinet department that has controlled all of the armed forces of the U.S. (with the partial exception of the Coast Guard, which is in the Department of Transportation in peacetime). Prior to 1947, two cabinet departments – the War Department for the Army and the Navy Department for the Navy – performed this function (the Coast Guard was in the Treasury Department, where it remained until 1967).

DZ: Drop Zone. An area in which troops, equipment or supplies are planned to be delivered by parachute.

E&E: Evade and Escape. The mission of special operations forces that are discovered in enemy territory.

EIB: Expert Infantry Badge. A **CIB** without the wreath. It is awarded as a qualification badge for passing a series of tests in infantry skills. It gives infantrymen who have not been in combat something to wear.

ELINT: Electronic Intelligence. Gained from the intercept of opposing forces or friendly electronic emissions, such as radar.

EOC: Emergency Operations Center. A command post set up on-site to coordinate and control all the activities at a terrorist or hostage situation.

EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The art of disarming bombs, preferably without dying.

escape and evasion: Liberation of personnel from enemy control; **exfiltration**.

exfiltration: The covert or clandestine movement of individuals or groups from hostile to friendly territory, usually through opposing forces' defense.

extraction: The overt, covert or clandestine movement of individuals, groups or equipment from an operational area by land, sea or air.

FAC: Forward Air Controller. Pilots who fly small planes and direct close air support (CAS) from them. The most accurate and flexible system of controlling the support of ground forces yet developed, but it can be very dangerous to the pilot, especially if enemy air has not been suppressed.

flag officer: The naval equivalent of a **general officer**, called a "flag officer" because his personal flag (with the stars of his grade) is flown when he is aboard ship. There are no one-star admirals; two-star rear admirals are divided into two grades called "lower half" and "upper half." Lower half are equivalent to brigadier generals; upper half are equivalent to major generals. Vice admirals are equivalent to lieutenant generals (three stars). Admirals are equivalent to generals (four stars).

FM: Frequency Modulation. Radio with more clarity but less range than **AM**. Most ground tactical radios are FM.


foreign internal defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in programs undertaken by another government to forestall or defeat insurgency or other lawlessness.

FSB: Federal Security Service. The Russian agency that has taken over the internal counterintelligence duties of the former KGB. It has much the same mission and responsibilities as the American FBI.

general officer: General officers are the senior professional commanders and managers of military forces. The exact titles vary from army to army (e.g., British brigadiers are not generals, but the British have a grade above general called "field marshal"), but most are roughly like those of the United States. The U.S. Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have the same general officer grades and names: brigadier general (one star), major general (two stars), lieutenant general (three stars) and general (four stars). The U.S. Navy has the same grades but different names; see **flag officer**.

GPMG: General Purpose Machine Gun. A machine gun with some of the characteristics of both light and medium machine guns. It can be carried and fired by one man, or it can be mounted on a tripod or vehicle and operated by a crew. Since WWII, GPMGs have been the basis of squad and platoon tactics.

Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN): The *Gendarmerie Nationale* is a French national police force, but it is controlled by the Ministry of Defence rather than the Ministry of the Interior. It is usually employed as a riot-control force. GIGN is a small, elite group that specializes in hostage rescue. They are almost alone among modern hostage rescue forces in favoring revolvers; they use the MR73 revolver for maximum shock effect on the target.



GRU: The former Soviet military intelligence branch, under the ministry of defense. It was sometimes a rival of the **KGB**.

GT: The GT score is a soldier's score on the Army General Classification Test. It is roughly equivalent to IQ.

HAHO: High Altitude High Opening. A parachuting technique that allows the jumper to move a considerable horizontal distance from exit to landing.

HAL: A Light Assault Helicopter squadron of the U.S. Navy.

HALO: High Altitude Low Opening. A parachute technique usually used in inserting agents or special ops teams.

HF: High Frequency radio.

host country: A country within which foreign organizations operate in accordance with and in response to official invitation.

HUMINT: Human Intelligence. Intelligence collected by human assets (spies) rather than technical means.

IDF: Israeli Defense Forces. Include air, sea and ground forces.

in country: In the Vietnam war, this term meant any activity carried out inside South Vietnam. In a larger sense, it means operations inside the foreign country to which troops have been deployed.

infiltration: The covert or clandestine movement of individuals or groups from friendly to hostile territory, usually through opposing forces' defenses.

INLA: Irish National Liberation Army. A violent, left-wing offshoot of the **IRA**.

insertion: The overt, covert or clandestine movement of individuals, groups or equipment into an operational area by land, sea or air.

INTSUM: Intelligence Summary. What the analysts think is important from the **raw data** they receive. Agencies don't like to release raw data because it is likely to compromise sources. Recipients don't like summaries because it is too easy for the analyst to slant the information. There are frequent bureaucratic battles over who gets INTSUM and who gets raw.

IR: Infrared. Part of the spectrum that is not visible to the naked eye, but which can be seen with special equipment.

IRA: Irish Republican Army. A group publicly dedicated to forcing a union between the mostly Protestant Northern Ireland and the mostly Catholic Irish Republic to the south. They have been active in terrorism and guerrilla warfare since the early 20th century. During WWI and WWII, they had German support; since the 1960s, they have been officially Marxist.

JSOC: Joint Special Operations Command. Includes elements of all the services. It is directly under **SOC/DOD**, and allows the fastest possible coordinated response to terrorist (especially hostage) incidents.

KGB: The former Soviet Ministry of State Security, responsible both for foreign intelligence and the internal control of disaffection. It had its own air, armor and special ops units. One of its divisions was stationed in Moscow, both to control and defend the central government. It has since been broken into a variety of smaller agencies.

KSK: Kommando Spezialkräfte. The German military's recently formed equivalent of the British SAS. They are tasked with many of the same missions.

LALO: Low Altitude Low Opening. A parachuting technique that allows the aircraft to fly under most radar as it approaches and leaves the **DZ**.

LOS: Line-of-sight. A straight line from observer to target, not interrupted by terrain features or the horizon.

LRRP: Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol. A patrol so deep in enemy-controlled territory that the patrol is beyond the support of most friendly units. LRRP refers both to the mission and to the units and personnel that accomplish it.

LZ: Landing Zone. An area in which the debarkation of troops and/or unloading of equipment or supplies from fixed or rotary wing aircraft is planned.

MACV-SOG: Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group. A cover organization for a range of special ops, including special reconnaissance and direct action missions, in Vietnam.

MAMO: Medium Altitude Medium Opening. The usual kind of parachute technique for mass jumps; what is taught at the Basic Airborne Course.

MEU: Marine Expeditionary Unit. A USMC infantry battalion, reinforced with tanks, artillery and air assets. It is capable of sustained land operations from its own organic resources.

MOS: Military Occupational Specialty. The particular job of a soldier. In the U.S. Army, it is identified by an alphanumeric code; e.g., 11B is the MOS code for a Light Weapons Infantryman - a basic grunt.

MRE: Meal, Ready to Eat. The army's name for the current version of field ration. Soldiers gripe about them, but they are better than the Vietnam-era C-rations.

MVD: The Russian Ministry of Internal Security. Includes air, naval and armored forces. It is responsible for maintaining order inside Russian borders.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Organized after WWII in response to the

Communist threat in Europe. Includes all Western European countries except France, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden. France withdrew from NATO in the 1960s, but still holds joint training exercises with NATO troops. Sweden and Switzerland have neutral foreign policies and impressive independent defense forces. Finland does nothing to irritate Russia. NATO has been officially trying to standardize military equipment and procedures among its members since its foundation. It has succeeded with map terminology, the caliber of pistols, assault rifles and light and medium machine guns, and the phonetic alphabet. NATO forces belong to their governments unless released to NATO command by those governments.

NAVSPECWARCOM: Naval Special Warfare Command. Responsible for all U.S. Navy special operations.

NAVSPECWARGRU: Naval Special Warfare Group. Controls all Navy special warfare assets for a large geographical area. There are currently two: one for the Atlantic and one for the Pacific.

NCA: National Command Authority. The person or body with the power to order a commitment of any national resource. The NCA can send special ops forces into foreign or domestic action.

NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer. NCOs are the link between enlisted men and officers. They are principally responsible for hands-on training, discipline and management. Called petty officers in the navy.

need-to-know: It is not enough to have a clearance to be granted access to classified material. An individual must have a demonstrated reason, related to his mission, before access can be granted. The various caveats attached to a classification are frequently related to need-to-know.

no-landing extraction: Any aerial extraction technique (like **STARS**) that does not involve the aircraft landing.

NOE: Nap-of-the-earth. Flying at most a few hundred feet off the ground. This enables the aircraft to avoid most radar detection, since it is lost in the ground scatter. It also lets the aircraft hide from visual detection by using terrain features. Flying low and fast is dangerous, but not as dangerous as hostile fire.



NSA: National Security Agency. The largest U.S. intelligence service. It deals with communications intelligence, especially cryptanalysis.

NVA: North Vietnamese Army. As distinct from the Viet Cong and **ARVN**.

OJT: On-the-Job Training. This never ceases in a special ops unit. Formal training courses provide only the basis from which the real skills of a special ops soldier develop.

OMON: The special operations state militia of Russia, directed by the **MVD**. Used primarily to combat violent crime and for riot control.

OPPLAN: A contingency plan for a possible action prepared in the form of an **OPORD**.

OPORD: Operations Order. The formal statement of a military organization's mission and methods for a particular operation.

OPSEC: Operations Security. The measures a force takes to keep an operation from being stopped before it begins. These include keeping the enemy from finding out about the operation, detecting it too early or preventing it from reaching the target.

organic: Organic assets, personnel and equipment are those normally assigned to a particular unit, and under its chain of command and its administrative and logistical system. They are distinct from *attached* and *supporting* assets. For instance, an army rifle company has organic 7.62mm machine guns and 81mm mortars. It might have an attached platoon of tanks and be supported by a battery of 155mm howitzers for an attack. The machine guns and mortars are always with the company; the attached tanks will be there only for the one mission; the supporting howitzers are never with the company, they just fire to help it with the mission.

vert operations: Activities conducted openly, with no attempt at concealing sponsors or participants.

HOTINT: Photographic Intelligence. Intelligence derived from the study of photographs.

IRA: Provisional Irish Republican Army. Also called the Provos. A somewhat more violent off-shoot of the **IRA**.

LO: Palestine Liberation Organization. One of several Arab factions involved in the conflict with Israel over control of former Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1948.

rowords: Procedure Words (always referred to by the abbreviation). Single words intended to convey an unambiguous meaning in military communication. The most common are: Roger (I understand your message), Wilco (I understand your message and will comply with it), Over (I have completed my transmission and you are to reply) and Out (I have completed my transmission and you are not to reply). Professional military radio operators make a fetish of the correct use of prowords; they never say Roger and Wilco or Over and Out.

rigil stick: A short staff, heavily padded at both ends, used in bayonet training. As a weapon, it is used with Staff skill; damage is crush/sw-2 or crush/thr-3 due to the padding and relative shortness.

AF: 1. Red Army Faction. A violent German terrorist group with strong contacts in almost all of the left-wing movements worldwide. It has worked in conjunction with Arab and Japanese groups. 2. Royal Air Force. The air force of the U.K.

w data: The actual information received from an intelligence source before it has been analyzed.

FO: Radio Telephone Operator. The title of anyone whose primary job is to operate a voice radio.

rules of engagement: Authoritative directives which permit armed forces to instigate combat without further orders under specified conditions and which prescribe limitations on the conduct of subsequent operations. The rules of engagement tell troops and commanders under what circumstances they can use what degree of force.

RV: Rendezvous. Any place where the separated parts of a unit come back together. RVs are designated for many situations: separation during a drop, caused by an ambush, caused by being overrun by the enemy, simply caused by getting lost.

S&T: Selection and Training. The process for an elite unit is likely to embrace much more than that of a line unit. Many of the initial training systems used by special ops units are in fact elimination systems designed to weed out candidates who are physically or psychologically unfit for arduous duty.

safe house: 1. Any facility which counterintelligence efforts make reasonably secure for groups or individuals to meet covertly or clandestinely. 2. Similar safe havens operated along an escape and evasion route.

SAS: 22nd Special Air Service Regiment. The British Army's elite special ops unit.

SATCOM: Satellite Communications. For special ops, this usually means the ability to relay signals over extreme distances via satellite. This works well in low-intensity conflict, but the equipment is heavy and times of contact limited. It is debatable whether satellites would stay aloft long in any major conflict.

SBS: Special Boat Service. A component of the Royal Marines that specializes in small-boat raiding and reconnaissance missions.

SDV: Swimmer Delivery Vehicle. A small, free-flooding submarine. "Free-flooding" means it is filled with water as it operates; the crew wear diving gear.

SEALS: Sea, Air, Land Soldiers. The main role of the U.S. Navy SEALs is raiding. Each SEAL Team is assigned to one of two Naval Special Warfare Groups (**NAVSPECWAR-GRU**).

SERE: Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape. The methods and tactics taught to troops, and the equipment employed by them, to keep from being captured or to resist enemy pressure if they are captured.

SFOD-D: See **Delta Force**.

SIGINT: Signals Intelligence. The collection of information by intercepting signals, whether this involves monitoring radios, photographing message forms or waylaying messengers.

SMG: Submachine Gun. A fully automatic weapon that fires pistol ammunition. It is usually significantly bigger than a pistol.

SOC/DOD: Special Operations Command/Department of Defense. The highest-level command exclusively concerned with special ops.

STABO: Stabilized Airborne Operations. A method for extraction of personnel from densely wooded or otherwise landing-unsuitable terrain by helicopter-borne cable.

STARS: Surface To Air Recovery System. A type of **no-landing extraction**.

takedown: The special ops term for putting an opponent or opponents out of action by force. It usually, but not invariably, involves killing at least some of them.

target acquisition: Detection, identification and tracking of a target in sufficient detail to permit focused operations against it.

TDY: Temporary Duty. An assignment under orders away from a soldier's permanent duty station. Frequent TDY, which leaves the family behind, is a leading cause of divorce in special ops units. On the other hand, TDY frequently carries benefits like extra pay and a break in routine, so it is not universally unpopular among troops.

TO&E: Table of Organization and Equipment. Says exactly what personnel and materiel every recognized unit in the army is permitted (and required) to have. Since special ops units are frequently *ad hoc*, they sometimes do not have a recognized TO&E. (They always have at least an informal unit-generated one so that everyone will know the succession of command in case of casualties.) Being a non-TO&E unit can have both advantages and disadvantages. Since you aren't required to have anything, supply channels don't have to give you anything, but you aren't forbidden to have anything either. One of the values of a military Patron of high Rank is that he can create provisional units with strange TO&Es from his resources. For instance, a division commander could organize a Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon and assign it any of the assets under his command. He might later be ordered to disband it, but that would take time.

UDT: Underwater Demolition Teams. Until 1983, the U.S. Navy specialists in planting and removing mines and obstacles in the water - the first to go near shore in an amphibious operation.

USAREUR: United States Army, Europe. The senior U.S. Army headquarters in Europe. The commander of USAREUR is a four-star general; he is also SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the field commander of NATO's armed forces.

USARPAC: United States Army, Pacific. The principal U.S. Army operational command in Asia and Oceania. A four-star general's command.

USSOCOM: United States Special Operations Command. The command authority under which all U.S. special ops forces are gathered.

VINSON: An American scrambling system, used to make it difficult to intercept voice radio transmission.

VTOL: Vertical Take Off and Landing. Describes an aircraft that can take off or land straight up and down without taxiing.

Warsaw Pact: Creates unified commands and doctrine for the armies of the Communist states of Europe. The standardization of equipment and doctrine is much more complete than in **NATO**: all small arms are of the same few calibers and most heavy equipment is of Russian design.

WO: Warrant Officer. Warrant officers occupy the grades between **commissioned officers** and **NCOs**. They are usually specialists in some technical field.

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